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Empirical research suggests that gallery and museum audiences have a 
strong propensity to make sense of artworks by understanding what the artist 
‘means to say’, or what the ‘encoded message’ of a work might be. Conversely, 
many contemporary artists subscribe to the idea that observers may (or even 
should) endow their work with their own meaning. In response to this situation, 
this thesis asks: How can one facilitate a more individual engagement by 
viewers in the meaning making process? 
To approach this task, the concepts of meaning and meaning-making are 
re-assessed and new definitions suggested that endeavour to relate these 
terms to discussions of art appreciation. A great deal of attention has been 
given to processes of meaning-making as a collective, social process. In this 
work the main emphasis will be placed upon the individual viewer’s encounter of 
a work of art. To develop the concept of meaning-making, arguments from post-
structuralist discourses, literature theory, pragmatist aesthetics, and the 
psychology of art apprehension will be considered. The relation between 
meaning, verbalisation, and emotion, as well as between the viewer’s 
constructive activity and the artist’s intentions are discussed. This work also 
considers how the construction of meaning is influenced by contextual elements 
such as biological and social factors, the latter including the influence of the 
gallery environment. Existing theories, viewer testimonials, artists’ statements, 
and both contemporary and art historical examples are examined in order to 
determine various approaches that facilitate meaning-making processes. 
It will be argued that this interdisciplinary approach successfully brings 
together diverse and otherwise divided perspectives on the concept of meaning 
making and the meaning-making process. This research is ultimately aimed at 
developing a better understanding of the artist-audience relationship. It is 
anticipated this will proffer a resource for art educators and for other visual 
artists. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
When you think about art, you have to think about life. 
If art doesn’t sensitize us to something in the world, 
clarify our perceptions, make us aware of the 
decisions we have made, it’s entertainment. 
Linda Weintraub, 19971  
1.1 Motivation 
1.1.1 Personal Motivation 
In January 2003 I built 
a snowman outside the 
University of Applied 
Sciences in Berlin (Fig. 1). 
The snowman was 
warehoused in a freezer 
with a glass door and 
exhibited in the foyer of the 
building for 365 days. 
Solar panels on a roof 
visible from the foyer 
provided the energy 
necessary to power the cooling system 24 hours a day. Occasionally when I 
visited my work, I listened to some of the comments made by passers-by. One 
lady felt reminded of people’s urge to have everything available at any time: 
“like strawberries in December”, she remarked, “we need snowmen in July 
now”.2 Others made comments about alternative energies or global warming, 
and one of the university technicians, having observed the snowman’s gradually 
changing shape, was most interested in the air’s movement and its effects 
inside the chilled container. It may have been its irony, absurdity, or location 
perhaps, but something about this installation inspired very diverse reflections.  
                                            
1 In: Wallach (1997, para.28). 
2 Observed in March 2003. 
 
Fig. 1:  Jörg Jozwiak, Yesterday’s Snow, 2003/2004, 
installation at the University of Applied Sciences, Berlin. 
Photo: Jörg Jozwiak 
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In museums and galleries I have frequently observed how viewers try to 
make sense of artworks by trying to understand what the artist ‘means to say’ or 
what the ‘encoded message’ of a work might be. Conversely, most artists I 
know subscribe to the idea that observers may (or even should) endow artworks 
with new, individual meaning. Also, as I can say from own experience, artists 
are often not clear on what exactly they want to ‘say’, and if they are – why 
would they hide it in a medium that demands so much work from the viewer? 
Thus, the viewer’s struggle to reveal meaning or hidden messages is often at 
odds with the artist’s intentions.   
I cannot say for certain that viewers of the snowman installation were not 
trying to interpret the ideas and intents of its maker; what is important about this 
work is that it raised the following question: 
What, if any, are the means and strategies, both 
artistic and contextual, that can be used to promote 
the viewer’s personal engagement with an artwork, 
rather than leaving her/him to search for hidden 
meaning?  
This question reflects both the motivation and the methodological challenges of 
this research project. For artists it is not uncommon to change sides and 
become their own audience.3 When I take a step back to look at my own work 
during its production, wondering whether to add or remove some detail, I reflect 
on how the work will be received. I consider decisions previously taken in 
comparable situations, my education as an artist, previous feedback from 
others, things I have read or seen. To ask oneself what makes a work of art a 
‘good’ one inevitably means considering how it will be received. It is an illusion 
that an exhibiting artist can create a work without anticipating its reception.4 I 
think it is important to gain a better understanding of the patterns that guide 
such decisions, and as an artist who encourages the viewers’ contribution to his 
works’ meaning, I would like to know more about what inspires and what 
hinders that process. Given my interest in human experience and learning I 
                                            
3 Painter Rebecca Fortnum, for example, said explicitly: “I am the maker but I am also the first 
spectator” (Whiteley 1999, p.88). 
4 In this vein, psychologists Arthur P. Shimamura and Stephen E. Palmer argued that works of 
visual art are “artifacts intentionally designed to direct attention to the features responsible for 
their artistically salient effects. The formal structure of an artwork can thereby be understood as 
the sum total and compositional choices directed towards the production of these effects” 
(Shimamura & Palmer 2012, p.56). 
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wanted to pursue this question further, and thus it has become both the 
practical and theoretical motivation behind my PhD research. 
1.1.2 Academic Motivation    
Marcel Duchamp made the following, often-cited claim: 
The creative act is not performed by the artist alone; 
the spectator brings the work in contact with the 
external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner 
qualification and thus adds his contribution to the 
creative act.  (Duchamp 1957, p.29) 
Many contemporary artists call firmly for such a contribution. When visitors 
enter a Tony Oursler installation today they are often confronted with 
complaining, slurring, or soliloquising figures – characters that the artist projects 
on sculptures and that cast the viewer into the role of an interlocutor or witness 
of their destiny (Figs. 44, 50, 52). These characters are designed to evoke 
inescapable feelings of empathy and other emotional states. The artist 
declared: 
This open conversational structure … has been a 
model for me: a model of the relationship between the 
viewer and the work of art. I have always fantasized 
about a dialogue that invites a creative engagement 
on the part of the viewer. (Oursler & Janus 2000, p.78) 
Similar strategies are also found in more static works, such as those of Ceil 
Floyer. Here the audience faces a ‘suggestion box’ with a ‘Closed’ sign 
attached, or an Apple Mac waste bin icon projected on the gallery wall (Fig. 2), 
which thus becomes an empty screen for the viewer’s projections. Floyer’s 
gallery asserts that her work “forces the viewer to renegotiate his perception of 
the world” and explores “an imaginative construction of meaning” (Lisson 
Gallery 2013, para.1). This question of art’s role as a language involved in the 
generation of meaning has also been at the forefront of Joseph Kosuth’s work. 
In a 2009 piece, neon letters plainly and self-referentially ask the viewer: ‘What 
does this mean?’ (Fig. 3).  
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Fig. 2: Ceal Floyer, Trash, 2005, data 
projector, gallery wall, dimensions variable 
[the ‘suggestions box’ (Untitled, 2008) visible 
in the background)]. 
Exhibition shown: Auto Focus, Museum of Contemporary 
Art North Miami (2010). Courtesy of 303 Gallery, New 
York; Esther Schipper, Berlin; Lisson Gallery, London. 
Photo: Steven Brooke / Museum of Contemporary Art 
North Miami (©)  
 
Fig. 3: Joseph Kosuth, What (does this 
mean?), 2009, yellow neon mounted directly 
to the wall, 180 x 14 cm. 
Exhibition shown: The Armory Show, New York (2012). 
Courtesy of the artist. Photo: Willy Somma (©). Licensed 
by Bildrecht, Vienna, 2013 (©) 
 
 
Whilst these works make it comparatively easy for visitors to keep some 
contemplative distance, Tino Sehgal forces his audience into a position of 
reflection by employing live actors who approach ‘viewers’ with personal or 
philosophical questions. Asked in an interview what the point of this strategy is, 
Sehgal confronted the reporter: “You tell me! ... The artist proposes, the 
reception decides” (Sehgal & Rattansi 2010, 2:09min).  
It is common for these artists – most of whose examples I will come back to 
– to follow Duchamp’s model of placing the burden of meaning-making on the 
viewer. This is now an accepted method in contemporary art practice. However, 
the viability of the concepts of meaning and meaning-making also evokes 
scepticism. Cultural critic Mark Cousins has even claimed that: “The purpose of 
art is to destroy meaning”, seeing the concept closely related to ‘commands’ 
that ask for ‘obedience’ (Cousins 2012, 1:16min). Such critiques often presume 
meaning to be a widely accepted but questionable attribute of things, situations, 
or conditions that has been established by some authority (“the existing order of 
signification”; Cousins 2012, 44:44min). From a post-structuralist perspective, 
meaning is something that is pre-configured by a whole set of socio-political and 
historical frameworks and contexts. In this vein, critics might argue that subjects 
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are only able to make meaning that is conditioned by their being subject to 
certain discourses and power-relations pertaining to cultural norms, social 
status, education, exposure to visual and commercial culture as well as 
language constraints. In the context of art in particular, this conditioning also 
involves the mechanisms of selection, presentation, and modes of discussion 
used by various institutions of art.  
The position advanced in this thesis acknowledges that the production of 
individual meaning has its limitations, and necessarily addresses a postmodern 
critique of meaning. However, the view adopted here endorses a more 
pragmatic approach to the relationships between artist, artwork and art viewer. 
The viewer is regarded not as a ‘victim’ of social determinants, but as an identity 
in flux born out of the confluence of biological and social influences. We know 
that people differ in terms of their values, inclinations, knowledge, etc., thus 
different people endow artworks with different meanings. In pragmatist, as in 
post-structuralist theories of meaning, the concept does not lay claim to 
objective certainties, rather it implies a body of personal, potential, and 
provisional beliefs that permits individuals to better cope with their environment. 
 
Philosopher Arnold Berleant observed that in the recent history of the arts, 
“artists have shaped works in every medium in which the active participation of 
the appreciator in completing the artistic process is essential to the aesthetic 
effect” (Berleant 1991, p.25/26). In subsequent years, ‘participation’ became a 
new buzz word in art discourses alongside curator Nicolas Bourriaud’s concept 
of ‘relational aesthetics’ through which he explores, “the productive existence of 
the viewer of art, the space of participation that art can offer” (Bourriaud & 
Simpson 2001, p.48).5 Philosopher Jacques Rancière, who has made equally 
influential contributions to art theory, has hinted at the special potential of film, 
video and installation art to rework “the frame of our perceptions and the 
dynamism of our affects” as they will potentially open up “new passages for 
political subjectivation” (Rancière 2010a, p.134). Conferences such as the 
annual ‘Making Sense Colloquium’ are held to “provoke and install the aesthetic 
encounter and an art practice as media to help us understand and make sense 
of the world” (Collins & Rush 2011, p.1). 
                                            
5 For example: Lacy (1994), Bourriaud (Bourriaud 2002 [1998]), Kwon (2004), Kester (2004; 
2011a), Bishop (2004; 2006a; 2012), James (2005). 
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The political objective of art has, as these and other observers of 
contemporary practice suggest, shifted towards inspiring the engagement of the 
audience. Thus, in recent years, the Duchampian perspective has become 
more poignant. Adding to the creative act is less defined by ‘deciphering’ than 
by ‘interpreting’ though, whereas interpretation allows, in the vein of Umberto 
Eco’s concept of the Open Work, an artwork to be charged “with all the personal 
reactions that might be compatible with the intentions of the author” (Eco 1989 
[1962], p.104). Although there has been broad agreement between artists and 
art theorists regarding the viewer’s role as a participant in the ‘creative act’, 
there is a body of empirical and theoretical research on audience behaviour to 
suggest that viewers are reluctant to take on the burden of responsibility.6 A 
study involving interpretative approaches of teachers at London’s Tate Modern, 
for example, revealed that:  
The biggest stumbling block in reading artworks was 
having confidence in the concept of multiple 
interpretations. ... [T]he group exhibited an enthusiasm 
to identify a single authoritative voice to deliver what 
was considered the definitive meaning of a work. Most 
often this ‘true’ voice was taken to be the artist’s 
intention. If this strategy failed, another authoritative 
voice was substituted, most commonly that of the art 
historian. (Charman & Ross 2006, p.32) 
As long as this approach to art is passed on to new generations, it is not 
surprising that the majority of viewers, as audience researcher Anne-Marie 
Émond has observed, “concentrate on the accessibility of the work’s symbolic 
message” (Émond 2008, p.55). 
Studies conducted over a wide range of audiences – from novices to 
museum professionals – suggest that it is often the major motivation for visitors 
of art exhibitions to prove to themselves that they are competent to make sense 
                                            
6 See: Burgbacher-Krupka (1979), Housen (1983), Parsons (1987), Csíkszentmihályi and 
Robinson (1990), Wetzl-Fairchild (1991; 1997), Hooper-Greenhill et al. (2001), Leder et al. 
(2004), Charman and Ross (2006), Van Moer (2007; 2010) Rowold (2008), Émond (2002; 
2006a; 2010), Pelowski & Akiba (2011), Kirchberg & Tröndle (2012); for a philosophical 
account, see: Pignocchi (2012); for a philosophical taxonomy, see: Inns (2001); for a 
pedagogical account and critique, see: Becker (1993); for an historical explanation of the 
increasing propensity of critics and art viewers in general to reveal hidden messages, see: 
Elkins (1999). 
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of certain artworks, or to improve their general ability to ‘understand’ art.7 This 
runs counter not only to the idea of the viewer as active meaning-maker, but 
also to the postmodern view that art should promote doubt in meaning 
production (for example Lyotard 1991; Deleuze & Guattari 1994).  
Some have argued that art tends to be ahead of its contemporary audience 
(Gopnik 2012). This assessment becomes obsolete with respect to the agendas 
of participatory art forms, especially when aiming to be “ways of living and 
models of action within the existing real” (Bourriaud 2002 [1998], p.13).8 Viewer 
participation has become a key demand. Artists and curators promote it, while 
art theorists discuss and assess participation’s multifarious facets and ethical 
perspectives as a contemporary art trend. Only museum visitors seem to be 
hesitant to participate.9 Thus, after developing a “model of art perception, 
evaluation and emotion in transformative aesthetic experience”, psychologists 
Matthew Pelowski and Fuminori Akiba proposed that a fruitful question for 
future research may be to determine what environmental and psychological 
combinations facilitate viewers’ moving beyond the common alternative 
between the “assimilation” or “rejection” of artworks (Pelowski & Akiba 2011, 
p.95). A related question for further investigation has been suggested by art 
historian James Elkins as he asked: “[W]hat kinds of pictures are most likely to 
provoke the generative fear or unease that sets our elaborate reactions in 
motion?” (Elkins 1999, p.288). Building on both psychological and art historical 
threads this thesis addresses these questions from an artist’s perspective. 
 
 
                                            
7 For example: Halcour (2002), Leder et al. (2004), Émond (2006b), Silvia (2005a). 
Anthropologist Shirley Heath argued that for some viewers the desire to improve art-related 
competence is linked to an “awareness of their role in the future replication or replaying of the 
current moment, and of the instructional, mentoring, or modelling function they will perform for 
others” (Heath 2006, p.144). For analyses of how classification/interpretation provides self-
rewarding intellectual experiences, see: Gordon & Holyoak (1983), Zeki (1999). 
8 In this vein, artist and philosopher Simon O’Sullivan observed that “art does not so much offer 
up a set of knowledges as set up the conditions, we might say the contours, for future 
knowledges still to come. It is in this sense also that art involves the posing of new questions 
and as such will always make demands on any already existing audience” (O’Sullivan 2006, 
p.56). 
9 For an empirical assessment of discrepancies between artists’ and non-artists’ approaches to 
art, see: Bezruczko & Schroeder (1994). 
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1.2 The Research Question, Aims and Justification  
This study revolves around the following central research question: 
How can contemporary artists influence the conditions 
necessary in order to make it more likely that viewers 
actively participate in the meaning-making of 
artworks?10  
The first aim of this thesis is to investigate, define, and develop the concept of 
meaning-making. In discussions surrounding participatory and relational art 
much attention has been paid to meaning-making as a collaborative practice.11 
Yet any investigation into the meaning of an object or situation must begin with 
the individual perceiving or experiencing it. Related analyses of meaning-
making that takes place in the one-to-one encounter of the viewer with the work 
remain comparatively rare in art theoretical debates. A better understanding of 
meaning-making at this personal level may inform further studies of how 
meaning is constructed in intersubjective relations or in larger groups of people. 
Closing this gap will help to better understand and evaluate not only work that is 
geared towards individual reception, but also art made for a collective 
production of meaning. I propose that an awareness of factors that promote 
such meaning-making can be advantageous not only for theorists but also for 
practitioners. Thus, the second aim of this thesis is to expose strategies that 
artists and art students may explore and apply to their own practice.  
The fact that the discrepancy between the interests of artists and viewers 
has received so little attention in the art world12 is perhaps linked to a 
widespread disdain of empirical research in this area. In 2000, philosopher 
Thomas Leddy observed that: “There are two academic disciplines that study 
aesthetics: one philosophical and the other psychological. The two are only 
vaguely aware of each other” (Leddy 2000, p.118). Reservations still persist but 
some attempts have been made to bring these different approaches closer 
                                            
10 To ask a structurally similar question – “What properties of art works make them likely to 
function as vehicles of aesthetic experience?” – was suggested by psychologists Lloyd E. 
Sandelands and Georgette C. Buckner (1989, p.111). Avoiding the contentious notion of 
‘aesthetic experiences’ I am focusing here on aspects of meaning-making only (see: 1.3.3). 
11 Related discussions concern, for example, how works acquire meaning by being discussed, 
or by the interaction between the artist and viewers (for references, see note 5). An extreme 
version of this view is art historian Grant Kester’s claim that in fact the initiated communication 
alone constitutes the actual work of art (Kester 2004; 2011). 
12 The term ‘art world’ as it is used here implies a group of people including artists, curators, 
critics, academics, and other art theorists, respectively people who professionally produce, 
theorise or exhibit contemporary art (Danto 1964; Becker 1984; Dickie 1997). 
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together.13 The third aim of this thesis is to add to this relatively young debate 
and explore how existing research in various disciplines can help to better 
understand the artist-audience relationship.  
A broad and increasing interest in meaning-making and the artist-audience 
relationship is evidenced in many activities already undertaken in contemporary 
art institutions. It has been acknowledged that although artworks can and do  
appeal to meaning-making, they often embody a “discursive code” that is not 
visible to the viewer, and therefore ...  
... needs to be made apparent in the art museum ... if 
a genuine experience of the art, as distinct from an 
affirmation of what is known already, is to be offered.  
(Deeth 2012, p.11,12; also Van Moer 2010) 
Recent initiatives to 
address this include on-
topic exhibitions,14 new 
curatorial strategies such 
as the juxtaposition of 
contemporary and classical 
art (Fig. 4), or the 
presentation of scientific 
experiments as part of the 
2012 Documenta and non-
art artefacts at the 2013 
Venice Biennial. Other 
curatorial initiatives include 
new formats of guided 
tours, workshops in museums, and participatory online curation.15  
Despite activities in fields that contextualise contemporary art, it might seem 
suspicious if an artist asks what theoretical knowledge artists might employ to 
                                            
13 For integrative approaches, see: Stokes (2009), Schellekens and Goldie (2011), Shimamura 
and Palmer (2012), Roald and Lang (2013), Bullot & Reber (2013). 
14 For example: The 2003 Venice Biennial with its motto ‘Dreams and Conflicts: The Dictatorship 
of the Viewer’, ‘Without You I'm Nothing: Art and Its Audience’ (Chicago Museum of 
Contemporary Art, 2010/11), ‘Uncertain Spectator’ (Experimental Media and Performing Arts 
Centre, New York, 2010/11); ‘The Death of the Audience’ (Secession, Vienna, 2009), ‘The 
World as a Stage’ (Tate Modern, London 2007/08) and ‘One-on-one’ (Kunstwerke, Berlin 2013). 
15 See: Carter-Birken (2008), Becker (1993), McManus (1989), Silverman (1995), Falk and 
Dierking (2000), Leinhardt et al. (2002), Hooper-Greenhill (1999), Ravelli (2006), Hubard 
(2007), Cann (2012), Malm et al. (2013).  
 
Fig. 4: Exhibition view Riotous Baroque: From Cattelan 
to Zurbarán: Tributes to precarious vitality. Kunsthaus 
Zürich, 2012. 
Courtesey of Kunsthaus Zürich. Photo: Bodmer/Mancia, Studio fbm (©) 
  18 
improve the relationship with the audience. This may sound like looking for rules 
or strategies within a traditionally autonomous domain and to question an 
accepted division of responsibility: ‘The artist proposes, the reception decides’ 
... and the institution facilitates. The following sections address these 
uncertainties. 
1.2.1 A Methodology for Artists? 
Artists rarely work in isolation from theory. Those aspects of theory that are 
reflected in art practice are necessarily shaped by several conditions such as 
the historical, cultural and ideological choices of both ‘providers’ of art-related 
knowledge (art schools, tutors, critics, philosophers, audiences) as well as its 
‘users’ (artists). Guidelines reach from clearly defined standards (like the golden 
ratio or the effect of complementary colours) to highly relative norms (such as 
what defines kitsch or the feasibility of engaging previously explored ideas). 
‘Rules’ are rarely precisely formulated. Sociologist Howard Becker argued that 
artists, when ‘editing’ their work, “respond as they imagine others might 
respond, and construct those imaginings from their repeated experiences of 
hearing people apply ... undefinable terms to concrete works in concrete 
situations” (Becker 1984, p.200). Architect and art school tutor Pentti Routio 
elaborated on this issue: 
The reason is that the rule is often quite complicated, 
it can include innumerable exceptions, the artist 
master who knows the rule is unwilling or unable to 
write it down, and a researcher that comes from 
outside does not fully understand the matter. Instead, 
the normative theory for arts operates mostly with 
exemplars, i.e. important earlier works of art, as 
commented from [a] contemporary point of view by 
experts. (Routio 2007, para.21) 
The approach taken by this research is in line with the views of Becker and 
Routio. Examples from historical and contemporary art show how artists always 
take the audience into account. It will be shown that research findings in 
psychology and other scientific fields regarding the ways people respond to 
their environment in general, and to works of art in particular, can be useful for 
gaining a better understanding of how one’s own work is likely to be 
experienced. This does not prescribe that  artists should apply them in their 
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practice. From an educational perspective, it is not suggested that reception-
related knowledge can or should be condensed into a set of rules that amount 
to theoretical blueprints for art school students. Rather such knowledge is to be 
treated as a background against which artists can assess their own work and 
that can also operate tacitly. Theoretical foundations have always been 
indispensible. For instance, Tino Sehgal builds on his studies in economy and 
dance (Higgins 2012, para.10), and Tony Oursler studied theories of multiple 
personality disorder to inform his work (Oursler & Janus 2000). A theory of 
meaning and meaning-making is nothing more, but certainly nothing less either 
than a resource for the inclined practitioner or theorist.  
1.2.2 The Propriety of Psychology in Art Theory 
To develop and substantiate its claims, this thesis draws on findings from 
psychology and empirical audience research. When artists turn to theory, and 
scientific theory in particular, they do not usually focus on research concerned 
with the apprehension of art itself.16 Many of the sources cited in this thesis are 
similarly not originally concerned with art. However, it might seem only natural 
that artists have an interest in theories that illuminate how their work tends to be 
apprehended. Psychologist Vladimir J. Konečni argued in this vein: 
To the extent that the psychology of art … is in part 
concerned with perceptual, cognitive, and emotional 
effects of works of art on appreciators, and that it has 
the requisite methodological and experimental tools, it 
would seem that its practitioners could provide an 
important service to the artists by informing them of 
the extent to which the intended message is ‘getting 
through’ to the audience. (Konečni 1984, p.71)17  
In principal, there is agreement between Konečni’s argument and the objectives 
advanced here. Thus, related research is also drawn on. The final part of the 
quote indicates however, what many artists and philosophically minded art 
theorists will justifiably find problematic. Psychology’s assumptions of what 
artists are interested in or what art is essentially about is often mistaken from 
the start. Here, it is the notion of the ‘intended message’ that is questionable. 
Generally speaking, it is striking how many studies still focus on notions of 
                                            
16 For discussions and overviews, see: Ede (2005), Wilson (2010). 
17 Re-affirmed by Konečni (2012, p.287). 
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‘beauty’ and ‘aesthetic pleasure’ (terms with little currency among contemporary 
artists) and are usually limited to the medium of painting (Hagdtvedt et al. 2008; 
Lindell & Mueller 2011). Such investigations appear out of touch with the 
majority of recent art practice and theory, at least if measured by the kind of art 
that museums of contemporary art or international biennales present today.   
Scepticism is also evident with regard to audience research conducted in 
museums and galleries. These studies are often bound to institutional interests, 
such as “measuring the economic and social impact of the arts” (Reeves 2002). 
A bias of this kind can be problematic if it becomes a value measure that 
decides, for instance, about the allocation of arts funding (Bishop 2006b). 
Another critique launched against the utility of the scientific assessment of 
responses to art is the opinion that art apprehension is too subtle, subjective or 
transcendental for a scientific (reductionist/empirical) assessment.18 Generally 
speaking, scientific research into art apprehension pursues its own, not 
necessarily objectionable but ultimately non-artistic aims. These include, for 
example, insights into ... 
... the functions of aesthetic practices and judgments 
for the development of cognitive and affective 
capabilities as well as for the subjective well-being, 
self-concepts and ‘self-fashioning’ of individuals, for 
social communication, and for economic purposes. 
(Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics 2013, 
para.2)19 
Such objectives have generated a climate of suspicion for artists and art 
theorists towards scientific research into art apprehension. It is important to 
stress, however, that the empirical study of art and art audiences is not identical 
with the study of aesthetic preference, value, taste or the optimal aesthetic 
experience. Psychological theory and audience research are cited here to 
support the claim that there is a discrepancy between the views of artists and 
the actual responses of viewers. This is relevant because it raises a question. 
An investigation of factors that make it more likely for viewers to actively 
participate in the meaning-making of artworks, presupposes knowledge of 
viewers’ interpretative practices. Regardless of the original research motivation, 
                                            
18 See: Munro (1956), Molnar (1974), Carey (2005), Belfiore & Bennett (2008), Gopnik (2012). 
19 Critic Blake Gopnik (2012, p.137) illustrated: “To discover for instance, that a brain injury or 
illness increases certain people’s representational skills tells you very little about their potential 
role in the art of the 21st century” (Gopnik 2012, p.137). 
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findings from empirical studies in this area are thus an important resource; this 
thesis aims to bring together outwardly unconnected theories and show how 
they can complement each other. 
1.3 Research Premises 
1.3.1 The Viewer 
With regard to possible cultural differences concerning the concept of 
meaning-making, this thesis focuses on the production and reception of art 
within western cultures only.20 Within this geographic limit, meaning-making as 
a mode of response is not seen as exclusive to trained viewers such as other 
artists or critics. Whilst it is understood that familiarity with art theory and 
contemporary practice adds additional layers to the viewer’s experience with 
artworks, the main skill required is not specialised knowledge. It is anticipated 
that the viewer will approach the artwork with curiosity and openness to new 
experiences.21 According to philosopher James O. Young, these viewers may 
be described as a “broad educated audience”, that is a group of people who 
“experience an artwork in whatever way makes it possible for them to benefit 
from its aesthetic value”, where “aesthetic value” includes reflection and 
“understanding” (Young 2010, p.30). Expert viewers are not excluded however. 
It is acknowledged that experts form an important part of the art audience, and 
their expertise does not eliminate their need for cues (given by artist or curator) 
in order to make meaning that corresponds with the ideas of the artist. 
The approach taken in this thesis does not assume that any work can or 
should motivate all art viewers. It is understood that every viewer brings with 
her/him individual experiences and interests that are beyond the artist’s 
influence. However, artists have employed many techniques in order to gain 
some influence over subjective factors. Research suggests that there are some 
common fundamental mechanisms at work in the process of experiencing art, 
and that the attitude of viewers does not depend on subjective dispositions 
alone.22 A creative, exploratory attitude can be heightened by objective factors 
                                            
20 Any application or relevance that this thesis may have outside of western culture will thus be 
fortuitous. 
21 For a discussion, see: McCrae & Costa (1997). 
22 For references, see: chapter three, note 43.  
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such as the kind of stimulus presented, the amount and type of additional 
information provided, and the wider exhibition context. This investigation 
focuses on information that, when applied, will facilitate meaning-making in the 
sense that a creative, exploratory attitude in viewers is made more likely.    
1.3.2 The Artwork  
Viewer participation in meaning-making does not carry equal weight across 
all art forms or genres, therefore it is necessary to specify the fields of 
contemporary art most pertinent to this investigation. The main focus lies in 
practices that assume, first and foremost, individual apprehension. The reasons 
for this choice are twofold. First, the modalities of reception of collaborative 
practices, which often take place in social settings outside the museum or 
gallery (Lacy 1994; Kester 2004; 2011), differ significantly from those inside 
these institutions and have, to my knowledge, not been covered by audience 
research. The application of gallery or museum-related studies to other 
environments would not be tenable. Second, notions of collective meaning-
making – as opposed to individual meaning-making – have already been the 
subject of extensive philosophical debate.23 Taken together, they have been 
theorised insufficiently on empirical grounds and abundantly in philosophical 
contexts. This circumstance encourages a focus on individual art apprehension. 
Furthermore, it can be noted with art historian and critic Claire Bishop that 
“individual analysis always takes place against the backdrop of society’s norms 
and pressures” and that a renouncement of the gallery – as a place promoting 
such reflection – would therefore be misconceived (Bishop 2012, p.39). 
Bishop distinguished between “participatory art” suggesting the involvement 
of many people and “interactivity” implying a one-to-one relationship between 
viewer and work (Bishop 2012, p.1). Although such a distinction is useful, the 
term ‘interactivity’ is misleading in that it is most often perceived or assumed to 
refer to physical engagement with digital technology such as Virtual Reality 
installations (Nolan 2009). A more appropriate description of the art with which 
this thesis is concerned is suggested by artist Thomas Hirschhorn whom Bishop 
cited elsewhere: 
                                            
23 Collective meaning-making emphasises learning about the views and values of other people 
through discussions of the work with other members of the audience, participants, or the artist. 
For references, see note 5. 
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I do not want to do an interactive work. I want to do an 
active work. To me, the most important activity that an 
artwork can provoke is the activity of thinking. Andy 
Warhol’s Big Electric Chair (1967) makes me think, 
but it is a painting on a museum wall. An active work 
requires that I first give of myself. (Bishop 2004, p.62) 
This thesis focuses on this type of ‘active’, individually experienced artwork. 
In most disciplines, meaning-making is bound up with notions of reflection. 
This is somewhat contentious when applied to art apprehension since among 
artists, like among viewers, there are differences regarding the weight given to 
intellectual apprehension. This thesis acknowledges that art can be physically, 
emotionally, visually or otherwise sensually experienced without demanding 
reflection, but it agrees that meaning-making (as one important way of 
apprehending art) is indeed closely related to intellectual processing. Therefore, 
the types or genres of contemporary art discussed here are those that demand 
intellectual efforts and this is especially characteristic for practices addressing 
social, environmental, and/or cultural issues. A closely related objective of many 
contemporary artists is to direct viewers’ attention back to themselves (as 
viewers) in order to foster greater self-awareness. Exposing viewers to mirrors, 
cameras or recordings of their own voice or image are some of the methods 
employed to achieve this (Rothbaum et al. 1982); other strategies will be 
discussed in the following chapters. Art theorist Lawrence Rinder and linguist 
George Lakoff suggested the term “consciousness art” as a category for works 
created with the aim of alerting the viewer to the “sensations and mechanisms 
of consciousness itself” allowing them to “experience firsthand conscious 
sensation” (Rinder & Lakoff 1999, p.26).24 Similarly, artist Olafur Eliasson 
declared that in his works ... 
... visitors may experience themselves experiencing 
the artwork. The audience should, in other words, be 
encouraged to see themselves both from a third-
person perspective, that is, from the outside, and from 
a first-person perspective. (Eliasson 2006, p.82) 
For Rinder and Lakoff as well as Eliasson, the “visceral connection of the 
viewer’s experience in the here and now” is most crucial (Rinder & Lakoff 1999, 
p.33). Audience researchers Andrea Weltzl-Fairchild and Andrea Gumpert 
                                            
24 In a related vein, philosopher Alva Noë argued that some art “enables us to catch ourselves 
in the act of perceiving and can allow us thus to catch hold of the fact that experience is not a 
passive interior state, but a mode of active engagement with the world” (Noë 2000, p.128). 
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described a more reflective mode of self-consciousness in art apprehension. 
Following their own empirical investigations they argued that: 
[I]t is quite possible for visitors … to become aware of 
their ideas, preferences and learning. For some 
visitors there is a sense of discovering themselves as 
they speak their thoughts while looking at works of art; 
while for others of a more reflective cast of mind, there 
is a confirmation of who they are and how they 
function. (Weltzl-Fairchild & Gumpert 2006, p.124) 
As a crucial self-reflective element (which I believe is under-represented in 
Rinder and Lakoff’s notion of ‘consciousness art’), I will refer to this type of art 
as art that refers the viewer back to her/himself (as viewer).  
In summary, the types or genres of contemporary art to which this thesis is 
most pertinent will:  
a) assume a ‘one-to-one relationship’ of meaning-making, mostly in the 
context of an art gallery or museum, 
b) address political, social, environmental, or cultural issues, and/or 
c) refer the viewer back to her/himself (as viewer). 
1.3.3 The role of ‘Aesthetics’ 
Many of the positions drawn on in this thesis, both philosophical and 
psychological, identify themselves as belonging to discourses on ‘aesthetics’. 
The common equation of art apprehension with aesthetic apprehension is 
problematic because it treats the concept of aesthetics as capable of being 
charged with ever new content, whilst ignoring its roots in the philosophical 
study of beauty, feeling, and sensation. Philosopher Peter Osborne argued that 
the “inability to grasp contemporary art philosophically in its contemporaneity” is 
partially owed to the “continuing conflation of ‘art’ and ‘aesthetic’” (Osborne 
2013, p.8). Art critic Blake Gopnik agrees:   
If nothing else, the fact that thousands upon 
thousands of art professionals now study and enjoy art 
without ever thinking or talking about ‘aesthetics’ or 
‘beauty’ means the concepts are not necessary, and 
certainly not sufficient, to what constitutes an art 
object or its understanding. (Gopnik 2012, p.134)25 
                                            
25 For related arguments, see: Blinkley (1977), Eldridge (2003, p.60), Tavin (2007), Ziff (2010 
[1984]), Gopnik (2012), Bergeron & McIver Lopes (2012).  
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In order to avoid confusion regarding the definition of aesthetics, this thesis 
is not intended to contribute to discussions of the aesthetic experience, at least 
not in so far as it is understood as a transcendental phenomenon or an attitude 
of ‘disinterest’26. Instead, it relies on the fact that we know that much 
contemporary art is, and is intended to be, reflected on by viewers – be that 
considered aesthetic apprehension or not. If the term aesthetics is used in the 
context of other authors’ writings it should be understood in the very broad 
sense suggested by philosopher George Dickie as “the language and concepts 
which are used to describe and evaluate works of art” (Dickie 1962, p.289).   
1.4 Terms and Definitions 
1.4.1 Meaning-Making (A Preliminary Definition) 
The concept of meaning is understood differently across a wide range of 
disciplines including linguistics, philosophy, semiotics and psychology, and 
there is no agreement among schools and individual thinkers within each 
discipline on how it is to be defined.27 Psychologist Dmitry A. Leontiev 
concluded: “Until now, meaning remains an insightful metaphor rather than a 
scientific concept” (Leontiev 2005, p.1). An investigation into the notion of 
meaning in the context of art apprehension will be specific to the visual arts, 
considering that in other contexts one might wonder what cloud formations 
mean for the weather to come, what is the meaning of ancient hieroglyphs or 
what a sudden rise in blood pressure means for a patient. For the purposes of 
this investigation, a preliminary definition of meaning-making is useful. Art 
theorist and art education scholar Michael J. Parsons summarised the premise 
of theories that focus on “our response to artworks as interpretation, as the 
construction of meanings rather than as the perception of qualities” as follows:28 
                                            
26 The notion of ‘disinterest’ goes back to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and assumes an 
attitude that is free from anything of practical use, moral judgment, economic worth, or other 
idiosyncratic interests. In this view, the ‘beautiful object’ is to be appreciated ‘for its own sake’ 
and devoid of any purpose in mind. For an overview, see: Wenzel (2008, chap.1).  
27 In their seminal ‘The Meaning of Meaning’, linguist Charles K. Ogden and literary critic Ivor A. 
Richards (1960 [1923]) compiled 16 different definitions (see their summary reproduced at the 
onset of this thesis). For a condensed overview of “approaches to the study of meaning”, see: 
Cruse (2010, pp.14–15). 
28 According to Parsons, these theories “treat the interpretation of visual works of art in much 
the same way theorists have treated literary and other kinds of texts, appealing variously to 
hermeneutic, reader-response, reception, and intertextualist theories” (Parsons 2002, p.30).  
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The meaning of the work is seen as constructed by 
the interaction of the viewer with the work. Meaning 
therefore depends in part on the particular viewer 
and/or the culture of the viewer. Hence it is not 
universal, the same for every viewer.  
(Parsons 2002, p.30) 
Although the sharp distinction between interpretation and sensing perceptual 
qualities will be disputed (as has Parsons), this definition best reflects the term 
meaning as it is applied throughout this thesis. The process of constructing, the 
making of meaning, is understood as a mental activity of the individual viewer. 
Musical semiologist Jean-Jacques Nattiez provided a definition: 
An object of any kind takes on meaning for an 
individual apprehending that object, as soon as that 
individual places the object in relation to areas of his 
lived experience – that is, in relation to a collection of 
other objects that belong to his or her experience of 
the world. (Nattiez 1990, p.9) 
Taking into account that merely tracing a work’s symbolic message or the 
artist’s intentions is, arguably, insufficient to establish its meaning, a working 
definition of participatory meaning-making is formulated as follows: 
As opposed to merely reproducing symbolised 
content, the artist’s intentions, formal properties, 
historical contexts, etc., meaning-making entails that 
the artwork extends unique and personal significance 
for the viewer. 
Finally, it is noted that meaning-makers as they are understood here, do not 
produce interpretations that must stand up to critique or add to a ‘pool’ of 
existing interpretations; the value of the ‘meaning made’ lies in its personal 
relevance to the viewer.29 The concept of meaning advanced here also differs 
from those that focus on the “meaning of artistic forms” relative to the ‘uses’ 
“made of these forms by society at large” (Bishop 2012, p.30). 
                                            
29 In that the notion of meaning-making advanced here differs from discussions such as whether 
the smile of the Mona Lisa rotated by 90 degrees reveals a male nude or whether Leon 
Trotsky’s face is incorporated in Vera Mukhina’s 1937 ‘Worker and Collective Farm Woman’ 
(Gamboni 2002, p.17).  
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1.4.2 Intellect and Reflection 
It is acknowledged that thinking about works of art as a subcategory of 
thinking in general is a highly complex process. To posit clearly separate areas, 
such as intellect (or cognition or reflection) versus emotions (or affects or 
feelings), would be a debatable endeavour. Thoughts are accompanied by 
emotions and these can be conscious or unconscious, verbal or nonverbal – all 
terms that would in themselves have to be properly defined. In this thesis, the 
terms intellect and intellectual are chosen for heuristic reasons, in the 
expectation that they will be understood as distinct from all human activity that 
can be described as emotional (see next section). They are used in accordance 
with the definition provided by The Oxford English Dictionary, as: 
That faculty, or sum of faculties, of the mind or soul by 
which a person knows and reasons; power of thought; 
understanding; analytic intelligence ... Intellect 
generally excludes, and is sometimes distinguished 
from, sensation, imagination, and will.30 
Without attempting to broach the complexities of human intellect, the notion 
of reflection as a crucial intellectual activity is assumed. To reflect means to 
draw on and re-combine existing concepts and relations between these 
concepts (Gregory 1970; Snyder & Barlow 1988; Perkins 1994), whereas 
concept is understood here in agreement with education researchers Joseph D. 
Novak and Bob Gowin as a perceived pattern or “regularity in events or objects, 
designated by a label” (Novak & Gowin 1984, p.4). Concepts are clustered 
propositions (what or how an object or event is or acts), exemplars, prototypes 
or definitions (Smith et al. 1981). The complex interrelation between these 
clusters forms a crucial part of a person’s knowledge and belief structure.  
When a viewer reflects, her/his existing structure is modified. The 
underlying process does not in itself take place in conscious verbal language. 
Emotions, images and apprehensions associated with concepts can remain 
                                            
30 “intellect, n.”. The Oxford English Dictionary (2010).  
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entirely inaccessible.31 Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson suggested that a 
range of mental processes operate pre-linguistically when meaning is made 
from texts (spoken and written), images, and films (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). 
Processes like ‘conceptual blending’ and ‘metaphorical projection’ illuminate 
contextual and situational conditions rather than grammatical structures 
(Fauconnier & Turner 2002; Lakoff & Johnson 1980). The relation between 
verbal thinking and meaning-making is instrumental as education theorist David 
Perkins pointed out: “[L]anguage adopts a sort of pointing function, which 
guides our senses to recognize things not apprehended before” and “helps to 
heighten and stabalize perception” (Perkins 1977, p.90; 1994, p.40). Words are 
rather the tip of the iceberg – that which allows us to navigate in the conceptual 
world. Accordingly, reflection may also be understood as that process of 
navigation. 
1.4.3 Emotion  
Emotion is yet another necessary but ambiguous term employed throughout 
the thesis.32 In the present context it is important to regard emotions as distinct 
from intellect although it is understood that this dualism is not undisputed. It will 
be maintained here mainly for heuristic purposes. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines emotion as: 
Originally: an agitation of mind; an excited mental 
state. Subsequently: any strong mental or instinctive 
feeling, as pleasure, grief, hope, fear, etc., deriving 
esp. from one’s circumstances, mood, or relationship 
with others.33 
This definition is in line with the view that emotions comprise essentially an 
affective appraisal of one’s own bodily state and/or one’s environment and a 
                                            
31 Ivor A. Richards observed that: “For handling feeling we have nothing at all comparable” to 
logical language. “We have to rely upon introspection, a few clumsy descriptive names for 
emotions, some scores of aesthetic adjectives and the indirect resources of poetry … For a 
feeling even more than an idea or an image tends to vanish as we turn our introspective 
attention upon it. We have to catch it by the tip of its tail as it decamps. Furthermore, even when 
we are partially successful in catching it, we do not yet know how to analyse it” (Richards 1929, 
p.207). 
32 For overviews of discussions regarding the definition of emotion, see: Roald (2007, 
chap.one), Solomon (2003, 2010), Parkinson (2012). 
33 “emotion, n.”. The Oxford English Dictionary (2011). 
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state of physiological arousal (James 188434, Robinson 2004, Prinz 2005). An 
emotion’s phenomenological valence (positive or negative) represents an 
evaluation of one’s current situation. Emotional evaluation takes place much 
faster than cognitive evaluation (categorisation, reflective judgement, etc.) 
(Robinson 2004, Prinz 2005). Psychologists have argued against this feeling-
based view that emotions are cognitive phenomena in themselves or at least 
inseparably correlated with cognitive appraisals.35 I cannot follow up this 
ramified debate here36 but – whilst using the term emotion in accordance with 
the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition – a close relation between emotion 
and cognition is not disputed. On the one hand, this complies with our common 
experience that feelings trigger reflection; we often try to rationalise or even 
‘explain away’ certain feelings (‘there is no reason to be jealous’; ‘spiders are 
not frightening’). On the other, one’s own reflection and imagination can stir up 
emotions (recalling an accident, picturing future success, etc.). 
In the vein of common experience – the “everyday, commonsense ontology 
of emotion” (Goldie 2002, p.247) – the word emotion is used here first and 
foremost in the phenomenological sense; as something that is experienced 
before, or without ever being specified as pleasure, grief, hope, fear, etc. 
(Goldie 2000, 2002). Although specific emotions can themselves be meaningful 
(from an evolutionary perspective for example, fear is meaningful in that it 
triggers heightened awareness), emotions will be regarded in the context of 
meaning-making as a vehicle for the reflections they trigger. This approach 
follows the view of sociologist Norman K. Denzin, as he argued that “the labels 
applied to emotional experience are always shifting and are subject to new or 
different interpretation”, and that “[t]he meaning of a given emotion lies in the 
interpretation a person brings to it” (Denzin 1994, p.5). 
                                            
34 William James posited that all emotions are rooted in physiological responses to stimuli. A 
closely related theory was developed independently by psychologist Carl Gustav Lange (1885); 
taken together their approach became known as James-Lange theory of emotion; for a review 
and critique, see Cannon (1927). 
35 Psychologists Stanley Schachter and Jerome E. Singer, for example, argued that people 
must search for clues in their environment to know what they are feeling since the symptoms of 
physical arousal are too similar in different emotions to be automatically differentiated 
(Schachter & Singer 1962). For a brief summary of views regarding emotion as cognition, see 
Roald (2007, pp.22–23). 
36 The reader is directed to Lewis et al. (2010). 
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1.5 Methodology 
This research builds on an interdisciplinary theoretical framework, bringing 
together philosophical perspectives with scientific concepts as well as theories 
regarding human response in general, and to art in particular. Findings from 
these fields are compared to historical and contemporary strategies employed 
by artists to engage viewers. These strategies are assessed for their potential to 
shed light on viewers’ active participation in the meaning-making process. It is 
hypothesised that otherwise divided perspectives from psychology (partly 
overlapping with biology and sociology), philosophy and art history, can yield a 
better understanding, definition, and clearer model of meaning-making, which 
can be brought to bear on contemporary art practice. 
The research task is a philosophical one in so far as the definition of 
meaning and meaning-making is an epistemological question. Furthermore, the 
research topic is intertwined with existing philosophical discourses – as in Eco’s 
concept of the Open Work, post-structuralist debates on authorship and 
subjectivity and pragmatist art theories – that must be addressed. Finally, there 
is an apparent logical paradox to be solved: How can it be artists’ justified 
intention not to be asked for their intentions?  
The research question is also intrinsically related to human psychology. It 
builds on assumptions of how people do respond to art. This premise would be 
untenable without empirical support. Furthermore, it is a question of a more 
psychological nature to identify strategies that influence the way viewers 
process artworks. As a consequence, both philosophical and 
psychological/scientific sources will be drawn upon. 
Ideas are tested as they develop on the work of various contemporary 
artists including Tony Oursler, Alfredo Jaar, Tino Sehgal and others. These 
artists are exemplary in that they highlight questions that may have broad 
implications for our understanding of how contemporary art can enhance 
meaning-making.  
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1.5.1 Specific Methods 
The investigative tools employed are mainly conventional methods of 
collecting, selecting, organising and comparing information available from 
various fields of study. Using examples from contemporary art, the similarities 
and differences between agendas, methods, and strategies of artists will be 
identified, assessed, and discussed. Claims made regarding the reception of art 
are aligned and developed in tandem with statements artists themselves have 
made as well as various viewer testimonials. Most of these testimonials were 
retrieved from the Internet and identified by the Google search engine using 
logical connectors. For instance, the concept ‘meaning to’ (somebody) [as 
opposed to ‘meaning of’ (something)] was explored in relation to experiences 
with art using the following algorithm: 
“meaningful to me” OR “means to me” OR “meant to me” AND gallery 
OR exhibition OR museum AND art OR artwork OR painting OR 
installation OR sculpture OR “work of art” 
Each search for a testimonial comprised a compulsory personal pronoun (‘I’, 
‘my’, ‘me’), which limited the results mostly to personal statements made in 
blogs but also to sources like journalistic exhibition reviews and conference 
papers recounting personal experiences.  
Using blog data for research purposes is an accepted method in the social 
sciences (Wakeford & Cohen 2008; Jones & Alony 2008) and yields similar 
benefits here. Testimonials regarding a wide range of questions are retrievable 
and can be treated as emerging ‘naturally’ rather than resulting from the 
interaction with interviewees.37 The disadvantages of this method are that 
researchers will often have little to no reliable data about the person whose 
statement they use (gender, age, occupation, etc.) and are limited to an ill-
defined target group (‘people publishing their opinion on the web’). For the 
purpose of this thesis, these complications do not pose a problem since the 
testimonials are not used to cluster information or to identify potential consent, 
trends, or draw other generalisable conclusions. They demonstrate the 
                                            
37 It is one of the vulnerabilities of data resulting from face-to-face interviews or questionnaires 
that interviewees often present themselves in a favourable light, a process sometimes referred 
to as ‘impression management’ or ‘social desirability bias’ (Tedeschi 1981). 
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possibility of certain kinds of experience with, or evaluation of, works of art, 
which would otherwise remain purely hypothetical. Using such examples is 
common in both philosophical and scientific fields. A single demonstrative 
instance is a necessary condition for a hypothesis’ validity. To seek further 
empirical evidence (for example from audience studies), extends this method 
and fosters the cogency of any newly proposed concept, a principle that does 
not exclude art theory. Nevertheless, anecdotal examples do not function as 
empirical evidence since the validity of the statements must remain 
unconfirmed. These examples thus function as thought experiments that 
examine and illustrate arguments in real-life situations. 
1.5.2 Justification of the Methodology 
It is one thing to argue that art and theory can benefit from empirical and 
scientific sources and another to prepare and filter such information in a thesis. 
The former is a question of opinion (addressed in 1.2.2 and 6.2.1), the latter, 
concerns the thesis’ methodological coherence. One discipline may take for 
granted what another questions, or define a term in an incompatible way. To 
account for this problem, some research premises and key terms have been 
defined in the previous section. 
This thesis emerges as part of a practice-based PhD, which is a 
comparatively new field of study that has no universally accepted standards or 
methods in place. Moreover, many of the references used in this thesis are in 
themselves not easily classified as belonging to one discipline alone. The work 
draws, for example, on Wolfgang Iser’s reception theory in the field of literature, 
which is informed by hermeneutics, phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. 
John Dewey’s ‘Art as experience’ (another recurring reference) is as much 
influenced by bio-psychology as by philosophy and pedagogy. When 
psychologist Bjarne S. Funch presents his ‘existential phenomenological’ 
approach to art appreciation, he argues not unlike a philosopher.38 This thesis 
hopes that drawing on philosophical and scientific theories will reveal where 
                                            
38 Funch mentioned briefly that his argument is based on interviews and introspective studies 
but provides no details regarding these sources (see chapter three). Funch assured, however, 
that he could have provided a separate chapter with empirical data (Funch 2013, personal 
communication). 
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they overlap, mutually enforce each other, and produce a sound argument that 
subscribes exclusively to neither.  
1.6 Chapter Overview 
Following this introduction, chapter two presents an art historical review of 
strategies artists have been using to engage the viewer in the meaning-making 
process. Existing accounts by art historians and art critics are surveyed and in 
some cases elaborated through findings from psychology and Wolfgang Iser’s 
reception theory. Strategies first identified by pre-Modern and Modern artists 
are aligned with contemporary examples. 
Chapter three addresses the definition of meaning and meaning-making, 
and distinguishes the ‘meaning of’ the artwork from the ‘meaning to’ the viewer. 
The relation between art’s meaning and becoming emotionally affected as well 
as being a source of potential personal benefit are discussed. Within this 
discussion the role of verbalisation as the making in meaning-making is given 
special attention, and it is considered whether meaning can remain altogether 
ineffable. A taxonomy is proposed to classify three varieties of meaning-making. 
This includes meaning-making as an effort to retrieve or speculate about 
meaning with a focus on the work’s objective features, and the construction of 
meaning in a separative way, that is focusing instead on an artwork’s subject 
matter. 
The fourth chapter addresses the apparent paradox of the artist having the 
intention not to be asked for intentions. This discussion leads to a distinction 
between semantic and modal intentions. After this, it is considered which 
responsibilities and possibilities artists have to convey the information 
necessary for viewers to make meaning on appropriate terms, and whether 
such appropriate terms can be aligned with the objective of meaning-making as 
an open-ended process. The sphere of the artist’s influence (and its limitations) 
is divided into context-related and work-related strategies. Examples of both are 
discussed; the former focusing on the relation between context and meaning in 
art, and the latter addressing a balance between emotion-fostering and 
reflection-fostering stimuli as a crucial variable to facilitate meaning-making.  
Chapter five discusses artworks by Alfredo Jaar, Tony Oursler, Superflex 
and Tino Sehgal in greater detail to expose their features and strategies to 
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foster the viewer’s participation in meaning-making. These features and 
strategies are illuminated through various concepts from psychology, sociology, 
film theory and other disciplines and it is examined how they appeal to innate 
and culturally determined response mechanisms. Whilst this discussion focuses 
on the potential utility of non-art theories to explore artworks’ response-inviting 
structures, the final part of the chapter looks at the specific theory developed in 
this thesis and how it can be applied to art practice. To that end, an example 
from the practice element of this project is discussed.  
The final chapter summarises research findings and discusses implications 
for the fields of art theory and criticism as well as higher and museum education 
in art. Chapter six proceeds to address limitations and questions that have 
arisen during the research process but could not be answered within its scope. 
This leads to a consideration of possible future directions that researchers might 
take to address those questions.  
 
Note on referencing: To make citations immediately datable, I include the 
original years of publication in cases where they differ from the source cited, 
separately in square brackets. The years provided there refer to the publication 
date in the original language (if other than English), for example: (Eco 1989 
[1962]). Up to three references are reproduced in the text. To ease reading 
longer lists, sources are placed in footnotes. 
2 CHAPTER TWO: 
VIEWER ENGAGEMENT AND MEANING-MAKING:  
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES 
 
The viewer is part of the work. I try to communicate 
with him by stimulating his memory: the viewer has the 
right to interpret the picture as he likes, to make his 
own picture. For me it’s enough simply to give him 
signs, to communicate with him without trying to teach 
or direct him. I want to bring out the viewer’s interior 
and invisible powers. 
Christian Boltanski, 19851 
 
It has been recorded that at the 1763 salon of Paris, Denis Diderot became 
angry over François Boucher’s use of colour. The philosopher complained 
about the painter’s arrogance to depict a mystical light which may be like that of 
‘Thabor and that of paradise’ but that no human could ever have seen and 
appropriately reproduced. Diderot concluded: “When one writes, must one write 
everything? When one paints, must one paint everything? Please let my 
imagination supply something” (Adhemar & Seznec 1975, p.205). Reference to 
the viewer’s participation in the meaning-making of a painting was highly 
unusual at the time.2 For centuries paintings had been expected to convey the 
morals of Christianity and Mythology, to immortalise important personalities or 
record historical events. Rather than being actively involved in meaning-making, 
it was assumed that viewers of artworks would be either educated or pleased. 
This chapter highlights some exceptions, tracing how the viewer’s engagement 
became a viable artistic objective, and eventually a widely pursued creative aim. 
All people cited in this chapter are art historians unless otherwise indicated.  
 
 
                                            
1 Boltanski & Davvetas (1996 [1985], p.517)  
2 Another example would be the priest and essayist Archibald Alison (1812) who emphasised 
the importance of the viewer’s association and imagination in the aesthetic experience, referred 
to by him as ‘attentive contemplation’ (for a discussion, see: Townsend 1988). 
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2.1 Pre-Modern Precedents 
The history of the viewer’s invitation to the meaning-making process has 
been traced as far back as the Renaissance (Shearman 1992; Didi-Huberman 
1995 [1990]) but truly open-ended narratives did not appear before the 17th 
century. Many scholars have hinted at Diego Velazquez’s 1656 ‘Las Meninas’ 
as fostering multiple viewpoints and interpretations.3 Another example is 
Nicholaes Maes’ 1655 ‘The Eavesdropper with a Scolding Woman’ (Fig. 5). 
Wolfgang Kemp observed that what is hidden behind a curtain that covers a 
large part of the picture, and what the maid in the image is hearing, is left 
entirely to the viewer’s imagination (Kemp 1998 [1986], pp.189–194). This 
appeal to the viewer is further enhanced by the maid’s direct gaze. Maes 
provided a variety of cues (the domestic scene, facial expressions, etc.) to limit 
the scope of feasible interpretations but he did not bestow the work with any 




Fig. 5: Nicholaes Maes, The Eavesdropper with 
a Scolding Woman, 1655, oil on panel, 46.3 x 
72.2 cm.  
Private collection. Reproduction: JarektUploadBot / 
Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain (PD-old-100) 
 
Fig. 6: Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, 
Syndics of the Drapers' Guild, 1662, oil on 
canvas, 191.5 cm × 279 cm.  
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. Reproduction: The Yorck 
Project: 10.000 Meisterwerke der Malerei. DVD-ROM, 
2002. Distributed by Directmedia Publishing GmbH 
(GNU-FDL PD-old-100) 
 
The technique of letting characters gaze at the viewer – a strategy used to 
refer the viewer back to her/himself (as viewer) – was frequently applied in 
Dutch genre painting, but not theoretically acknowledged until the 19th century. 
In 1858 Théophile Thoré noted that Rembrandt’s 1662 ‘Syndics of the Drapers 
Guild’ (Fig. 6) “seem to talk to you and provoke you to respond” (Olin 1989, 
                                            
3 See: Alpers (1983; 2005), Foucault (2002 [1966]). 
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p.287). Partly building on Thoré, Alois Riegl critiqued the idea of the artwork as 
a hermetically closed and coherent whole (Riegl 2000 [1902]). Riegl discussed 
how painters like Rembrandt addressed the audience directly by orchestrating 
the gaze and gestures of the depicted characters in order to have viewers 
confront their own consciousness with that of those figures.4 
Riegl’s theoretical observations coincide with the increasing attention the 
beholder as meaning-maker was given by practitioners of his (early Modern) 
time (see 2.2 and 2.3). Riegl identified the same interest, although 
comparatively subtle, in examples from earlier periods. Kemp’s identification of 
Maes’ curtain as ‘blanking out’ information reflects Riegl’s findings; Pierre-Paul 
Proudhon’s 1808 ‘Justice and Divine Vengeance Pursuing Crime’ (Fig. 7) offers 
another example:  
[T]he fact that the culprit has eyes only for his victim, 
thinks only of his escape, and does not see what is 
brewing above him is a functional blank that the 
viewer must fill in. (Kemp 1985, p.108)  
Kemp adopted the term ‘blank’ from the literature theory of Wolfgang Iser to 
denote information suspended or withheld by the artist.5 When blanks were left 
for the audience to complete the narrative in 18th and 19th century paintings, 
they were mostly intended to prompt the viewer to put her/himself in the position 
of depicted characters (like the culprit in Proudhon’s painting) and live through 
the depicted moment. The painting’s moral however, remained usually pre-
structured by the artist.6 A slightly more open narrative can be found, according 
to Stefan Germer, in Pierre-Narcisse Guérin’s 1799 work ‘The Return of Marcus 
Sextus’ (Fig. 8) (Germer 1992). Like Proudhon’s, Guérin’s painting appeals to 
the viewer’s empathy with the hero but the fact that Marcus Sextus is not a 
                                            
4 For more recent discussions of Dutch genre paintings’ appeal to the viewer’s contribution, see: 
Becker (1993), Puttfraken (2000, pp.12–17).  
5 According to Iser’s literature theory, blanks are initiated by authors as they abbreviate certain 
details, interrupt the plot, give the text ‘unexpected directions’, abruptly juxtapose segments or 
suspend the connectability between segments (Iser 1994 [1976]; 1989). Generally speaking, 
blanks designate gaps between textual elements that have to be filled in by the reader’s 
hypothesis. See also Iser’s definition of blanks on pp.50/51) 
6 This observation is still useful to determine limits of meaning-making. A merely ostensible 
openness was attested to many participatory practices since the 1990s (see 2.11). Artist and 
writer Dave Beech, for example, remarked that the participant of art events like those of Rirkrit 
Tiravanija, Jeremy Deller, Santiago Sierra and Johanna Billing, is typically “not cast as an agent 
of critique or subversion but rather as one who is invited to accept the parameters of the art 
project”, rather, the participants “enter into a pre-established social environment” in which the 
artist has already assigned them a specific role (Beech 2008, p.3). For related critiques, see: 
Kester (2004; 2011). 
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mythologically coded but an invented character offers more flexibility to 
complete his story. Germer elaborated: 
[T]he beholder is confronted with the decisive segment 
of an incomplete linear narrative; the moment between 
the return of Marcus Sextus and his reaction to the 
misery that had afflicted his family in his absence. 
(Germer 1992, p.29) 
 
 
Fig. 7: Pierre-Paul Proudhon, Justice and 
Divine Vengeance Pursuing Crime, 1808, oil 
on canvas, 294 x 244 cm.   
Musée de Louvre, Paris.  Reproduction: WikiPaintings / 
Public Domain (PD-old-100) 
 
Fig. 8: Pierre-Narcisse Guérin, The Return of 
Marcus Sextus, 1799, oil on canvas, 243 x 
217 cm. f 
Musée de Louvre, Paris. Reproduction: WikiPaintings / 
Public Domain (PD-old-100) 
 
However, the viewer’s invitation to 
make sense of what preceded the 
hero’s return was not completely 
free but conditioned, Germer 
argued, by the envisioned audience 
at the 1799 Salon: mainly people 
who recalled the French revolution 
as an act of thetic brutality and who 
were expected to interpret the 
picture as a metaphor and critique 
of the recent violence. Such 
reception premises need to be taken into account when interpreting both 
historical and contemporary art. Guérin’s example highlights the importance of 
considering the cultural and political context in which art is presented. This can 
also be seen in the more recent example of Alfredo Jaar’s Billboard ‘A Logo for 
 
Fig. 9: Alfredo Jaar, A Logo for America, 
1987, lightboard (altering graphics); Times 
Square, New York.   
Courtesy of the artist. Photo: alfredojaar.net 
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America’ (1987), which caused no particular public reaction when it was shown 
at New York’s Times Square (Fig. 9) but facilitated significant controversy when 
presented in Miami, given local ethnic tensions and ambiguities arising from the 
Spanish translation of the title. Some residents took the slogan ‘This is not 
America’, which appeared on 16 billboards throughout the city, as sarcastic 
commentary regarding the huge Hispanic population, others as a reflection on 
people living in certain neighbourhoods (Valdés-Dapena 1998).  
2.2 Blanks and Negation 
Towards the end of the 
19th century the use of blanks 
gained new significance: 
“[T]he artist is no longer the 
fabricator of solid data and 
relations; instead he arranges 
spaces and surfaces, which 
are open to projective activity 
of the beholder” (Kemp 1985, 
p.114). Blanks now provide 
the viewer with a new and no 
longer moralising kind of 
guidance. Kemp used Léon Gérôme’s 1868 painting ‘The Execution of Marshal 
Ney’ (Fig. 10) as an example and argued that it prompts the viewer to 
reconstruct the events immediately preceding the depicted moment. Ney’s 
execution is not shown but implied by the evidence remaining; bullet holes in 
the wall, the dead man on the ground, and a group of withdrawing soldiers: 
For what happened [and] is no longer visible but ... 
nonetheless of crucial importance for the action of the 
picture – namely, the firing squad, the shots, the 
execution of state power – all remains situated in the 
area before the picture, in the blank, invisible and yet 
present both in its traces in the picture … and as 
picture. (Kemp 1985, p.112) 
 
Fig. 10: Léon Gérôme, The Execution of Marshal 
Ney, 1868, oil on canvas, 65.2 x 104.2 cm. 
Galleries and Museums Trust, Sheffield. Photo: Bridgeman Artt  
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By not showing the execution itself, the work involves the viewer in the 
evaluation of a contentious historical event:7 
It then could not prevent, and in all likelihood did not 
want to prevent, the object of historical painting from 
surreptitiously changing: in the place of history, 
happening; instead of manifest intelligibility, 
contingency; instead of sense, sensory data; instead 
of comprehension on the part of the beholder, 
suspense. Such were – expressed epigrammatically – 
the new options. (Kemp 1985, p.114) 
The example highlights that these ‘new options’, which gained particular 
importance with the rise of abstraction, also have their place within the narrative 
tradition of painting. ‘Contingency’ of the narrative, coupled with a special 
interest in ‘sensory data’ (such as peculiar lighting or colour) and ‘suspense’ of 
an unequivocal message became signature strategies of 20th century Realists 
like Edward Hopper and Eric Fischl.8 What Vivian Green Fryd says about 
Hopper’s work is equally true with regard to Gérôme’s ‘Execution of Marshal 
Ney’ and, to an extent, Guérin’s ‘Marcus Sextus’: 
[T]he narrative implied through the figures, objects and 
settings is never completed. Consequently, the 
narrative consists of both absence and presence: 
incomplete information is provided by the artist, while 
the viewer, filling in the details, creates his or her own 
narrative. (Green Fryd 2003, p.118) 
Artists can rely on viewers’ urge to do so. Anthropological, sociological and 
neuroscientific research suggests that apparently incongruous situations and 
blanks appeal to the human propensity to reconcile disparities, which we 
achieve by providing missing information in order to ‘cultivate continuity’ (Heath 
2006). 
                                            
7 Wolfgang Kemp summarised the historical facts: Ney “had incurred a grievous guilt when he 
betrayed the cause of the Bourbons in 1815 and went over to Napoleon, taking his troops with 
him. The legal proceedings initiated against him, however, were not only extremely 
questionable from a juridical point of view – in addition, their conclusion was dictated by the 
political motive of finding a scapegoat for the ‘Hundred Days’. Ney’s rehabilitation was not 
accomplished [until] the1860s … Gérôme did not intervene in an undecided rehabilitation suit 
with his choice of a subject, nor did he ingratiate himself with the government of Napoleon ... 
[A]nyone who looked for a pro or a contra in Gérome's treatment of it could discover evidence 
for both positions” (Kemp 1985, p.118/119). 
8 For discussions, see: Linker (1984), Homes (1995). Eric Fischl explained: “I’m not interested in 
narrative in the strict sense, as a kind of linear progression. I try to create a narrative whose 
elements have no secure, ascribed meanings so that an effect of greater pregnancy can be 
generated than in customary straightforward narrative” (Kuspit & Fischl 1987, p.38).  
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A concept closely related to the blank in Iser’s theory is negation.9 Used by 
Iser, the term describes a kind of questioning of social norms that does not 
plainly reject existing conditions, but highlights where conventions and 
descriptions of the world are weak and in need of re-consideration. To perform 
such reconsideration is a challenge that the author issues to the reader without, 
however, pre-determining any solution. An example of this strategy from the 
field of early Modern painting is Edgar Degas’ depictions of laundresses (Figs. 




Fig. 11: Edgar Degas, Women Ironing, 1884, oil on 
canvas, 76 x 81 cm.  
Musée d'Orsay, Paris. Reproduction: The Yorck Project: 10.000 
Meisterwerke der Malerei. DVD-ROM, 2002. Distributed by 




Fig. 12: Edgar Degas, The 
Laundress, 1873, etching and 
aquatint, plate: 11.7 x 15.9 cm; sheet: 
20.3 x 23.8 cm.  
Norton Simon Museum of Art, Pasadena. 
Reproduction: Courtesy of the Norton Simon 
Art Foundation 
 
In late 19th century France, laundresses had a reputation for being sexually 
permissive and generally vulgar.10 Although working at a time when it was not 
unusual for artists to denounce social disparities, Degas did not set out to 
                                            
9 For an in-depth discussion, see: Fluck (2000). There are various theories of negation in 
postmodern critical theory, mostly focussing on the boundaries of discursive expression in 
fiction and prose. Theatre scholar Daniel Fischlin noted that negation theorists typically criticise 
“both the 'noise' of affirmative discourse and of the unrepresentable 'silence' of the negative 
discourse that underlies postmodern notions of textuality” (Fischlin 1994, p.2).  
10 Eunice Lipton explained that this reputation is to an extent owed to the fact that laundresses 
had to work in devastating heat that caused them to “violate middle-class standards of dress 
and ‘lady-like’ conduct”, often picked up and delivered laundry from bachelors, and were 
notorious for drinking, though seeking escape from the daily strain (Lipton 1982, p.282). 
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campaign against this misjudgement. In fact, he picked up on erotic notions11 
but, as Eunice Lipton observed, “graced his images with a dignity that was 
highly unusual given his culture” (Lipton 1982, p.281). Contemporary viewers 
were prompted to re-evaluate their own image of laundresses; Degas aroused 
expectations “by the presence of the familiar” and their concurrent 
“defamiliarization”, to use the words of Iser (Iser 1994 [1976], p.213). The 
women appear tacitly seductive but they are not posing, they are working. 
Degas’ (impressionist) view of their workplace is romanticised but critical at the 
same time. Lipton elaborated: 
Degas captures the ritualistic nature of ironing and 
forces us to see it. He does not, as the Degas 
literature would have us believe, merely wrap the 
women in a hazy glow of palpable light, nor is he 
simply fascinated with motion. Rather his drawing and 
spatial constructions reveal the women’s solitude, their 
withdrawal, their fatigue. And when for a moment we 
are no longer only mesmerized by the magical light 
and brilliant drawing, we may be shocked to find 
ourselves face-to-face with the boredom and 
alienation inherent in such labour. (Lipton 1982, p.282) 
This strategy of ambiguity is akin to Iser’s idea of negation:  
[T]here is no blanket rejection of the encapsulated 
norms, but instead there are carefully directed, partial 
negations which bring to the fore the problematical 
aspects and so point the way to the reassessment of 
the norms. (Iser 1994 [1976], p.213) 
The “differentiation in attitude” that negation aims to facilitate, depends on 
the reader being “blocked off from familiar orientations”, whilst remaining unable 
to “gain access to unaccustomed attitudes” (Iser 1994 [1976], p.213). Evoking 
such a state in viewers became especially salient with the new treatment of the 
nude at the end of the 19th century. In 1863, Édouard Manet famously 
confronted his audience with the nudity of ‘ordinary’ women (‘Olympia’; ‘The 
Luncheon on the Grass’). Up until then, the depiction of nudity had mostly been 
tolerated only under religious or mythological pretexts; with these depictions the 
                                            
11 Lipton observes that the beholder is “startled to notice not only her high colour but her 
unbuttoned bodice. She is working, but she is tacitly seductive too” (Lipton 1982, p.278) (Fig. 
12). 
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viewer had no justifiable reason for looking at (and being seen looking at)12 
naked bodies. His (less likely her) voyeuristic position is further enhanced by 
the fixing gaze of the women aimed directly at the viewer. As will be discussed 
later, this strategy of casting the viewer into the role of a voyeur to refer her/him 
back to her/himself (as viewer), is evidenced also in many more recent 
examples. 
In the vein of Iser’s concept of negation, the examples of Degas and Manet 
illustrate the difference between questioning existing norms and behaviours and 
their outright denunciation. There is a history of artists – examples include John 
Heartfield, Diego Rivera, or Martha Rosler – leaving little doubt about their 
critical agenda and the moral they wish to convey.13 By contrast, Manet’s and 
Degas’ stance is less accusatory, instead they ask viewers to re-evaluate their 
views and come to their own conclusions. Contemporary examples of this 
strategy are Celia Shapiro’s images of recreated death row meals in her ‘Last 
Suppers’ series (2001) (Fig. 13) and Marc Quinn’s marble sculptures of 
amputee models. Viewers’ attentiveness is heightened when expectations 
aroused by ‘the presence of the familiar’ (food on a tray) have been stifled by 
the knowledge of whose food they are looking at. Thus the viewer is ‘blocked 
off’ from the familiar (innocuous) concept of food on a tray by the knowledge of 
who will consume it, yet the explicit context in which it exists and is to be 
consumed remains unfamiliar/inaccessible. The installation of Quinn’s ‘Alison 
Lapper (8 months)’ (2005-2007) (Fig. 14) on London’s Trafalgar Square caused 
a public debate regarding the exploitation of disability for shock value versus the 
making visible of a social taboo (Millett 2008). The work features a portrait of 
                                            
12 Philosopher Alexander Nehamas addressed this aspect in relation to Marcel Duchamp’s 
installation Étant donneés (1966), a three-dimensional interior, comprising a landscape 
arrangement and a twisted naked body of a woman holding a gas lamp. To see this 
arrangement, the viewer is required to step through a doorway and spy through a peephole. 
Nehamas commented: “It is likely that most spectators strain to see a little more of the scene 
than is visually available to them: the management is designed to tantalize them in that 
direction. But this takes time, and inevitably produces embarrassment, which is especially 
profound if others are waiting their turn. The room is darkened, but not dark enough to hide 
one’s face” (Nehamas 1992, p.258). For an extended discussion, see: Fried (1996); for 
psychological evidence that viewing habits in galleries are influenced by other viewers, see: 
Pelowski (2007). 
13 Some critics have taken issue with artistic agendas of outright critique. Jacques Rancière, for 
example, argued that Martha Rosler’s ‘Bringing the War Home’ series (1967–72, 2004, 2008) 
presupposes a viewer who already feels “guilty about viewing the image that is to create the 
feeling of guilt” because s/he knows to rejoice “the prosperity rooted in imperialist exploitation of 
the world” instead of acting against it (Rancière 2009, p.85). This suggests that the viewer 
already agrees with the artist. Rosler’s work in question consists of photographic montages 
merging war imagery with middle and upper class domestic scenes.  
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Lapper, a British resident, born without arms and truncated legs in her eighth 
month of pregnancy. 
 
 
Fig. 13: Celia A. Shapiro, John William Rook - 
09/19/86 (from the Last Supper series), 2001, 
cibachrome print, 51 x 61 cm. f 
Reproduction: Courtesy of the artist (©) 
 
Fig. 14: Marc Quinn, Alison Lapper  
(8 months), 2000, marble, 83.5 × 40 × 65 cm; 
commissioned by: The Fourth Plinth 
Commission, Trafalgar Square, London 
(September 2005 – October 2007).   
Photo: Loz Pycock / Public Domain  (CC BY-SA 2.0) 
 
Blanks and negation are 
often inseparable; in fact, Iser 
sometimes refers to the former 
as a special kind of the latter. A 
contemporary example is 
Santiago Sierra’s various works 
in which people stand with their 
backs to the viewer. Sierra’s 
work revolves around disparities 
of wealth and poverty, and the 
faces the viewer cannot face 
usually belong to socially 
marginalised people such as members of the Huichole tribe in Mexico (Fig. 15) 
and homeless women in London.14 Their hidden faces are blanks to be filled in, 
obliging the viewer to “develop a specific attitude that will enable him to discover 
that which the negation has indicated but not formulated” (Iser 1994 [1976], 
p.213). Sierra himself confirmed that when a person’s face is hidden ...  
                                            
14 For his work “Group of persons facing the wall and person facing into a corner” shown at 
London’s Tate Modern in 2008 Sierra paid homeless women the cost of an overnight stay in a 
hostel to stand in a line facing a gallery wall for one day.  
 
Fig. 15: Santiago Sierra, 89 Huicholes. San 
Andrés Jalisco. Jalisco, Mexico, 2006, 84 black 
and white photographs, 30 x 22.5 cm. 
Exhibition shown: Santiago Sierra, Magasin 3 Konsthall,  
Stockholm  (2009). Photo: Collection Magasin 3 Stockholm 
Konsthall (©) 
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… you have to think why does she not show me the 
face … And in a world full of images, this image, which 
is an anti image in a way, becomes full of meaning, 
because the person has to create what the person 
doesn’t see.  (Sierra 2008, 1:06min) 
This process of imagining is, according to Iser, the only way of making sense of 
the work (“meaning can only be grasped as an image”; Iser 1994 [1976], p.9). 
Although it will be argued that this view is ultimately too reductive, Iser hints at a 
crucial ideational component of meaning-making, which is exemplified by 
Sierra’s thematisation of guilt and shame: the impossibility to capture meaning 
exhaustively by means of verbalisation. As an historic example of the close 
relation between blanks and negation as stimuli of imagination one might think 
of Maes’ ‘Eavesdropper’. The maid invites the viewer to become her accomplice 
despite the negative connotation of secretly listening to other people’s 
conversations (negation of a norm); whatever there is to be heard is blanked out 
by a veil. 
 
2.3 Blanks and Pictorial Abstraction 
With the early 20th century rise of pictorial abstraction, strategies of blanking 
out and negating acquired new dimensions. Arguably, it was Paul Cézanne who 
introduced the concept of the blank to the technical side of artistic creation 
when he left parts of the canvas literally unpainted (Fig. 17).15 Omitting, 
reducing, and distorting details became avant-garde methods.16 Artists including 
Wassily Kandinsky, Henri Matisse and Pablo Picasso, became more interested 
in viewer response as they turned against the one-sidedness of realism, 
traditional morals and Enlightenment thought. The formal blank was carried to 
                                            
15 To Cézanne himself this was probably rather a problem than a method as a 1905 letter to 
Émile Bernard indicates. The painter wrote that “the abstractions … do not allow me to cover my 
canvas entirely nor to pursue the delimitation of the objects where their points of contact are fine 
and delicate; from which it results that my image or picture is incomplete” (Harrison 2006, p.35). 
16 The dissociated and distorted forms that viewers were asked to identify and re-compose 
challenged them to reconsider what art is altogether. With regard to Pablo Picasso’s ‘Still Life 
with Antique Bust’ (1925), Peter Lodermeyer pointed out that the painting’s objects allow for two 
or more, mutually exclusive, interpretations. For instance, the mandolin’s absence of strings can 
be regarded as an abbreviation or as the depiction of a genuinely string-less instrument; the 
limits of the balcony between the bowl and the bust can either be seen as a solid parapet with 
vertical cavities or as a fence with thin struts and wide distances (Lodermeyer 1999, p.112). In 
1935 Picasso said that once a painting is finished, “it changes further, according to the condition 
of him who looks at it. A picture lives its life like a living creature, undergoing the changes that 
daily life imposes upon us. That is natural, since a picture lives only through him who looks at it” 
(Picasso & Zervos 1985 [1935], p.49). For a discussion, see also: Markus (1996). 
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extremes in John Cage’s silent 
performances, such as his 1952 
composition 4’33 in which a piano is 
not being touched by its ‘player’ for 
four minutes and thirty-three 
seconds. Hans Belting described the 
way in which Cage “devised zones of 
silence as zones of freedom where 
the audience was expected to 
become creative in the face of 
nothing” (Belting 2002, p.391).  
The challenge to make meaning 
evolved alongside a growing emphasis on formal abstraction. Degas’ painterly 
distortions still corresponded with his critical stance towards his chosen subject 
matter;17 the 20th century avant-gardes’ criticality lies above all in the self-
referential attitude of the artist who disobeys (aesthetic) rules. If artists negated 
any social norms, they did so at best indirectly, as philosopher Theodor W. 
Adorno says, by pointing “to a practice from which they abstain: the creation of 
a just life” (Adorno 1978, p.317). Because of the types or genres of art with 
which this thesis is concerned, formal blanks and negation focussed on art’s 
own norms need not be discussed in further detail.  
2.4 Excursus:  
Philosophical Acknowledgement in the 20th Century 
In art practice and its assessment by art historians, so in the philosophy of 
art the role of the viewer as meaning-maker has gained increasing recognition 
in the 20th century. In aesthetic theories, from Immanuel Kant to Adorno and 
Clement Greenberg, independence from purpose was regarded as art’s key 
characteristic. A fundamental assumption of these theories is that art has no 
                                            
17 Kathryn Brown observed: “Throughout Degas’s works, unconventional perspectives, 
distortions of scale, the disintegration of form, and the withholding of visual information 
configure the surface of the work as a simultaneous invitation and frustration of the spectator’s 
attempt to comprehend fully the visual content of the work” (Brown 2010, p.180). Lipton gave an 
example of what this means with regard to the laundresses, arguing that the beholder is forced 
to regard them “at a distance across deep and activated spaces as well as from discomforting 
angles … warning us to keep the distance” (Lipton 1982, p.280). 
 
 
Fig. 16: Paul Cézanne, The Garden at Les 
Lauves, 1906, oil on canvas, 65.4 x 80.9 cm. 
The Phillips Collection, Washington, D.C.  
Reproduction:  Scewing / Wikimedia Commons / 
Public Domain (PD-old-100) 
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distinct and determinable function that it is able to fulfil better than anything 
else. The only way to justify art was to situate it beyond purpose and function, 
and define it as having self-sufficient value; meaning was reserved for the 
artwork’s internal coherence.  
Educational theorist and philosopher John Dewey was one of the first to 
question the opposition of self-sufficient or ‘intrinsic’, and ‘instrumental’ value. In 
Dewey’s view art was functional but not in the sense that it should or could be 
used to serve any defined goal or singular end. “The work of esthetic art 
satisfies many ends, none of which is laid out in advance”, Dewey wrote; it 
“serves life rather than prescribing a defined and limited mode of living” (Dewey 
2005 [1934], p.140). How it will ‘serve life’ will be different from viewer to viewer. 
Martin Heidegger (2008 [1936]) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (2013 [1960]; 1986 
[1977]) emphasised that artworks are inevitably approached with individual 
prejudices (or ‘fore-meanings’) which provide points of entry to the work and 
foster a personal understanding or colouring of its truth.18 In the same vein, 
Ernst Gombrich referred to an inevitable ‘beholder share’ (Gombrich 1977 
[1960]).19 Heidegger, Gadamer and Gombrich appreciated that there is no 
innocent look, no contemplation uninfluenced by prior knowledge and previously 
contemplated images. However, they agree that the viewer’s active participation 
consists in a more or less successful re-evocation of the artist’s ideas. To what 
degree this is at all possible is questionable. With reference to their empirical 
studies of audiences, psychologists Hans and Shulamith Kreitler held against 
this view that “not even on the level of the general meaning of the product of art 
is a correspondence to be expected between the artist’s possible intention and 
the spectator’s interpretations” (Kreitler & Kreitler 1972, p.4/5).20  
A crucial step towards the acknowledgement of differences between the 
artist’s and the viewer’s thoughts as a genuine quality of art was made by 
                                            
18 The artist must provide a certain direction for thought, a “challenge which expects to be met” 
but the answer, given by the one who accepts the challenge, “must be his own, and given 
actively” (Gadamer 1986 [1977], p.26). Gadamer argued that “understanding is always more 
than merely re-creating someone else’s meaning” and that this is indeed the productive moment 
of meaning-making: “Questioning opens up possibilities of meaning, and thus what is 
meaningful passes into one’s own thinking on the subject” (Gadamer 2013 [1960], p.383; 
compare: chapter three, note 19). 
19 Gombrich explained: “Without some starting point, some initial schema, we could never get 
hold of the flux of experience. Without categories, we could not sort our impressions. 
Paradoxically, it has turned out that it matters relatively little what these first categories are. We 
can always adjust them according to need” (Gombrich 1977 [1960], p.76).  
20 A closer relation between art-making and art-viewing was posited by psychologist Pablo Tinio 
(2013). 
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Umberto Eco in his 1962 ‘The Open Work’. Eco was suspicious of idealist and 
hermeneutic traditions, which maintain that to understand a work of art means, 
ultimately, to get in touch with (its) immutable truths regardless of the extent to 
which that is possible in practice. Against this background, he argued: 
[T]he form of the work of art gains its aesthetic validity 
precisely in proportion to the number of different 
perspectives from which it can be viewed and 
understood. (Eco 1989 [1962], p.3) 
This idea of openness reflects Eco’s philosophical position; he sees works 
of art as an “epistemological metaphors” for the fragmented world we inhabit: 
The discontinuity of phenomena has called into 
question the possibility of a unified, definitive image of 
our universe; art suggests a way for us to see the 
world in which we live, and, by seeing it, to accept it 
and integrate it into our sensibility. The open work 
assumes the task of giving us an image of 
discontinuity. It does not narrate it; it is it.  
(Eco 1989 [1962], p.90)  
In the field of visual art Eco finds this best represented by informal painting. 
Through a lack of conventional sense and order, these works are analogies of 
feelings of senselessness, disorder and shattered relations that the modern 
world evokes.21 Ultimately, Eco’s position remains ambiguous. On the one hand 
he suggests that the viewer is invited to endow the work with personal meaning, 
constrained by certain defaults set by the artist. On the other he defined 
openness as ultimately rejecting any assignment of meaning.  
2.5 Ready-Mades 
Marcel Duchamp was one of the first artists to acknowledge in writing that 
the viewer makes a ‘contribution to the creative act’. Duchamp also introduced 
the term “personal art coefficient” to describe an artwork’s “arithmetical relation 
between the unexpressed but intended and the unintentionally expressed” 
(Duchamp 1957, p.29). The resulting vagueness of each artwork’s message 
automatically endows the work with scope for the viewer’s interpretation. 
Duchamp’s ready-mades challenge the propensity of viewers to seek meaning 
in the artist’s message as these works instigate doubt as to who their real 
                                            
21 Compare: Robey (1989, p.XIV).  
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author is, and, consequently, what the author’s intentions might be. It is 
common to seek the intention behind ready-mades in the artist’s gesture of, and 
questions raised about, the exhibition of a non-art object in an art context.22 
With his famous urinal ‘Fountain’ (1917) (Fig. 17), Duchamp further complicated 
such evaluations by signing the work with the pseudonym ‘R. Mutt’, and by only 
exhibiting a photograph of the object by Alfred Stieglitz rather than the object 
itself. Thus, besides himself and the object’s actual designer, yet another 




Fig. 17: Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 
1917, porcelain (ready-made) 36 x 48 x 
61 cm / black and white photograph by 
Alfred Stieglitz; original missing.  
Image originally published in: H.R. Roche, B. 
Wood, and M. Duchamp (eds.) (1917). The Blind 
Man. No. 2, p.4. Reproduction: Piero / Wikimedia 
Commons / Public Domain (PD-old-70) 
 
Fig. 18: Peter Friedl, The Zoo Story, 
2007, taxidermied giraffe (ready-made), 
720 × 1200 × 850 cm.   
Exhibition shown/commissioned by: Documenta 
XII (2007), Kassel. Courtesy of the artist and 
Documenta. Photo: Jack Toolin / Public Domain 
(CC BY-NC 2.0) 
 
 
 A contemporary example of the ready-made strategy is Peter Friedl’s ‘The 
Zoo Story’, a stuffed giraffe exhibited at the 2007 Documenta (Fig. 18). The 
animal had died of heart failure in a Palestinian zoo during an Israeli bombing 
raid. Friedl views the work “as a sculpture that can and should help visitors 
                                            
22 For discussions, see: De Duve (1996), Buskirk (2005). 
23 For discussions, see: Camfield (1989; 1991). 
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invent stories to go along with it” (cited by Deutsche Welle Online 2007, para.7). 
Both Duchamp and Friedl played with the notion of authenticity, but whilst 
Duchamp built on a categorical, intellectual confusion, Friedl appealed to 
meaning-making on the basis of emotional response.  
Although expert viewers may be less influenced by emotions in their 
judgement of art than non-expert viewers (Leder et al. 2012), all stories viewers 
are inspired to invent are arguably influenced by an initial appreciation of the 
giraffe as cute, impressive, pitiful, etc.24 In chapter four it will be argued that 
fostering emotional engagement is a crucial strategy for suspending the quest 
for artistic intentions, and promote instead more personal varieties of meaning-
making.  
2.6 Work Titles 
Another facet of Duchamp’s work is his use of apparently unrelated titles, 
such as the urinal entitled ‘Fountain’. Similarly, René Magritte, who also used 
titles hardly descriptive of the depicted content of his works, asks viewers to 
consider carefully what they see and to investigate ...  
... certain characteristics of the objects such as are 
commonly ignored by one’s consciousness but of 
which one sometimes has a presentiment when 
confronted by extraordinary events which one’s 
reason has by no means been able to shed light upon 
yet. (Magritte cited by Paquet 2006, p.23)25 
The title of the work is thus being used as a distinct kind of blank consistent with 
Iser’s definition: 
The blanks break up the connectability of the 
schemata, and thus they marshal selected norms and 
perspective segments into a fragmented, counter-
factual, contrastive or telescoped sequence, nullifying 
any expectation of good continuation. As a result, the 
imagination is automatically mobilized, thus increasing 
the constitutive activity of the reader, who cannot help 
                                            
24 For a general account of how emotions inform judgment and regulate thought, see: Clore and 
Huntsinger (2007); there seems to be a tendency that especially positive emotions encourage 
reflection and foster inspiration (Fredrickson 2001; Fredrickson & Branigan 2005; Thrash & 
Elliot 2003; 2004). 
25 Heath explained that unrelated titles “introduce a discrepancy between what we know through 
our real-world experience and what we are led to perceive as real within his art. Hence we 
juxtapose two seemingly opposed views in order to make meaning of what is before us” (Heath 
2006, p.135).  
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but try and supply the missing links that will bring the 
schemata together in an integrated gestalt.  
(Iser 1994 [1976], p.186) 
Titles are usually welcomed by viewers as instructions, because they are 
understood to be guides towards a field of feasible interpretations.26 Thus, 
apparently unrelated titles can simultaneously increase and decrease the scope 
of openness; they put the viewer on an ‘interpretive track’ but they also call into 
question the feasibility of this track. A related strategy involves the eschewal of 
titles altogether. “Giving works neutral titles or calling them ‘Untitled’”, art critic 
Arthur C. Danto explained, “does not precisely destroy, only distorts the sort of 
connection here … ‘Untitled’ at least implies it is an artwork, which it leaves us 
to find our way about in it” (Danto 1981, p.119). Another related strategy is to 
imply the viewer’s relation to the work through the title, as exemplified by Olafur 
Eliasson’s frequent use of ‘Your’ as in ‘Your windless arrangement’ (1997) and 
‘Your natural denudation inverted’ (1999).27 
2.7 Pop Art and the 1960s  
Using ready-mades and apparently unrelated titles exemplify that amongst 
the decisions that artists take to guide the reception of their work are some that 
deliberately complicate the quest for ‘intended’ meaning and enhance the 
viewer’s own ‘contribution to the creative act’. They are strategies that not only 
accept the ‘personal art coefficient’ as an inevitable or merely ‘interesting’ 
corollary but actively promote it.28 With the rise of Pop Art in the 1950s this 
                                            
26 For general discussions of how titles inspire viewers to construct meaning see: Bann (1985), 
Gombrich (1985), Russell and Milne (1997), Franklin (1988), Franklin et al. (1993), Belke et al 
(2010). 
27 Ina Blom criticised Eliasson for this strategy calling him an “an über-producer controlling not 
only the creation of a set of conditions for viewing or perceiving, but also the particular effects 
those conditions will have on those who happen to be subjected to them. In fact, the range of 
control-factors is rather wide: The titles indicate not only the types of emotion that will be 
evoked, or the type of positioning that will take place, but sometimes even transformations the 
‘you’ is likely to undergo” (Blom 2002, p.20). 
28 Sol LeWitt merely arranged himself with the individual interpretations: “It doesn’t really matter 
if the viewer understands the concepts of the artist by seeing the art. Once out of his hand the 
artist has no control over the way a viewer will perceive the work. Different people will 
understand the same thing in a different way” (LeWitt 1967, p.57). Jasper Johns treated the 
same fact more productively. He explained: “There is a great deal of intention in painting; it’s 
rather unavoidable. But when a work is let out by the arts and said to be complete, the intention 
loosens. Then it’s subject to all kinds of use and misuse and pun. Occasionally someone will 
see the work in a way that even changes its significance for the person who made it; the work is 
no longer ‘intention,’ but the thing being seen and someone responding to it” (Johns in Johns & 
Swenson 1964, p.43). This claim goes beyond the notion that viewers inevitably interpret works 
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momentum was systematically expanded. Artists sought to erase traces of 
individual handwriting, copying visual styles, images, and reproduction 
techniques used in the advertising and entertainment industries. Minimalism’s 
denial of any symbolic interpretation took this strategy further, with artists using 
industrial materials and commissioning other people to produce their work.  
 
 
Fig. 19: Tom Wesselmann, Great American Nude 
No. 99, 1968, oil on canvas, 206 x 152 cm.  
Morton G. Neumann Collection, Chicago. Licensed by Bildrecht, 




Fig. 20: Jasper Johns, Target with 
four faces, 1955, encaustic on 
newspaper and cloth over canvas 
surmounted by four tinted-plaster 
faces in wood box with hinged front, 
85.3 x 66 x 7.6 cm. 
Museum of Modern Art, New York. Licensed 
by Bildrecht, Vienna, 2013 (©) 
 
Tom Wesselmann’s ‘Great American Nudes’ (Fig. 19), for instance, may 
equally be considered a (proto-feminist) critique of the equation of lust and 
commodity in advertising or a cheerful embrace of the availability of female 
nudity in popular culture (Wesselmann et al. 2003; McCarthy 1990). Another 
Pop Art innovation is Jasper Johns’ (and later Robert Rauschenberg’s)29 appeal 
to physical engagement as a new strategy to refer the viewer back to 
her/himself (as viewer). Johns’ 1955 painting ‘Tango’ features a small key 
protruding from the work that could be turned by the viewer to trigger sounds 
                                                                                                                                
of art according to personal dispositions, identified by Eco as ‘openness of the first degree’, and 
supports what he called ‘openness of the second degree’: The explicit aim of much modern art 
to foster a wide range of interpretive possibilities (Eco 1989 [1962], p.76).  
29 Rauschenberg’s 1961 combine painting ‘Black Market’ allows the viewer to leave messages 
on integrated clipboards and to exchange small items in the work. For a discussion of similar 
strategies also used by Ed Rusha, see: Allan (2010). 
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from a manipulated music box. Similarly, ‘Target with four faces’ (1955) (Fig. 
20) comprises flexible objects for the viewer to touch and use. For this work, 
Johns placed four plaster facial moulds inside boxes with movable lids above a 
painted target. In his monograph on Johns, Max Kozloff argued that the 
intention of these works was to “provoke the spectator about the spectator’s 
provocation”, and that the content is not “the thing seen” but “seeing it” (Kozloff 
1969, p.9). This notion of provocation 
is taken to extremes by some artists’ 
use of mirrors. In Michelangelo 
Pistoletto’s ‘Vietnam’ (1962-65) (Fig. 
21), for example, viewers find 
themselves participating in a political 
demonstration. What is at issue here is 
explicitly not what the work represents 
but what the viewer her/himself 
represents.30 
Referring the viewer back to 
her/himself (as viewer) was an 
important objective for many artists in 
the 1960s. Op Art invites the 
interrogation of discrepancies between 
illusion and reality, between 
comprehension and perception. 
Minimalism focuses on viewers’ 
personal experience of the work as 
heightening awareness of the relation between themselves and the exhibition 
context. However, the artistic interest revolves around the individual’s 
experience of the autonomous object, respectively, as artist Robert Morris said, 
“aesthetic terms … that find their specific definition in the particular space and 
light and physical viewpoint of the spectator” (Morris 1995 [1966], p.234). 
Minimalist painter Darby Bannard established that Pop, Op and Minimalist 
artists all believed that meaning “exists outside of the work itself” and stressed 
                                            
30 Compare: Ad Reinhardt’s cartoon ‘What Do You Represent?’ (chapter three, Fig. 34). 
Pistoletto played with notions of representation and described one of his interests in the use of 
mirrors as “the inclusion in the work of the viewer and his/her surroundings (which make ‘the 
self-portrait of the world’)” (Pistoletto 1964, para.2).  
 
Fig. 21: Michelangelo Pistoletto, Vietnam, 
1965, graphite and oil on cut transparent 
paper mounted on polished stainless steel, 
2201 × 120 x 2 cm. 
The Menil Collection, Houston. Courtesy of 
Fondazione Pistoletto ONLUS (©) and the Menil 
Collection (©) Photo: ONLUS. Image may not be 
reproduced without permission from both institutions. 
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the works’ capacity to trigger “thought and emotion pre-existing in the viewer 
and conditioned by the viewer's knowledge” (Bannard 1966, p.35). However, 
the knowledge envisioned here is not knowledge in general but rather 
knowledge ... 
… of the style in its several forms, as opposed to the 
more traditional concept of a work of art as a source of 
beauty, noble thought, or whatever. … [T]hese styles 
have been nourished by the ubiquitous question: ‘but 
what does it mean?’ These styles are made to be 
talked about. (Bannard 1966, p.35) 
Bannard’s statement emphasises that the Modernist trend to focus the viewer’s 
attention on art’s own foundations was expanded in the 1960s. Pop, Op and 
Minimal art (and much Concept Art) all introduced strategies to foster active 
participation – strategies that were later taken up by other artists to facilitate 
meaning-making. However, it was not the primary objective of most of these 
artists to make viewers reflect on political, social, and/or cultural issues, or their 
own position in the world.31  
2.8 Physical Participation 
It is questionable that ready-mades, the use of apparently unrelated titles, 
and the introduction of non-art imagery, materials, and production techniques 
do not foster asking why the artist has chosen these means. Arguably, exploring 
the boundaries between art and life meant for most artists of the 20th century 
avant-gardes to fathom how much life can be absorbed by art but always 
without risking the latter’s integrity. By contrast, Allan Kaprow was fully aware 
that his work may not even be recognised as art:  
I am not so sure whether what we do now is art or 
something not quite art. If I call it art, it is because I 
wish to avoid the endless arguments some other 
name would bring forth. (Kaprow 1961, p.59) 
                                            
31 When there were exceptions, such as James Rosenquist’s or Martha Rosler’s responses to 
the Vietnam war, the messages were hardly ambiguous and offered little room for personal 
negotiation; compare: Pohl (2008, pp.438–447, 456–460). 
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In a sense reversing the 
idea of the ready-made, 
Kaprow’s happenings do 
not bring non-art into the 
gallery but instead 
evacuate artistic concepts 
from it. For example, he 
took friends and students 
to specific sites where they 
performed a small action 
(Fig. 22). Kaprow was not 
interested in the role of the 
artist and the institution as 
meaning-giving authorities and he outrightly rejected the art world’s whole 
occupation with itself. Kaprow demanded instead a ‘lifelike art’: 
[T]he problem with artlike art, or even doses of artlike 
art that still linger in lifelike art, is that it 
overemphasizes the discourse within art, that is, art’s 
own present discourse as well as its historical one ... 
lifelike art makers’ principal dialogue is not with art but 
everything else … (Kaprow & Morgan 1991, p.56) 
Brazilian artist Hélio Oiticica held a similar view as he argued in 1966 that the 
issue of knowing whether art is “this” or “that” or whether it ceases to be, should 
not even be raised. Instead, Oiticica, best known for his brightly coloured 
‘Parangolés’ – capes and banners meant to be worn by the audience while 
dancing32 – demands an ... 
… Anti-art, in which the artist understands his/her 
position not any longer as a creator for contemplation, 
but as an instigator of creation – ‘creation’ as such: 
this process completes itself through the dynamic 
participation of the ‘spectator,’ now considered as 
‘participator.’ Anti-art answers the collective need for 
creative activity which is latent and can be activated in 
a certain way by the artist. (Oiticica 2000, p.8/9 [1966]) 
                                            
32 These garments were made from cheap material and inspired by Oiticica’s contacts with the 
samba school of Rio de Janeiro’s largest favela. For a discussion, see: Dezeuze (2004).  
 
Fig. 22: Allan Kaprow, Household: Women Licking Jam 
off of a Car, 1964, activity. 
Photo: Sol Goldberg, Allan Kaprow Papers. Licensed by Sol Goldberg 
Estate and Research Library and The Getty Research Institute, Los 
Angeles (980063) (©) 
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Fellow artist Lygia Clark’s ‘Máscaras Sensoriais’ (1967) provide a graphic 
example. In this series of works, the audience is asked to wear hoods with 
objects or materials built in to cover their eyes and ears, and sometimes hold 
smelling substances under the nose. In one piece, a glass frame held mirrors 
instead of lenses, making the viewer look at images of her/his own eyes (Fig. 
23).  
For Kaprow the 
happening was, as Fluxus 
artist Dick Higgins 
formulated, “[a] game, an 
adventure, a number of 
activities engaged in by 
participants for the sake of 
playing” (Higgins 1976, 
p.268). Oiticica and Clark 
were interested in creating 
bodily experiences with the 
political agenda of freeing 
people’s oppressed 
creativity.33 Although neither of them envisioned the viewer primarily as 
meaning-maker, both contributed significantly to this idea. Kaprow’s 
ambivalence towards the identity of his work ‘as art’ expands the discussion of 
meaning-making’s context-sensitivity. Oiticica and Clark asked for a creative 
appropriation of the artist’s material in the most outright, physical way, 
anticipating the relational practices of the 1990s and demonstrating that this 
was not only a legitimate creative objective, but in fact a political act.34 Oiticica 
pointed out that the “social manifestation” of this art is also realised “in a more 
complex way through discourse” (Oiticica 2000 [1966], p.9) and Clark explained 
that the participant is “to invest his or her gesture with meaning” and this act is 
“nourished by thought” (Clark & Bois 1994, p.101). Art theorist Anna Dezeuze 
                                            
33 Oiticica called theirs “a totally anarchic position” (Oiticica 2000 [1966], p.9). 
34 This is to be seen against the backdrop of Brazil’s dictatorship at their time. Both Oiticica and 
Clark considered artists as ‘proposers’ whose work was meant to bring “the participant’s 
freedom of action to light” (Clark & Bois 1994, p.101). Clark further explained: “It’s crucial that 
the work not count in and of itself and instead be a simple springboard for the freedom of the 
author-spectator. The latter will become aware by means of the proposal offered by the artist” 
(Clark & Bois 1994, p.101).  
 
Fig. 23: Lygia Clark, Máscaras Sensoriais, 1967, mixed 
media, dimensions variable. 
Exhibition shown: Lygia Clark: Uma Retrospectiva, Itaú Cultural, São 
Paulo (2012). Photo: Laborativo (laborativo.blogspot.com) (©).  
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confirmed this after having worn a Parangolé herself in public bearing phrases 
like ‘Sex and violence, this is what I like’ or ‘I am hungry’: “[They] ask me, the 
wearer, to reflect on who decides what I am – who actually ‘possesses’ or owns 
me” (Dezeuze 2004, p.67).  
 
 
Fig. 24: VALIE EXPORT, TAPP und TASTKINO 
(Tap and Touch Cinema), 1968; expanded 
cinema. 
Courtesy of the artist and the photographer. Photo: Werner 
Schulz (©). Archiv VALIE EXPORT, Vienna (©). Licensed 
by Bildrecht, Vienna, 2013 (©) 
 
Fig. 25: Bruce Nauman, Get Out of My 
Mind, Get Out of This Room, 1968, wooden 
walls, speaker, light bulb, 402 x 304 x 304 
cm (dimensions variable). 
Exhibition shown: Slightly Unbalanced, Rodman Hall 
Arts Centre, St Catharines, Canada (2009). Photo: 
Derek Knight (©). Licensed by Bildrecht, Vienna, 2014 (©) 
 
Kaprow, Oiticica and Clark established physical engagement as a form of 
active participation that went beyond the scope allowed by Johns and 
Rauschenberg. Also, they tested new modes of reception and participation by 
working outside the context of the gallery. These strategies can help divert the 
viewer’s attention from seeking meaning in coded messages and guide them 
towards a more personal engagement. Both strategies are combined in Valie 
Export’s 1968 ‘Tap and Touch Cinema’ (Fig. 24). In this performance and film 
project the artist allowed people in the street to touch her breasts through a 
curtained box fixed upon her chest. In this situation, participants confronted how 
they would be seen by passers-by, by the intently watching artist, and by 
viewers of the film recording their action. Bruce Nauman pursued a similar 
strategy with his installation ‘Get Out of My Mind, Get Out of This Room’ (1968) 
(Fig. 25) but in this case the gallery context facilitates the effect. Visitors enter a 
tiny, dimly lit room in which they hear the words of the work’s title repeated by a 
stertorous, disembodied voice. Export and Nauman both appeal to an 
antagonism between emotional experience and intellectual awareness. The 
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former creates a tension between curiosity paired with sensual pleasure and 
reflection on (being watched) performing a socially questionable act. Nauman’s 
work reverses the strategy, whereas reflection should be comforting and the 
spontaneous response uneasy: the discomfort caused by the awe-inspiring 
voice and claustrophobic environment should be (but perhaps is not quite) 
neutralised by the knowledge of being in an art gallery where one encounters 
an orchestrated mise-en-scène.  
2.9 Using Text 
Nauman’s application of words reaches from the acoustic irradiation of ‘Get 
Out of My Mind, Get Out of This Room’ to various works with neon tubes 
spelling out words and phrases (see also Kosuth’s ‘What (does this mean?)’, 
Fig. 3). Artist Ian Burn argued with regard to the use of text: “Language 
suggests through the idea 
and viewer, a kind of dialogue 
or ‘conversation’” and that 
“participating in a dialogue 
gives the viewer a new 
significance: rather than 
listening, he becomes 
involved in reproducing and 
inventing part of that 
dialogue” (Burn 2000, p.111 
[1969]). In this vein, Dan 
Graham’s ‘March 31st 1966’ 
(1966) (Fig. 26) challenges 
the viewer to contemplate 
extreme distances, from the 
edge of the universe to the distance between cornea and retina wall. Other than 
facilitating meaning-making through a discrepancy between an emotional and 
an intellectual response (see 4.4 and chapter five), the reduction of the artwork 
to a written text appeals directly to the viewer’s intellectual processing.  
Since the 1970s, artists including Alfredo Jaar, Barbara Kruger and Jenny 
Holzer brought the notion of dialogue to public space using hoarding posters, 
 
Fig. 26: Dan Graham, March 31st 1966, 1966, 
typewriter on paper, 7.9 × 22.9 cm. 
Private collection. Courtesy of the artist. Photo: Collection Michael 
Lowe and Kimberly Klosterman, Cincinnati (©) 
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text projections and other public displays. Another example is Rosemarie 
Trockel’s 1993 installation of a large inscription behind the altar of Cologne’s St. 
Peter church saying ‘Ich habe Angst’ (‘I am scared’) (Fig. 27). The text 
comments on, and interacts with, the environment it is fit into, aiming to 
stimulate reflections on our social 
conditioning.  
Trockel leaves open who states 
‘I am scared’ (literally: ‘I have fear’) 
at the place which is usually 
reserved for a crucifix, and in a 
building people visit for spiritual 
consolation: Christ, ‘the church’, an 
invisible preacher, the artist, or any 
of them on behalf of the 
viewer/reader? What is the cause of 
this fear? Do the words replace the 
Word, which is usually enunciated 
from here? And how is one to 
respond? Questions like these are 
left to be reflected on by the 
reader/viewer.35  
As in these examples, a text can constitute an entire work, or it can 
accompany it and provide necessary background information. Yet another way 
for text to function is as one of several elements in a larger arrangement. Victor 
Burgin uses this strategy extensively to challenge viewers to contemplate 
possible connections between picture and text. His 1978 ‘Zoo 78’ (Fig. 28), 
juxtaposes the image of a girl in a peep show, a photo of a sentimental painting 
of the Brandenburg gate (at the time of the work’s production hermetically 
cordoned off by the Berlin wall) hung up in front of floral wall paper, and an 
excerpt of Michel Foucault’s critique of institutional control, originally published 
in his book ‘Discipline and Punish’. Various notions of observation, 
representation and memory are potentially common denominators, and how or 
whether the images illustrate the text and vice versa is a question presented for 
reflection. Burgin provides a direction of thought but leaves the conclusions, as 
                                            
35 For discussions of this work, see: Pocock (1993), Zink (2003, p.132/133). 
 
Fig. 27: Rosemarie Trockel, Ich habe Angst, 
1993, installation at St. Peter’s church, 
Cologne. 
Courtesy of the artist; Gallery Sprüth Magers, Berlin, 
London (©). Licensed by Bildrecht, Vienna, 2013 (©) 
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he has repeatedly emphasised, to the viewer. “[M]y work”, Burgin asserted, 




Fig. 28 a-c: Victor Burgin, Zoo 78, 1978/79, one of eight black and white photographic diptychs, 
each photograph: 50 x 75cm. 
Text on right margin of Fig. 28a: “The plan is circular: At the periphery, an annular building; at the centre a tower, 
pierced with many windows. The building consists of cells; each has two windows: one in the outer wall of the cell allows 
daylight to pass into it; another in the inner wall looks onto the tower, or rather is looked upon by the tower, for the 
windows of the tower are dark, and the occupants of the cell cannot know who watches, or if anyone watches.” 
Photos: Victor Burgin: Una Exposición Retrospectiva (catalogue of the exhibition at Funcadio Antoni Tapies, April 6th -
June 17th, 2001). 28a and 28b: p.117; 28c (exhibition view Palais des Beaux-Arts, Brussels, 1979): p.114 
2.10  Postmodern Meaning-Making 
In 1978, Keith Haring noted in his journal: 
The meaning of art as it is experienced by the viewer, 
not the artist. The artist’s ideas are not essential to the 
art as seen by the viewer. The viewer is an artist in the 
sense that he conceives a given piece of his own way 
that is unique to him. His own imagination determines 
what it is, what it means. (Haring 2010, p.17) 
Postmodern thought embraces the idea that meaning is always shifting because 
a person’s ideas are conditioned by her/his lifetime experience of representation 
and embeddedness in certain cultures, ideologies and interpretive communities. 
In this view it would be naive to imagine that the artist invents new forms or is 
able to control a work’s meaning. Postmodern ideas of infinite recombination 
and citation were embraced by artists in the early 1980’s and used in work that 
recycled images and materials from seemingly incompatible systems of 
representation. Cases in point are Julian Schnabel’s panel paintings on which 
he combines images, quotes, photographs and religious icons on surfaces 
patched together from diverse materials including animal skin, rugs, posters, 
driftwood and broken crockery (Fig. 29). Christopher Reed described these 
works as ...  
  61 
… conventional forms of authoritative ideology 
(religion, art history, medicine), yet their ultimate effect 
denies the viewer any certainty about their meaning… 
Schnabel’s works seem desperate to communicate 
something, but that something is never clear; their 
mismatched signifiers force the viewer to confront the 
process of meaning-making itself. (Reed 1994, p.273) 
Artists as diverse as Burgin and Schnabel challenge viewers to evaluate 
how representation functions and how they, under the influence of a media-
dominated society, construct meaning. In this vein, Rosalyn Deutsche argued 
that the image itself is now treated “as a social relationship and the viewer as a 
subject constructed by the very object from which it formerly claimed 
detachment”, respectively that it becomes important to turn viewers’ “attention 
away from the image and back on themselves – or, more precisely, on their 
relationship with the image” (Deutsche 1998, p.296). Using Cindy Sherman’s 
staged film stills (Fig. 30)36 as an example, Deutsche explained: 
Sherman explored these characters not as 
reproductions of real identities but as effects produced 
by such visual signifiers as framing, lighting, distance, 
focus, and camera angle. In this way she drew 
attention to the material process of identity formation 
that takes place in culturally coded but seemingly 
natural images of women. Sherman’s photographs 
both elicit and frustrate the viewer’s search for an 
inner, hidden truth of a character to which the viewer 
might penetrate, an essential identity around which the 
meaning of the image might reach closure.  
(Deutsche 1998, p.298/299) 
Focusing the viewer’s attention on meaning-making itself – in this case 
regarding how female stereotypes are (re)produced by the film and advertising 
industries – Sherman negates social norms. Clichés of femininity are exposed 
but it is left, as in the work of Degas, to the viewer to evaluate them and to 
invent her/his own story. Sherman further enhanced this appeal by leaving the 
film stills untitled. 
The intellectual position of questioning meaning-making itself entails a 
fundamental doubt as to the possibility of meaning as something definable by 
the artist or any authority. However, it may also be understood as the very call 
                                            
36 The series Untitled Film Stills (1977–1980) consists of 69 black-and-white self-portrait 
photographs on which Sherman poses in various female character types as they are 
disseminated by mass-media images.  
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to make meaning in a provisional and personal way. A corresponding 
pedagogical function was formulated by Eco as follows:  
[T]he new perception of things, and the new way of 
relating them to each other, promoted by art might 
eventually lead us to understand our situation not by 
imposing on it a univocal order expressive of an 
obsolete conception of the world but rather by 
elaborating models leading to a number of mutually 
complementary results. (Eco 1989, p.150 [1962]) 
This statement may be taken as the maxim of what became known as relational 
art in the 1990s.  
 
 
Fig. 29: Julian Schnabel, untitled (two 
parts), 1983, oil, crockery, bondo on 
wood, 275 x 245 x 25 cm.  
Private collection. Reproduction: Dorotheum 
Vienna, auction catalogue November 25, 2009 
 
Fig. 30: Cindy Sherman, Untitled Film Still #43, 1979, 
gelatine silver print, 19.2 x 24 cm. 
Museum of Modern Art, New York. Reproduction: Courtesy of the 
artist and Metro Pictures 
2.11 Relational Art 
The concept of the Open Work has been challenged and expanded by a 
number of artists who emphasise the facilitation of human relations as the 
desired effect of their work. This objective goes back to artists like Kaprow, 
Oiticica, and Clark but it is commonly associated with art practices of the 1990s 
and 2000s.37 Arguably, the most influential label for many of them has become 
‘relational aesthetics’, or ‘relational art’. Curator Nicolas Bourriaud, who coined 
                                            
37 Claire Bishop identified “socially engaged art, community-based art, experimental 
communities, dialogic art, littoral art, participatory, interventionist, research-based, or 
collaborative art” as practices comprising the “expanded field of relational practices” (Bishop 
2006b, p.180). 
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the term, identified as a trend of the 1990s that “the artist sets his sights more 
and more clearly on the relations that his work will create among his public, and 
on the invention of models of sociability” (Bourriaud 2002 [1998], p.28). 
 
 
Fig. 31: Carsten Höller, Test Site, usable 
slide installation; commissioned by: The 
Unilever Series / Tate Modern, London 
(October 2006 – April 2007). 
Photo: Craig Morey / Public Domain (CC BY-SA 2.0) 
 
Fig. 32: Pierre Huyghe, Chantier Barbès 
Rochechouart, 1994 billboard, Paris, 300 x 400 
cm. Offset printed poster (1996), 80 x 120 cm.  
Courtesy of the artist. Licensed by Bildrecht, Vienna, 2013 
(©) 
 
Among Bourriaud’s examples are gallery-based works like Carsten Höller’s 
usable sculptures (Fig. 31) and Rirkrit Tiravanija’s cooking sessions (Fig. 33), 
as well as public interventions like Pierre Huyghe’s photo of construction 
workers exhibited as a billboard overlooking the site where it was taken (Fig. 
32)38 Another example is Alix Lambert’s 1992 ‘Wedding Piece’, a project 
consisting in the artist getting married to and divorced from, three men and one 
woman within six months. Relational works complicate their interpretation in 
terms of formalism, symbolic content and artistic intentions; instead the viewer 
finds her/himself in the role of a “witness, associate, customer, guest, co-
producer, and protagonist” (Bourriaud 2002 [1998], p.58).  
At face value, relational art – taking “as its theoretical horizon the realm of 
human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an 
independent and private symbolic space” (Bourriaud 2002, p.14 [1998]) – 
seems to be opposed to the meaning-making of contemplative one-to-one 
                                            
38 In the 1994 work entitled Chantier Barbes-Rochechouart, “Huyghe offers an image of labor in 
real time: the activity of a group of workers on a construction site is seldom documented, and 
the representation here doubles or dubs it the way live commentary would” (Bourriaud 2005 
[2001], p.17). 
  64 
encounters between viewer and work.39 However, the identification of 
Bourriaud’s conception as promoting merely ‘conviviality’ and ‘sociability’ 
(claimed, for example, by Bishop 2004; 2005; Rancière 2009) is unduly 
reductive. It is true that people may have been inspired by Huyghe’s billboard to 
discuss the situation in situ, and Lambert’s ‘Wedding Piece’ had an impact 
through the marriage-divorce procedures on the people directly involved. 
However, it is questionable whether such works do not unfold their main 
potential – “to actually be ways of living and models of action within the existing 
real” (Bourriaud 2002 [1998], p.13) – by their subsequent preparation as 
exhibitions where they proffer occasions for individual reflection.40 Even the 
most explicitly ‘sociable’ examples of relational art comprise crucial components 
of individual meaning-making, as Bourriaud’s description of Tiravanija’s cooking 
events indicates: 
The meaning of the exhibition is constituted by the use 
its “population” makes of it, just as a recipe takes on 
meaning when a tangible reality is formed: spaces 
meant for the performance of everyday functions 
(playing music, eating, resting, reading, talking) 
become artworks, objects. The visitor at an exhibition 
by Tiravanija is thus faced with the process that 
constitutes the meaning of his or her own life, through 
a parallel (and similar) process that constitutes the 
meaning of the work. (Bourriaud 2005 [2001], p.47/48) 
The artist involves his audience in the cooking and eating of meals “like a 
movie director” (Bourriaud 2005, p.48 [2001]). Tiravanija said that he tries to 
deprive the audience of its “usual approach by setting up a different situation” 
but eventually “the situation can be defined through the context of art”; in other 
words, the framing as art suggests that the experience should be thought about: 
“I want people to leave thinking that they must reposition themselves in relation 
to what is being dealt with” (Tiravanija & Barak 1996, p.3,1,3). Such 
‘repositioning’ implies not only individual reflection but also the momentum of 
utility Bourriaud referred to in his description of Tiravanija’s work. In 
distinguishing relational art from earlier practices with similar agendas he 
elaborated:  
                                            
39 See: chapter one, note 23. 
40 Lambert’s exhibition included, among other items, wedding photos and certificates, divorce 
documents, presents, and videos of the ceremonies (Bourriaud 2002 [1998], p.34). 
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Minimalism addressed the question of the viewer’s 
participation in phenomenological terms. The art of the 
‘90s addresses it in terms of use. Tiravanija once 
quoted this sentence from Wittgenstein: ‘Don't look for 
the meaning of things, look for their use.  
(Bourriaud & Simpson 2001, p.47)41 
Although posed as an 
opposition, the process of 
‘looking for use’ is itself an 
act of meaning-making as 
Bourriaud goes on to 
corroborate: “One is not in 
front of an object anymore 
but included in the process of 
its construction” (Bourriaud & 
Simpson 2001, p.47). This 
stance allows Bourriaud’s 
concept of relational art to be 
seen from a pragmatic 
perspective.42 The founder of 
pragmatist art theory, John Dewey, posited a distinction ... 
 … between the art product (statue, painting or 
whatever), and the work of art. The first is physical 
and potential; the latter is active and experienced. It is 
what the product does, its working.  
(Dewey 2005 [1934], p.168) 
To shift the emphasis of ‘work’ in ‘work of art’ from noun to verb assumes a 
transactional activity of the viewer: 
We are carried to a refreshed attitude toward the 
circumstances and exigencies of ordinary experience. 
The work, in the sense of working, of an object of art 
does not cease when the direct act of perception 
stops. It continues to operate in indirect channels. 
(Dewey 2005 [1934], p.145)  
                                            
41 Relational art is distinguished from historical avant-garde in that the former tends to focus on 
particular people, places, conditions, or social issues, whereas the latter subscribed to 
ideological projects that were much more general in scope. 
42 The parallels between relational and pragmatist aesthetics, which Bourriaud neglects to 
discuss, were analysed by Smith (2005, chap.two). 
 
Fig. 33: Rirkrit Tiravanija, cooking event as part of the 
Fear Eats the Soul exhibition, 2011, Gavin Brown's 
Enterprise, New York. 
Photo: Didier Leroi  | www.vernissage.tv (©) 
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In this vein, meaning (as use) begins with a self-rewarding experience and can 
eventually be defined, as argued in the next chapter, by the habits and 
conceptual changes it produces. Concurrently, Bourriaud suggests that an 
artwork’s meaning lies in “pointing to a desired world, which the beholder thus 
becomes capable of discussing, and based on which his own desire can 
rebound” (Bourriaud 2002 [1998], p.23). Along these lines, relational art 
advances the concept of the Open Work. Eco’s idea of multiple meanings is tied 
to the idea of a potential, “as the inception of possible orders” (Eco 1989 [1962], 
p.93); with Bourriaud it becomes a matter of ‘hands-on utopias’ entailing an 
increase of people’s ability to act in, or better understand aspects of, the world 
they inhabit.  
The objective is given additional weight by Bourriaud’s more recent 
argument that much of today’s art is concerned with finding common 
denominators of different discourses, viewpoints and cultures – a “new 
universalism”, which “is based on translations, subtitling and generalised 
dubbing” rather than continuing the post-structuralist legacy of discontinuity and 
fragmentation (Bourriaud 2009a, para.5). Openness is thus no longer bound to 
the idea of “ever-changing profiles and possibilities in a single form” (Eco 1989, 
p.74 [1962]). Artists tackle extant social, environmental, and/or cultural 
problems and challenge viewers to reconsider their viewpoints. In a review of 
the 2008 exhibition Brave New Worlds43, which brought many such positions 
together, Christopher Atkins asked: “[C]an we look with rather than at these 
works?”, and argued that “looking in this way recruits us, as an audience, to 
participate within the articulation, exchange, and critique of these different 
worldviews” (Atkins 2008, p.47). This approach suggests an ‘opening of 
openness’ to the personal negotiation of specific issues and the possibility of 
arriving at conceptual changes.  
2.12  Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that appealing to meaning-making has a long 
historical tradition, has been undertaken with various motivations and was 
achieved through various methods. One overriding motivation is summarised in 
Iser’s concept of negation, which generally pertains to questioning social norms 
                                            
43 Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, 2007/08. 
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whilst abstaining from outright rejection. Examples discussed include 
confronting viewers with common preconceptions regarding stigmatised groups 
of people, policies and their own voyeurism, as well as questioning processes of 
meaning-making themselves.  
To facilitate the viewer’s attitude and readiness to ‘contribute to the creative 
act’, artists have devised multifarious methods. A key strategy is the stimulation 
of an emotional response coupled with an appeal to reflection. This is a 
complex relationship that will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. 
Another key method is what Iser and Kemp called the employment of blanks. 
The blank – the unstated – is to be filled by the viewer’s reflection and 
imagination. Many auxiliary devices like visually concealed details, narrative 
puzzles, and apparently unrelated titles constitute blanks. Specific methods to 
refer the viewer back to her/himself (as viewer) include letting characters gaze 
at the viewer, the use of mirrors, the choice of the venue and their engagement 
in a relational situation. Having traced a history of strategies used to invite the 
viewer’s meaning-making in art practice, the next chapter will explore the 
concept of meaning-making from art theoretical, philosophical and 
psychological perspectives. 
3                                CHAPTER THREE:  
                  MEANING AND MEANING-MAKING 
 
When something blows your mind, it can change the 
way you look at the world, and open it up to meditation 
and contemplation, and finally to being more aware. 
This is what an artwork can do; it creates a distance 
between the common place and the inner space, and 
lets people think by themselves.  
Marie Sester, 20061 
 
The fact that artists like Joseph Kosuth, Victor Burgin and Cindy Sherman, 
have focussed the prompt to make meaning on the processes of meaning-
making itself – asking through their work what it actually means to make 
meaning – indicates that there is something at stake with the very concept of 
meaning. Having outlined the history of artists’ interest in and methods used to 
engage the viewer in meaning-making, I will now consider the definition of 
meaning and meaning-making per se. 
Debates on the concept of meaning most often revolve around the idea that 
a given symbol, object, situation, or event either does have meaning or does not 
have meaning, or, that it can be made meaningful through interpretation. 
Classic examples of meaningful entities are signs, symbols and words, the latter 
being variously considered a subcategory of either of the former. The word 
house (the ‘signifier’), for example, signifies (or means) a distinct class of 
buildings (the ‘signified’). For a person to think of  as opposed to something 
like , would be contentious in this model. When one’s aim is to communicate 
a certain meaning the challenge is to use the most appropriate signifiers; for 
example, the term ‘igloo’ instead of ‘house’. Whether the receiver understands 
the signified is a matter of education and mental ability.2  
Linguist Charles K. Ogden and literary critic Ivor A. Richards criticised the 
assumption that every word or sign has a certain, correct meaning connected 
with it, referring to this as the ‘proper meaning superstition’ (Ogden & Richards 
1960 [1923]). By contrast, Ogden and Richards established that meaning 
resides in people rather than symbols (including words and texts). This raises 
                                            
1 Sester & Debatty (2006, para.12) 
2 For surveys of the topic see: Ogden and Richards (1960 [1923]), Speaks (2011). 
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questions regarding the fact that different people associate different ideas with 
the same symbols.3 Post-structuralist philosophers including Roland Barthes, 
Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, raised further doubts about the ability of 
verbal language (and images) to represent meaning. They argued that 
whenever one tries to define the meaning of something, one must recourse to 
contingent definitions that have been established against a backdrop of cultural 
and historical contexts and the rules of a given language (vocabulary, grammar, 
etc.) (Barthes 1989; Derrida 1977a; Foucault 1969). For example, the meaning 
of any word can only be stated through other words leading to an infinite 
deferral of meaning. When looking for the meaning of an artwork one will, as 
evidenced by Guérin’s ‘Return of Marcus Sextus’, Jaar’s ‘Logo for America’ and 
other examples discussed in chapter two, necessarily make culturally and 
historically dependent assumptions. Meaning thus resides not only in individual 
people, but in contingent definitions, languages, and cultural conventions.  
With regard to art, it seems particularly contentious to look for meaning. By 
“asking what art means (to say)”, philosopher Jacques Derrida argued ... 
... [one] submits the mark ‘art’ to a very determined 
regime of interpretation which has supervened in 
history: it consists, in its tautology without reserve, in 
interrogating the vouloir-dire of every work of so-called 
art, even if its form is not that of saying.  
(Derrida 1987 [1978], p.22) 
This is why questions such as ‘What does the artist want to tell us?’ are 
problematic. However, both non-expert viewers and art world professionals 
alike pose such questions. Donald Preziosi criticised fellow art historians’ 
frequent “logocentric paradigm of signification” and, despite different 
programmatic premises including iconographic analysis, Marxist social history, 
and (structuralist) visual semiotics, their shared concern with explaining “how 
artworks mean” (Preziosi 1991, p.16). Posing this question is akin to asking 
what art represents, which is to ask how artworks reflect social, cultural and 
historical issues. By contrast, postmodern philosophers have argued that art is 
essentially an assault on systems of representation, demanding that, through 
their openness and appeal to sensual reception it undermines systems of 
                                            
3 Philosopher Emanuel Levinas established: “To seize by inventory all the contexts of language 
and all possible positions of interlocutors is a senseless task. Every verbal signification lies at 
the confluence of countless semantic rivers” (Levinas 2003 [1972], p.11/12).  
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conceptual representation. Jean-François Lyotard, for example, held that 
searching for ways “to impart a stronger sense of the unrepresentable” is the 
key ethical capacity of art (Lyotard 1984 [1979], p.81). Already in 1946, artist Ad 
Reinhardt encapsulated a similar 
discontent with the dogma of 
representation in one of his cartoons, 
where a painting returns the viewer’s 
pretentious question (Fig. 34). 
Despite his critique, Derrida saw 
positive aspects of verbal meaning-
making. He suggested that works of art 
do not escape the system of language 
because they “cannot help but be 
caught within a network of differences 
and references that give them a textual 
structure” (Derrida et al. 1994, p.15). 
Whereas Eco considered the 
interpretive instability of art’s symbolic meaning as a central emancipating 
virtue, Derrida regarded it as “infinitely authoritarian” (Derrida et al. 1994, p.13). 
The “silent” work with its “untouchable, monumental, inaccessible presence” 
can be controlled only through a discourse “that is going to relativize things, 
emancipate itself, refuse to kneel in front of the authority” (Derrida et al. 1994, 
p.13). Although in this view verbal language with all its constraints functions not 
as a corset but as a liberator of meaning, meaning nevertheless remains caught 
up in discourse. Whether meaning as something that can be put in words is an 
essential attribute of art remains questionable for Derrida.  
One possible way to strengthen the notion of meaning in the realm of art 
would be to deny its strict ties with language. A brief look at Ogden and 
Richard’s summary of the ‘meaning of meaning’ (reproduced on p.8) of this 
thesis) indicates that the concept may be understood as exceeding the linguistic 
realm. An alternative view was presented by Pragmatist philosophers when they 
argued that meaning resides first and foremost in bodily experience – ‘beneath 
interpretation’ (Shusterman 1990; Shusterman 2000, chap.five) – and thus 
precedes all expression in language. In the pragmatist view, for anything to 
have meaning it must relate to human needs, longings, or fears. Mark Johnson 
 
Fig. 34: Ad Reinhardt, What Do You 
Represent? (from the series How to Look 
at Modern Art in America), cartoon 
published in PM, June 2, 1946   
Licensed by Bildrecht, Vienna, 2013 (©) 
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pointed out that the three things babies need to master in order to function 
successfully are interaction with others, bodily motion, and the perception, 
manipulation and use of objects, which are ...  
... at once bodily, affective, and social. They do not 
require language in any full-blown sense, and yet they 
are the very means for making meaning and for 
encountering anything that can be understood and 
made sense of. (Johnson 2008, p.36) 
This view upholds the primacy of experience for meaning-making, and this is 
not limited to infancy.4 It is biologically rooted in our desire for well-being,  
survival and the physical interaction with our environment. This may appear as 
the substitution of one confining structure (language) with another (body), but 
pragmatists emphasise that experiences are phenomenologically unique and 
rooted in the individual person’s “characteristics of temperament” and “special 
manner of vision” (Dewey 2005, p.299 [1934]). Also, Pragmatism does not deny 
the importance of language. Like Derrida, John Dewey argued that words are 
“practical devices” as they are “the agencies by which the ineffable diversity of 
natural existence as it operates in human experience is reduced to orders, 
ranks, and classes that can be managed” (Dewey 2005, p.244 [1934]). As such, 
language is an essential tool for orientation and meaning-making but it is not the 
primary locus of meaning.5 In the pragmatist view, art-related meaning-making 
concerns bodily experience as well as the analytic mind. According to Richard 
Schusterman the role of art is to give “a satisfyingly integrated expression to 
both our bodily and intellectual dimensions” and he added that the sensed “is 
without meaning if de-contextualized from the intellectual and vice versa” 
(Shusterman 2000, p.7).6 This view will serve as a point of departure when 
investigating ways of making meaning in language while acknowledging the 
experiential factor. 
 
                                            
4 Philosopher Crispin Sartwell gave an example: “Think seriously for a minute about what you 
do and what you experience in a day. Better, think about the richness contained in a single 
glance. Then think, first, about the impoverished character of any human sign system with 
regard to the content of any glance: how far we are from being able to describe it, how far we 
are from wanting to, how far we are from needing to” (Sartwell 2000, p.44). 
5 For a summary and defence of the pragmatist view of meaning, see: Morse (2008). My 
references to Sartwell and Johnson are owed to his account. 
6 Compare: Parsons’ (2002) similar view, see 6.2.3. 
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Dmitry Leontiev argued that in psychology and the humanities there are 
only two generally accepted properties to characterise extra-linguistic meaning: 
(a) a meaning of an object, event or action exists only 
within a definite context; in different contexts the same 
object has different meanings, and (b) meaning 
always points to some intention, goal, reason, 
necessity, including desired or supposed 
consequences, or instrumental utility.  
(Leontiev 2005, p.2) 
When applied to the interpretation of art, this may be taken to imply that it is the 
task of the viewer to investigate as thoroughly as possible what the artist’s 
meaning (intention) was when the work was created. Indeed this is an approach 
many viewers take to art (see 3.6.1), and it is supported by the philosophical 
doctrine of ‘Intentionalism’.7 Intentionalists aim first and foremost to elucidate 
the artist’s ‘message’ and how s/he made her/his choices in the (socio-
historical) context of the work’s production. This approach is largely (although 
not entirely) inadequate to a theory of meaning-making because it neglects that 
intentions also reside in the viewer, and that these intentions may or may not 
converge with those of the artist. The viewer brings to the work her/his own 
context, not only intellectually but also as s/he undergoes an emotional 
response. It will be argued that both are closely intertwined with the personal 
system of values that guide the construction of personal meaning. 
3.1 Meaning and Intention 
According to art historian Richard Wollheim, artistic intention can be defined 
as the “desires, thoughts, beliefs, experiences, emotions” and “commitments, 
which cause the artist to paint [or otherwise create] as he does” (Wollheim 
1987, p.19).8 Intentionalism is commonly justified by the conviction that, just as 
we aim to interpret the intentions of the deeds and words of others in everyday 
life, we aim to interpret an artist’s intentions when viewing artworks. Artworks 
are seen as solutions to problems and appreciating these solutions must involve 
                                            
7 The debate originates in literature criticism but carries across to visual art. For intentionalist 
positions, see: Wollheim (1980; 1987), Hirsch (1967; 1976), Knapp & Michaels (1982), Irwin 
(1999), Pignocchi (2012). 
8 A similar definition was provided by William K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley who described 
intention as “design or plan in the author's mind” and having “obvious affinities for the author’s 
attitude toward his work, the way he felt, what made him write” (Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946, 
p.469). 
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appreciating the artist’s agency. This view neglects that works of art, like 
objects, situations or actions in general, proffer meanings to a viewer during and 
after apprehension that are unpredictable and sometimes unwarranted. Such 
meaning-making can involve selecting, transforming, or generating (emotional) 
associations, or a behavioural dimension by “energizing, blocking, or directing” 
an activity (Leontiev 2005, p.6). What follows is that intentions underlying the 
production of an artwork and the production of meaning might widely diverge, 
and whether artistic intention (as a work’s meaning) should be prioritised over 
more private apprehensions is debatable.  
Related doubts are endorsed by many artists, although a complete 
subjectivism (which would be an equally debatable inversion of the argument) is 
seldom claimed. When asked in a panel discussion how important the viewer’s 
understanding of his intentions is, artist Pavel Büchler responded: 
My intention as an artist is totally irrelevant to you as a 
viewer… I have to have enough trust in what I do to 
somehow rely, or at least hope for, the capacity of the 
work to act as a focus for the production of meaning in 
the encounter with the audience …  
(Renton et al. 2010, 1:11:22h)9 
The second part of the statement puts the first into perspective. Many 
opponents of a strict intentionalism do not altogether reject the idea that 
intentions are relevant to interpretation, but disagree regarding their pertinence 
and the importance of consulting artist statements in order to reveal such 
intentions.10  
A formalist critique of intentionalism by literature scholar William K. Wimsatt 
and philosopher Monroe Beardsley (1946;  also Dickie & Wilson 1995) holds 
that artists are simply unsuccessful if they do not manage to make their 
intentions intelligible through the work: “How is he [the interpreter] to find out 
what the poet tried to do?”, they asked and gave an astute answer:  
                                            
9 Artist Pavel Althamer responded similarly to a related question: “‘Up to you!’ It doesn’t matter 
what I want to do. It’s up to you ... That’s the message” (Althamer & La Republica 2013, 
0:29min). 
10 This controversy evolves around versions of ‘actual’ and ‘hypothetical’ intentionalism. The 
former holds that direct pronouncements of intention by an artist are an admissible source for 
the interpreter, which the latter excludes arguing that works of art have a degree of autonomy 
once they are released to the public and shouldn’t require its maker to explain what they are 
about. Key contributions to this debate include, but are not limited to, Carroll (1995; 2000), 
Livingston (1998; 2007; 2010), Bevir (2000), Stecker (2006), Iseminger (1995; 1996), Levinson 
(1995; 2010), Nehamas (1981), Nathan (2006). For an overview, see Irvin (2006). 
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If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itself 
shows what he was trying to do. And if the poet did not 
succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence, 
and the critic must go outside the poem – for evidence 
of an intention that did not become effective in the 
poem. (Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946, p.469)11 
The argument amounts to the idea that all necessary information should be 
retrievable from or at least be compatible with the work itself. According to 
Wimsatt and Beardsley, and in agreement with later arguments by post-
structuralists and pragmatists, such claims extend far beyond the context of the 
work’s production:12 “[T]he history of words after a poem is written may 
contribute meanings which if relevant to the original pattern should not be ruled 
out by a scruple about intention” (Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946, p.488). In other 
words, the meaning of artworks is allowed to change over time.  
Amongst the dangers that an interpreter who ‘goes outside the poem’ faces 
are that artists can fail to put their intentions into words, lie about them, change 
their own interpretation throughout their lives, may not be clear about what they 
intend to ‘say’ or be reluctant to comment. Tino Sehgal, for example, declared 
that:  
I think artists’ intentions – I’m not sure that’s so 
relevant. They are important to generate the piece but 
then I just don’t feel that I am the authority to speak 
about it any more… (Sehgal & Thatcher 2012, p.1) 
His interviewer Jennifer Thatcher added:  
He asks me not to transcribe the interview as a 
straight [question and answer], anxious that once an 
artist has expressed their [sic] thoughts on a work it 
becomes impossible to interpret it in any other way.  
(Sehgal & Thatcher 2012, p.1) 
Partly owed to such uncertainties, but going beyond the formalist retention of an 
intelligibility linked to the proper employment of signifiers and the assumption of 
                                            
11 A similar view was also defended by Dewey (1934, chap. 13). 
12 Derrida stated: “To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a kind of machine that is in 
turn productive, that my future disappearance in principle will not prevent from functioning and 
from yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting” (Derrida 1977b [1971], p.8). Richard 
Shusterman argued that “our most established and respected practices of literary interpretation” 
aim “at connectively constituting a greater wealth of meaningful features into a more coherent 
whole, a coherent understanding which exceeds the limits of the work itself and which can 
indeed be constructed on the inconsistencies of the work and its interpretive aporia by 
explaining and placing them in a larger context” (Shusterman 2000, p.92). 
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a normative reader/viewer qualified to understand the ‘evidence’ provided,13 
post-structuralist anti-intentionalists argue that searching for authorial intention 
is an altogether arbitrary enterprise. Philosophers like Roland Barthes (1967), 
Jacques Derrida (1993 [1966]; 1987 [1978]), and Michel Foucault (2008 [1969]) 
posit that the alleged single self-determining author (artist) as a person 
conscious and able to realise her/his (and only her/his) intentions, is an illusion 
and that no analysis whatsoever can reveal stable meaning.14 In this view, not 
only the confinements of language but also ideological, social and cultural 
forces, the subconscious and conventions of artistic genres ‘speak through’ 
artists without them being fully aware and in command of them.15 Barthes 
argued that no text has ... 
 … a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the 
Author-God), but is a space of many dimensions, in 
which are wedded and contested various kinds of 
writing, no one of which is original…  
(Barthes 1967, n.p.) 
With this ‘death of the author’ and ‘birth of the reader’, post-structuralist 
philosophers along with reader-response theorists (Iser 1994 [1976]; Holland 
1975; Fish 1982) renounced the possibility that any final, let alone determinable, 
meaning can be encoded in texts or artworks. This does not jettison that 
artworks emerge out of specific situations and it is neither impossible nor 
appropriate for a viewer to ignore them completely. Eco clarified that openness 
is ultimately constrained by “communicative conventions as cultural 
phenomena”; a “critical act” is demanded, by which the viewer is to determine 
“whether and to what extent the ‘openness’ of a particular work to various 
readings is the result of an intentional organization of its field of possibilities” 
                                            
13 Philosopher Jerrold Levinson summarised the notion of the ‘appropriate reader’ as one 
“versed in and cognizant of the tradition out of which the work arises, acquainted with the rest of 
the author’s oeuvre, and perhaps familiar as well with the author’s public literary and intellectual 
or persona” and as being competent in the language employed and having “knowledge of the 
references and allusions embedded in the text, and so on” (Levinson 1996, p.183,184). 
14 Michael Foucault recouped the author to a certain extent, describing her/him from the 
recipient’s point of view as the result of “a complex operation which constructs a certain rational 
being which we call ‘author’” (Foucault 2008 [1969], p.287). However, he viewed the search for 
authorial intentions as an, although creative, ultimately unsatisfiable process that makes the 
author an object of ‘free manipulation’ (see 4.3.1, p. 110). 
15 Against this exclusion, cognitive scientist and art theorist Alessandro Pignocchi argued that 
unconscious mental states also qualify as intentions because what spectators care about are all 
mental states that “had a causal influence, through the actions and the decisions of the artist, on 
the appearance of the artwork. ... We are extremely permissive when we detect intentions 
behind the properties of a work: many intentions that we attribute to the artist are invented or, at 
least, projected” (Pignocchi 2012, p.4). 
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(Eco 1989, p.115,100 [1962]). This does not reject the possibility viewers can 
create meaning autonomously, but it acknowledges the difference between 
responding to art and, for example, responding to faces one can spot in cloud 
shapes. 
Viewers’ presumption of a work being intentionally composed is what 
makes them consider it worthy of reflection, leaving them wanting to know 
more. Shusterman expanded on this, claiming that such prior understanding 
“though it be inchoate, vague, and corrigible” not only motivates but guides 
interpretive processes:  
[W]e form our interpretive hypotheses about the text 
(and accept or reject alternative interpretations) on the 
basis of what we already understand as properly 
belonging to the text rather than falsely foisted onto it.  
(Shusterman 2000, p.130) 
It makes a difference if a giraffe was stuffed for display in a natural history 
museum or for an art exhibition, or if a painting was made by a monkey or by an 
artist.16  
No artist can foresee all potential contexts that will situate her/his work, but 
viewers can expect artists to at least envisage the contemporary audience well 
enough to anticipate how an artwork will be generally apprehended. Otherwise, 
no one including artists making artworks, could ever be made responsible for 
what they do. Only when the object of contemplation can “be considered an act 
of communication”, as Eco said, is it more than “an absurd dialogue between a 
signal that is, in fact, mere noise, and a reception that is nothing more than 
solipsistic ranting” (Eco 1989, p.100 [1962]).17 This leaves us with the task of 
locating a definition of meaning between constitutive and retrievable intentions 
on the one hand, and openness to the viewer’s interpretation on the other. 
                                            
16 Hoaxers have repeatedly trained monkeys to paint and presented the results to critics. Of the 
famous case of ‘Pierre Brassau’ a neglected French artist (in fact a chimpanzee) whose 
paintings were exhibited at the Gallerie Christinae in Göteborg, Sweden in 1964 – a critic wrote: 
“Pierre Brassau paints with powerful strokes, but also with clear determination. His brush 
strokes twist with furious fastidiousness. Pierre is an artist who performs with the delicacy of a 
ballet dancer” (cited in: Time 1964, p.77).  
17 Eco gave an example: “If, after looking at Dubuffet’s Materiologies – which are much like a 
road surface or other bare terrain in their attempt to reproduce the absolute freedom and 
unlimited suggestiveness of brute matter—somebody had told him that they bore a strong 
resemblance to Henri IV or Joan of Arc, the artist would probably have been so shocked that he 
would have questioned the sanity of the speaker” (Eco 1989 [1962], p.99). In a similar vein, 
Gopnik argued: “We want the knowledge and effects they [works of art] provide to be frangible, 
labile, and particular – not formless or infinitely elastic, but suited to a large range of purposes 
and contexts, and to repeated, and repeatedly fertile, viewing” (Gopnik 2012, p.145). 
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Moderate versions of intentionalism endorse this intermediate position of 
meaning. Philosopher Paisley Livingston explained:  
[K]nowledge of some, but not all intentions is 
necessary to some, but not all valuable interpretive 
insights because such intentions are sometimes 
constitutive of the work’s features or content. 
Moderate intentionalism recognizes that the artist’s 
intentions do not always constitute the work’s 
meaning. The contention, rather, is that when 
intentions are compatible with the text, they can be 
constitutive of a work’s implicit meanings.  
(Livingston 1998, p.835) 
The consequence of this approach is that if an artistic intention can 
(however precisely) be identified, meaning-making must not contradict this 
intention if it is to do the work justice.18 Idiosyncratic personal rules, habits and 
associations do not necessarily separate each artist from each viewer. Perhaps 
not meaning-making in general but meaning-making paying respect to the work 
cannot ignore that Friedl’s ‘Zoo Story’ began with an Israeli bombing raid, or 
that the food on Shapiro’s trays mimics the last meals of death row inmates. It 
must be expected that contemporary viewers of these works are familiar with 
these particular subjects.19  
3.2 The Repertoire 
An alternative to the disputed notion of ‘intention’ is Wolfgang Iser’s concept 
of ‘repertoire’. According to Iser, a literary artwork’s repertoire exposes and puts 
up for debate social norms and conventions, references to previous works, and 
the whole culture out of which the work has emerged (Iser 1994 [1976], 
sec.three). Likewise, the understanding of many works of visual art depends on 
such backgrounds. However, for the present purpose a slight modification is 
reasonable. Instead of opening up the concept of repertoire by including ‘the 
whole culture’ out of which a work has emerged, I suggest to replace this notion 
by historical factors that need to be known (such as the Israel-Palestine conflict 
                                            
18 For related arguments, see: Eco (1989 [1962]), Livingston (1998; 2007; 2010), Räsänen 
(1999), Barrett (2002). 
19 Gadamer argued that we must trace the artwork “out as we see it because we must construct 
it actively”; every composition requires “constant cooperative activity” and “it is precisely the 
identity of the work that invites us to this activity. The activity is not arbitrary, but directed, and all 
possible realizations are drawn into a specific schema.” (Gadamer 1986 [1974], p.27; compare: 
chapter two, note 18) 
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in Friedl’s ‘Zoo Story’). Doing so still complies with Iser’s idea of a work’s 
repertoire incorporating “a specific external reality into the text, and so [offering] 
the reader a definite frame of reference” ... “along which the text is to be 
actualized” (Iser 1994 [1976], pp.212,85). Once the claim to a repertoire is 
omitted, openness is reduced to arbitrariness of reception and the artist’s 
relevance to the work’s meaning is sacrificed. 
The concept of repertoire accommodates the notion that the artist is often 
not the most reliable source to provide information about intentions, and 
highlights what Foucault (2008, p.229) calls the “subject’s’ points of insertion, 
modes of functioning, and system of dependencies” (Foucault 2008 [1969], 
p.292). The repertoire points beyond the intentions of the artist (as self-
governed, autonomous originator) and towards social norms and cultural 
circumstances, but the term does not refer to these as guiding or even 
constituting the artist-subject (as Foucault might have foregrounded) but as 
being chosen and exposed by the artist. This involves an intentional moment 
but it does not impute or demand the pervasion of the chosen norms and 
circumstances by the artist.20 It is important, as Iser emphasised, that the norms 
concerned must be “sufficiently implicit to act as a background to offset their 
new significance” and “need to be organized in such a way that the reason for 
their selection can be conveyed to the reader” (Iser 1994 [1976], pp.69,80). The 
repertoire provides the viewer with toeholds for fashioning new connections or 
seeing new possibilities within the work.21 To establish a repertoire requires that 
artists carefully consider both their media and the envisioned audience; 
however, further contextual factors such as curatorial devices may be needed to 
mediate a work’s repertoire (see 4.3).  
                                            
20 Artists must expect to be questioned on their competence to comment on certain subject 
matters. In my view painter Fernando Botero’s qualifications, for example, to portray the 
atrocities in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison, which he only knew from commonly available 
photographs, is therefore questionable (see: Botero’s 2004/05 Abu Ghraib series). 
21 In a similar vein Nicholas Bourriaud argued: “[A]rt is an editing table that enables us to realize 
alternative, temporary versions of reality with the same material (basically, everyday life). Thus, 
artists manipulate social forms, reorganize them and incorporate them in original scenarios, 
deconstructing the script on which the illusory legitimacy of those scenarios was grounded. The 
artist de-programs in order to re-program, suggesting that there are other possible usages for 
techniques, tools and spaces at our disposition” (Bourriaud & Ryan 2009, para.17).  
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3.3  ‘Meaning of’ and ‘Meaning to’  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘meaning’ as: “The significance, 
purpose, underlying truth, etc., of something”22. Linked to the definition of 
‘making’ as: “To bring into existence by construction or elaboration”23, meaning-
making boils down to ‘constructing or elaborating significance, purpose, or 
underlying truth’. ‘Making significance’, amounts to a tautology as the term is 
commonly used as a synonym of meaning.24 If an artwork has an underlying 
truth (as discussed, a questionable notion), this truth is necessarily pre-
established (by the artist, respectively the context that ‘speaks through’ the 
artist) and cannot be made by the viewer. However, as far as the repertoire’s 
relevance is concerned, this notion retains a certain justification (see 3.6.1).  
The remaining interpretation of meaning-making as a ‘construction’ or 
‘elaboration’ of a ‘purpose’, reflects the pragmatic perspective that was 
identified already in Bourriaud’s concept of relational art in 2.11. One of the 
founders of Pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, argued in this vein:  
The whole function of thought is to produce habits of 
action ... To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, 
simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a 
thing means is simply what habits it involves.  
(Peirce 1878, p.292) 
If ‘habit’ is taken to include all kinds of activities that have become relatively 
automatic or characteristic for a person, including consistent patterns of thought 
and attitudes (Peirce 1899; Bergman 2012), the pragmatic view is in line with 
Nattiez’ idea that objects take on meaning for a person when s/he places them 
in relation to her/his lived experience (see 1.4.1). Above all, making new 
meaning means to question one’s existing concepts and attitudes. This is what 
                                            
22 ‘meaning, n.’. The Oxford English Dictionary (2001).  
23 ‘make, v.’. The Oxford English Dictionary (2001).  
24 An alternative terminology was suggested by literary critic Eric D. Hirsch (1967 [revised 
1984]). Hirsch distinguished between ‘meaning’ (authorial intention; ‘fixed and immutable’) and 
‘significance’ (what a text is to the reader; ‘open to change’). This view affirms the impossibility 
to make meaning for the reader (viewer) but it introduces a derivate concept instead. To follow 
Hirsch is problematic. He assumed that grasping the artist’s intention to be the ultimate goal of 
interpretation and significance to be completely dependent on it: “Meaning, then, may be 
conceived as a self-identical schema whose boundaries are determined by an originating 
speech event, while significance may be conceived as a relationship drawn between that self-
identical meaning and something, anything, else” (Hirsch 1984, p.204). Hirsch pointed to an 
ambivalence of the term meaning but the gains of replacing it in some instances by significance 
are limited. Hirsch’s arbitrary re-definition of what usually counts as a synonym of meaning 
would have to be given much greater autonomy than Hirsch desires to be useful to this thesis.  
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philosopher Gilles Deleuze advanced when he advised to treat familiar 
concepts as objects ‘of an encounter’ and as ‘a here-and-now’ ...   
… from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, 
differently distributed ‘heres’ and ‘nows’… I make, 
remake and unmake my concepts along a moving 
horizon, from an always decentered center, from an 
always displaced periphery which repeats and 
differentiates them. (Deleuze 1995 [1968], p.xx/xxi) 
Although Deleuze did not consider such conceptual changes germane to art 
apprehension, his account effectively describes the objective of meaning-
making. Artworks can inspire processes like those Deleuze refers to, they can 
challenge us to re-consider our concepts of, and attitudes towards the world. 
This pragmatic notion shifts the focus from ‘meaning of’ (an artwork) to its 
‘meaning to or for’ (the viewer), and enforces the epistemic position as a first 
person perspective implying a value judgement. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines meaning in this sense as “a source of benefit or as an object of regard, 
affection, or love; to matter (a lot, nothing, etc.)”25. The following discussion 
presents examples for the construction or elaboration of personal purpose that 
is rooted in changes of thought or attitude, or in preparing the ground for such 
changes.  
In her blog, a viewer of Wangechi Mutu’s installation ‘Try Dismantling the 
Little Empire Inside of You’ (2007)26 (Fig. 35) described her response to the 
work as follows: 
... I feel that this piece was particularly meaningful to 
me because as a feminist woman, I feel the same 
internal struggle of contemporary beauty standards 
and what I should and should not be doing as an 
independent woman ... (Fortner 2007, para.6) 
‘Meaning to’ in this example relates to having found an object of identification 
and confirmation. In a narrower sense, meaning is not ‘constructed’ or 
‘elaborated’ (understanding these terms to imply some deliberate activity) but 
rather discovered or ‘coming upon’ the viewer. A somewhat different approach 
was taken by a viewer describing his response to a series of paintings by 
Jennifer Louise Martin (Fig. 36): 
                                            
25 ‘mean, v. trans.’. The Oxford English Dictionary (2001).  
26 Seen at the exhibition ‘Global Feminisms’, The Brooklyn Museum, New York, 2007. 
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Martin[’s] ... paintings of women who appear to be 
crying and ruining their makeup … made me imagine 
an alternative universe in which instead of getting 
broken up with, I break up with each of my ex 
girlfriends. I cannot over emphasize how satisfying 
that is. (Watson 2012, para.5)27 
Although the statement is somewhat tongue in cheek, the constructed meaning 
of the artwork (‘women who appear to be crying and ruining their makeup’) is 
made meaningful to the viewer through his constructive imagination of an 
‘alternative universe’. However, whether this alternative universe produces 
habitual/conceptual changes or rather remains a volatile fantasy remains 
questionable. To substantiate the notion of self-generated meaning, more 
pertinent examples are discussed in the following sections. What these two 
testimonials do indicate is that a work’s acquisition of ‘meaning to’ a viewer 
entails an emotional element; an important feature that requires more attention. 
Also calling for further discussion is the understanding of ‘making’ as a 
deliberate activity. Whatever defines this process of ‘constructing’ or 
‘elaborating’ constitutes participation on the basis of reflection.  
 
                                            
27 Seen at the exhibition ‘¡The New Curiosity Shop!’, Londonewcastle Project Space, London, 
2012. 
 
Fig. 35: Wangechi Mutu, Try Dismantling the Little 
Empire Inside of You, 2007, Collage, ink, spray paint 
and mixed media on mylar, Diptych: 135.9 x 246.4 cm 
and 137.2 x 246.4 cm.  
Courtesy of Susanne Vielmetter, Los Angeles and Sikkema Jenkins 
& Co., New York. Photo: Beckett Logan Collection of Deste 
Foundation, Athens, Greece (©) 
 
Fig. 36: Jennifer Louise Martin, 
Beauty Is An Affliction I, 2011, 
acrylic on canvas, 180 x 240 cm.  
Courtesy of the artist. Photo: Sylvain Deleu. 
(©) 
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3.4 Meaning, Affect, and Existential Themes  
The notion of ‘meaning to’ as a source of benefit (or at least the anticipation 
thereof) entails not only a pragmatic, but also an affective side. Meaning in this 
sense does not require verbal interpretations but may manifest in various 
habitual, and potentially ineffable changes and emotional responses. The 




Fig. 37: Louise Bourgeois, Altered States, 
1992, gouache, ink, ball pen, and pencil on 
paper, 48.2 x 60.3 cm.  
Centre Georges Pompidou, Paris. Licensed by Bildrecht, 
Wien, 2013 (©) 
 
Fig. 38: Louise Bourgeois, Femme Maison, 
1994, white marble, 12 x 24.5 x 7.6 cm.  
Collection of the artist; The Estate of Louise Bourgeois 
(©). Photo: Christopher Burke, © The Easton Foundation. 
Licensed by Bildrecht, Vienna, 2013 (©) 
 
In a conference speech, sociology PhD student Paula McCloskey described 
her experience with several works by Louise Bourgeois (Figs. 37, 38)28 as 
especially relating to various aspects of (her) maternity: 
I was moved by how the form translated an energy to 
me, an emotion with which I could connect. I found the 
images sinister in many ways, but also strong, bold, 
questioning, defiant. The affective nature of this event, 
as being part of a trans-situational process, led to a 
sense of possibility, of something new, of something 
different. … there was strangeness, an Otherness. 
However, there was some recognition; the images 
transmitted to me feelings of being trapped, as well as 
ambivalence, a feeling that I had experienced with my 
own maternity. The images allowed access to a      
                                                                           
                                            
28 Works referred to in the paper: The Cells series (for example ‘Cell XVIII (Portrait)’, 2000), 
various drawings (for example ‘Altered States’, 1992), the spider sculptures, and the series of 
pictures and sculptures of ‘Femme Maison’. 
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maternal part of me that was so hidden, so 
untouchable, that by this encounter-event I felt jolted. 
(McCloskey 2010, p.1/2) 
In another part of the text, the viewer explains that difficult maternity has 
been an existential theme in her life.29 The pertinence of existential themes in 
art appreciation has been examined and theorised by psychologist Bjarne S. 
Funch (1997, pp.241–268; 2007). Funch explained that despite their being 
deeply embedded in a person’s psyche, emotions associated with existential 
experiences are usually much more complex and ineffable than those such as 
fear, joy, sadness, etc. When such emotions are only “diffusely established in 
the psyche of the experiencing person or perhaps not constituted at all”, they 
“can only be actualized in new encounters that are similar to the first; they 
cannot be remembered and recalled” (Funch 1997, p.248; 2007, p.10). In a 
similar vein, Dewey argued that it is a “unique quality” of art to clarify and 
concentrate “meanings contained in scattered and weakened ways in the 
material of other experiences” (Dewey 2005 [1934], p.87). There is a sense of 
recognition here but none of the sort at work when meaning is found in symbols, 
intentions, or the mere identification of depicted objects. Funch argued that in 
(emotional) recognition something can seem familiar even if it does not bring 
forth any memories (Funch 2007, p.9). Crude impressions and diffuse emotions 
can be very unsettling if they randomly intrude on the stream of consciousness 
(trauma would be an extreme example). Works of art can provide for the first 
time a distinct form for hitherto inaccessible emotions, and facilitate through 
their objectification “a platform for better contact to present life” (Funch 2007, 
p.13).   
To discover an existential theme is an experience contingent upon a perfect 
match of the viewer’s personal life-experiences with a certain artistic utterance. 
However, they are not entirely accidental. Many grand themes of art – love, 
death, guilt, hope, transience, etc. – are existential ones. Their treatment by the 
individual artist may have a more or less profound impact on individual viewers 
but the recurring choice of these subjects indicates a universal pertinence. 
Moreover, different times raise different existential themes (alienation, 
                                            
29 McCloskey stated that her “matrilineage bears witness to a history of ‘disrupted’ or ‘lost’ 
maternities’” and when having had a baby herself “a combination of complex factors, events, 
and relationships collided” shattered the confidence in herself as a mother in such a way that 
she decided her son would be cared for by someone else (McCloskey 2010, p.1). 
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ecological crises, etc.). In this vein, Funch pointed out that when “current 
existential themes are objectified through works of art these objectifications 
make it possible for the audience to constitute and retain new emotional 
qualities” (Funch 2007, p.17). With this type of emotional confirmation the work 
acquires ‘meaning to’ the viewer in that it has an immediate non-verbal impact. 
To speculate on McCloskey’s example this may have been a feeling of being 
understood for the first time, albeit by a strange entity: an artwork, an artist or a 
disembodied approval of her own way of feeling and responding to the world.30  
Not linguistically mediated, ameliorative meanings of art have been claimed 
by philosophers as well as scholars from other disciplines.31 McCloskey 
described Bourgeois’ work, using the terms of Deleuze and the psychoanalyst 
Felix Guattari, as a “hospitable monument, with a ‘multiplicity of sensations’ 
which draw together a multiplicity of others (sensations, experiences, and so 
on)” (McCloskey 2010, p.2). Deleuze called on Baruch Spinoza’s definition of 
‘affect’ as a kind of sensation drawing together “affections of the body by which 
the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained” 
(Deleuze 1988 [1970], p.49; also Deleuze & Guattari 1994 [1991]). The term 
‘affect’, as used by Deleuze and Guattari, is more fundamental than ‘feeling’ or 
‘emotion’. Philosopher Brian Massumi explained that it does not denote ...  
... a personal feeling (sentiment in Deleuze and 
Guattari). L’affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is ... a 
prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage 
from one experiential state of the body to another and 
implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s 
capacity to act. (Massumi 1987, p.xvi) 
 In this sense, affect always precedes and remains beyond consciousness; 
it can lead to feelings but also to motion, orientation behaviour, etc. The term 
denotes, as brain scientist Alvaro Pascual-Leone agrees, fundamental 
agitations of the organism that serve to ready it “via the hormonal/endoctrine 
and the muscular tonus/postural systems ... for oncoming expected kinds of 
experience” (Pascual-Leone, p.304.32 According to Deleuze and Guattari, it is 
                                            
30 In this vein, philosopher Robert Sokolowski posited that paintings can “present worlds in 
which something like us can be” (Sokolowski 2005, p.346). 
31 For example: Beardsley (1981), Shusterman (2000), Johnson (2008), Arnheim (1974), Joy & 
Sherry (2003), Di Benedetto (2007). 
32 This definition is narrower than other common understandings of the term affect. 
Anthropologist and psycholgist Paul Ekman, for example, regards affect rather as a 
superordinate concept comprising emotions, moods, character traits and other psycho-
physiological phenomena (Ekman 1992, 1994). 
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the artist’s mission to explore and make manifest new ways of perceiving and 
being affected;33 artists create affects and percepts34 in their work, then “give 
them to us and make us become with them” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, p.175).  
Philosopher Brian Massumi elaborated on the notion of affect and related it 
to the concept of meaning. “Meaning encounters” are a “thinking-perceiving 
body” (exemplified by a carpenter) that is moving “out to its outer most edge, 
where it meets another body” (a piece of wood) and which draws it ... 
... into an interaction in the course of which it locks 
onto that body’s affects (capacities for acting and 
being acted upon) and translates them into a form that 
is functional for it (qualities it can recall). A set of 
affects, a portion of the object’s essential dynamism, is 
drawn in, transferred into the substance of the 
thinking-perceiving body. From there it enters new 
circuits of causality. (Massumi 1992, p.36) 
Relating this notion to the encounter between artwork and viewer, artist and 
philosopher Simon O’Sullivan described it as: 
[A] collision, between two fields of force, transitory but 
ultimately transformative … The encounter, between 
participant and artwork, is as productive, albeit in a 
different sense, as that between artist and material. 
“Meaning” might then be thought as this productive 
“event”, this “moment” of meeting, ungraspable in its 
moment of occurrence, but real in its effects.  
(O’Sullivan 2006, p.21) 
On a similar but more therapeutic note, Beardsley argued that the experience of 
art can generate feelings of personal integrity, resolve lesser conflicts, develop 
imagination, refine perceptual discrimination, and improve the ability to 
empathise (Beardsley 1981 [1958], p.574). What Funch, O’Sullivan, and 
Beardsley’s accounts suggest is a pragmatic, emotional, and potentially 
ineffable side of meaning.  
                                            
33 Deleuze and Guattari defined the work of art as a ‘multiplicity (or ‘bloc’) of sensations’ 
(percepts and affects). It is the only entity in which sensations endure: “The young girl maintains 
the pose that she has had for five thousand years, a gesture that no longer depends on 
whoever made it. The air still has the turbulence, the gust of wind, the light that it had that day 
last year and it no longer depends on whoever was breathing it that morning” (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1994 [1991], p.163). 
34 John Wylie summarised the two concepts as they pertain to visual qualities: “[A] percept is a 
style of visibility, of being-visible, a configuration of light and matter that exceeds, enters into, 
and ranges over the perceptions of a subject who sees. An affect is an intensity, a field perhaps 
of awe, irritation or serenity, which exceeds, enters into, and ranges over the sensations and 
emotions of a subject who feels” (Wylie 2005, p.236). 
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These evaluations of meaning outside the realm of verbal language are 
valid, revealing that there is more to this concept than many post-structuralist 
critics accounted for. However, related claims that bring meaning close to 
enabling a ‘better contact to present life’, influencing ‘the body’s power of 
acting’, or appealing to ‘powers in which man recognizes himself’ remain vague 
and somewhat esoteric. This does not compromise any benefits a person may 
gain from art apprehension independent from language, but, at least for 
heuristic reasons, verbal accounts such as McCloskey’s remain very instructive: 
My moving forward embroiled me in a process of 
thinking and doing. I had to re-evaluate and re-
configure all that I had known and understood (or not 
understood) … this encounter would ultimately 
destabilise this world. I started to read, write, and 
draw. (McCloskey 2010, p.4)  
The statement suggests that putting apprehensions in words can be useful in 
bringing out crucial aspects of meaning. Although an artwork’s ‘meaning to’ a 
viewer comprises germane emotional, pragmatic, and visual/imaginary 
elements, it is often reflective realisation that renders them fully effective. The 
following sections will further explore this assumption.   
3.5 Meaning-Making 
3.5.1 Meaning and Verbalisation 
Psychological research has shown that emotional engagement is 
foundational to the construction of personal meaning in general, and specific 
studies of the relation between emotion and intellect in the apprehension of art 
confirms this observation.35 A number of models have been suggested to 
describe the emotional-cognitive relation in art apprehension, variously 
emphasising that cognition is the basis of emotions or vice-versa.36 Drawing 
together results from several psychological studies (Csíkszentmihályi 1990; 
Carver 1996; Smith 1996), Matthew Pelowski and Fuminori Akiba concluded 
that unreflected encounters with art “do not include a component of self-
                                            
35 For a general assessment, see: Sanbonmatsu & Kardes (1988), Greenberg & Pascual-Leone 
(1997), Dirkx (2001). For art-related investigations, see: Silvia (2005a; 2005b), Roald (2007), 
Hagdtvedt et al. (2008). 
36 For example: Leder et al. (2004); Hagtvedt et al. (2008) draw attention to contributions by 
Cohen & Areni (1990), Berkowitz (1993), Forgas (1995), and Wyer et al. (1999). 
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modification and leave the viewer without any understanding of the significance 
of the preceding event” (Pelowski & Akiba 2011, p.92). It may be objected that 
the implied pertinence of ‘understanding’ is contentious because ‘significance’ 
(meaning) does not require to be understood and self-modification (meaning 
turning into effect) occurs already on emotional, practical and/or 
visual/imaginary levels. At least this is implied by the discussion in the previous 
section (also Shusterman 1990; 1999; Johnson 2008). Meaning can, as in the 
case of the Mutu-viewer, ‘come upon’ us – sometimes perhaps as a kind of 
aha!-experience (Lasher et al. 1983) – without our wilful constructive or 
elaborating activity. In such situations, however, we do not make the meaning. If 
the making is under observation, reflection is a component that cannot be 
neglected and verbalisation will often help to gain further insight regarding the 
‘preceding event’ and make it manageable.  
McCloskey’s account suggests that ‘thinking’, ‘re-evaluating’ and ‘re-
configuring’ eventually facilitated her habitual changes (her beginning to ‘read, 
write, and draw’, etc.). “The constitution of an individual emotional quality”, 
Funch noted, “makes it possible to reflect on it, which in the long run is the 
fundamental basis for a personal ethic” (Funch 1997, p.249). I would like to flesh 
out this passage from an emotionally to an intellectually (and, for that matter, 
ethically)37 purposeful encounter through a personal memory. 
As a student, I went to see an exhibition of photos by Clare Strand with a 
few friends. The photographer had girls in their early teens pose as the Spice 
Girls pop group (Fig. 39). On the way out, one of our group remarked casually 
that he had ‘caught himself thinking that one or two of the girls looked almost 
sexy’. He was then quick to explain that ‘of course they were children’, and that 
‘he was no pervert’, and ‘how amazing it is what an outfit and makeup could 
do’.38 If this student hit an existential theme of his, it would make a perfect 
example for Funch’s theory: “The individual emotional quality” (some distraught 
but ultimately ineffable state) “goes from being governed by outer forces” (the 
                                            
37 I do not aim to make a contribution to debates on aesthetics in relation to ethics but it is 
noted, with Funch that self-realised ‘emotional growth’ would present an interesting starting 
point for such a discussion. In a similar vein, O’Sullivan argued that art increases our capacity to 
act in the world and embodies a kind of ‘ethicoaesthetics’, that is “the organisation of productive 
encounters ‘through’ art’. These productive encounters themselves allow for the generation of 
‘common notions’, understood simply as the concepts we form about the world when we 
experience the joy of two bodies that agree coming together” (O’Sullivan 2006, p.42). 
38 To provoke a disquietingly erotic response to seductively dressed teenagers is not an 
uncommon artistic strategy. An example would be the exhibition ‘Viva Lolita’, Maddox Arts 
Gallery, London, 2008. See also: Windsor (1998). 
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artist’s composition of percepts and 
affects, in this case the effect of ‘an 
outfit and makeup’) “to something that 
is an integrated part of the psyche” 
(erotic attraction) “and becomes 
focused on a specific existential theme 
for the first time” (very young girls) 
(Funch 1997, p.248).  
The scenario works as a thought 
experiment but ultimately seems 
excessive. A less existential yet 
meaningful encounter would be one 
accountable for in terms of Iser’s 
notion of negation: the viewer showed 
“a productive response” as he turned 
his attention towards his own 
spontaneous emotional reaction that 
contradicted his “previous range of 
orientation” (Iser 1994 [1976], p.133). He was thereby enabled to “become 
aware of the inadequacy of the gestalten he has produced” and “detach himself 
from his own participation in the text”, respectively “see himself being guided 
from without” (Iser 1994 [1976], p.133). In the example the viewer relegates the 
responsibility for his response to the girl’s outfit and makeup (as staged by the 
photographer). Ultimately it was the reflective response – the viewer being 
turned back to himself as a subject shaped by instincts and social norms – that 
rendered the work potentially meaningful to this viewer.  
In the existential scenario of McCloskey’s reception of Bourgeois’ work and 
the student’s experience of Strand’s Spice Girls, an initial emotional response 
took the place of a quest for intentions and yet both viewers responded in 
accordance with the works’ repertoire. Louise Bourgeois declared: “A work of 
art doesn’t have to be explained. If you do not have any feeling about this, I 
cannot explain it to you. If this doesn’t touch you, I have failed” (Bourgeois 
2001, 20:06min). In a different key, Strand’s Spice Girls appeal to the viewer’s 
emotional response – “insecure, vulnerable, feral and precociously jaded in their 
prematurely provocative yet unflattering poses”, as observed by critic Ana Finel 
 
Fig. 39: Clare Strand, Spice Girls: Ginger 
Spice - Charlotte Lane Aged 11 Years, 
1998, C41 print on aluminium, 101.6 x 76.2 
cm. 
Reproduction: Courtesy of the artist (©) and Royal 
College of Art, London 
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Honigman (2007, para.3). Yet the viewers have actively participated in the 
meaning-making through reflection on their emotional response and thus made 
the experience more purposeful; they elaborated the ‘meaning to’ them.  
3.5.2 A Basic Schema of Meaning-Making 
Although reflection and verbalisation are crucial features of meaning-
making, it cannot be reduced to these activities. Meaning-making begins before 
the viewer starts to think about a work of art. As already argued, philosophers 
have hinted at the role of prejudices (or ‘fore-meanings’) and the embedding of 
any subject in social and linguistic contexts that determine an artwork’s 
reception. As noted in the introduction, audience studies suggest that museum 
visitors frequently use art to prove to themselves (and sometimes others) that 
they are competent to make sense of it. Psychologist Dorothee Halcour 
observed that art viewers often seek art’s “vagueness (and the accompanying 
tension) ... in order to reduce it subsequently” (Halcour 2002, p.67, my 
translation) – a process that other researchers have identified as ‘cognitive 
mastery’ (Leder et al. 2004).39 
Another scenario of the initial phase of meaning-making is that the artwork 
captures the viewer’s attention unexpectedly, or that the viewer’s intellectual 
approach is interrupted by an instinctive response such as a feeling of disgust 
or erotic stimulation. Research suggests that arousal experienced at a given 
point in time emphasises and polarises succeeding affective and evaluative 
responses (Hagdtvedt et al. 2008; Pham 2004; Reisenzein 1983). In the case of 
an ‘affective ambush’, the artwork’s initial meaning is determined by an intuitive 
evaluation as a phenomenon deserving further attention; it is primarily 
perceived as something potentially useful, pleasing, or dangerous.  
In both cases – when viewers treat an artwork as a distinct intellectual 
challenge and when they respond instinctively to an ‘affective ambush’ – initial 
                                            
39 According to Helmut Leder, Benno Belke, Andries Oeberst & Dorothee Augustin, the 
aesthetic experience is “a cognitive process accompanied by continuously upgrading affective 
states that vice versa are appraised, resulting in an (aesthetic) emotion” (Leder et al. 2004, 
p.493). Psychologist Paul Silvia observed that evaluations of events, rather than the events 
themselves, cause the emotional experience. In this view, artworks may be said to affect 
emotions via their influence on appraisals (Silvia 2005a; 2005b). Silvia hints at the importance 
of the ‘knowledge emotions’ interest, confusion, and surprise (Silvia 2009; 2010). They, he 
argued, originate in people’s “appraisals of what they know, what they expect to happen, and 
what they think they can learn and understand” (Silvia 2009, p.49).  
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meaning is implicitly ascribed to the work in anticipation of the purpose it will 
probably have. Such meaning is necessarily potential in that the work bears a 
‘promise of meaning’. Whether/how the artwork will actually become meaningful 
in the sense of fostering a habitual/conceptual change (‘self-modification’) has 
yet to be worked out by the viewer. Fig. 40 illustrates the process: 
 
 
Fig. 40: Meaning-making – Basic Schema 
 
We know that artworks are automatically associated with images and other 
sensual memories, emotions, or verbal knowledge (Fenner 2003; 2008). 
Whether further analysis takes place depends on whether these associations 
can be related to one’s personal interests. This does not necessarily involve 
conscious reflection. Dewey referred to a phase of ‘undergoing’ in experience 
but emphasised that this process is not impersonal or unrelated to reflection: 
The organism brings with it through its own structure, 
native and acquired, forces that play a part in the 
interaction. The self acts as well as undergoes, and its 
undergoings are not impressions stamped upon an 
inert wax but depend upon the way the organism 
reacts and responds. ... The organism is a force, not a 
transparency. (Dewey 2005 [1934], p.56) 
This ‘force’ is largely involuntary – however, “adequate yielding of the self” to 
the artwork requires also “a controlled activity that may well be intense”; “[t]here 
is work done on the part of the percipient as there is on the part of the artist” 
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scrutinising how spontaneously evoked images, emotions, or verbal memories 
intersect with the viewer’s general interests. One may be reminded of women 
who ruin their makeup, of issues surrounding maternity, or of teenage sex 
appeal, but one may find these themes of little personal interest. Conversely, 
finding an artwork interesting rather than just pleasing40 prolongs the time spent 
on its apprehension. Prolonged viewing time increases the chances of making 
connections with one’s own ‘lived experience’, and thus of discovering personal 
relevance (Pelowski 2007; Lachapelle 2010).  
It is conceivable that meaning to one’s life can be elaborated or constructed 
outside verbal language. One might indeed improve one’s cooking skills by 
participating in a Tiravanija work or train equilibrioception when balancing on 
Robert Morris’ ‘Bodyspacemotionthings’41. What such exercises have in 
common with verbal meaning-making is the time component, or yielding. 
However, this type of meaning-making is often a corollary of conceptual 
frameworks and remains comparatively rare. Usually, the meaning-maker 
confronts the question: ‘What is the work doing for me?’ In response, existing 
assumptions can be enforced (as by the Mutu-viewer), revised (as by the 
Bourgeois-viewer) or at least challenged (as by the Martin- and the Strand-
viewer). The ‘meaning of’ (‘purpose of’) the artwork eventually converges with 
the ‘meaning to’ (as apprehension of value) fulfilling the initially perceived 
promise of meaning.42   
3.6 Modes of Meaning-Making 
The fact that different people interpret the same work of art in different ways 
is partially owed to different, but not mutually exclusive, interpretative ‘logics’. 
With reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’, Richard Shusterman 
referred to ‘interpretive games’ and interpretation as a “performed ability” 
responding “to the work of art in ways conforming to the range of culturally 
                                            
40 Compare: Silvia (2006, chap.one) 
41 ‘Bodyspacemotionthings’ is collection of weights, beams, tunnels, platforms, ramps, and 
rollers, inviting the visitor to crawl, balance, climb and otherwise interact with. The installation 
was presented by the Tate gallery in London in 1971 and re-staged by the Tate Modern in 2009. 
42 When Rancière cautions against artists (like Martha Rosler) and theorists (like Nicolas 
Bourriaud) who allegedly presume viewers to be passive by default and thus strive to ‘activate’ 
them so that they would realise or take action against something that the artist finds worthy of 
critique, he trusts precisely in this individual motivation. Rancière is confident though that “the 
very people that are supposed to be ignorant or passive spectators are able to reappropriate in 
their way the product of the strategies of the artist” (Rancière 2010b, p.74). 
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appropriate response, ways already accepted or ways capable of winning 
acceptance” (Shusterman 2000, p.92). In the following, three types of meaning-
making – meaning-retrieval, meaning-speculation, and meaning-separation – 
are distinguished. 
3.6.1 Retrieval 
Despite doubts about ‘true’ and fixable meaning, the desire to find and 
retrieve such meaning is still widespread. This is perhaps most understandable 
within art historical disciplines where artworks are often explained based on the 
context out of which they emerged. Retrieval also remains pivotal, however, to 
certain art critics. Intentionalists and formalists defend the necessity to find 
meaning in the motivation of the author, respectively the work’s compositional 
‘code’. Even in hermeneutic theories of interpretation that emphasise the 
importance of viewer bias, the principle aim remains to reveal hidden truth.  
Audience research confirms the general preference for meaning-retrieval 
among exhibition visitors. Art viewers in museums typically begin their 
explorations by trying to recognise works’ subject matter through their visual 
language and perceptible details (Weltzl-Fairchild 1991; Émond 2008). 
Subsequently, they often seek confirmation in the label: “They want to know 
how close they actually come to the official description of the artwork they 
explore” (Émond 2008, p.54;  also Deeth 2012). Information provided by 
museums about the artwork and the artist is generally welcome (Émond 2006a; 
Carter-Birken 2008; Wood 2012). It has also been observed that viewers 
typically make initial value judgments based on recognition and personal 
preferences (Leder et al. 2004).43 A further reaching ambition is, then, “the 
correct placement of a work of art in terms of a period, school, style, or 
particular place within the artist’s oeuvre” (Housen 1987, p.43).44 Viewers go 
beyond this stage of classification when critical skills are brought into the 
service of feelings and intuitions (Housen 2007, p.175). This happens, for 
                                            
43 The observations of Émond and Leder et al. are supported by research of Parsons (1987), 
Housen (1987), Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990), Weltzl-Fairchild (1991), Van Moer 
(2007), Pelowski & Akiba (2011). 
44 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Rick Robinson observed that the propensity to appreciate 
especially “the organisation of the elements constituting the work”, “sleuth out secret messages 
hidden in the work” as well as to “place it within a historical, art historical, or biographical 
context” are among the most frequently discussed aspects of art world professionals 
(Csíkszentmihályi & Robinson 1990, pp.30,43,44). 
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example, when a work’s metaphors are assessed, a move Leder and 
colleagues call ‘cognitive mastering and evaluation’ (Leder et al. 2004).45 
Finally, viewers often enjoy “general contemplations about art production, art 
criticism and the space in which artifacts are placed” (Van Moer 2007, p.6).  
In ‘retrieval mode’, meaning is located entirely outside oneself, where, 
Pelowski & Akiba argued, “it can be received and assessed but is itself 
‘unchangeable’” and “leaves no opening for considering the role [of the viewer’s 
own identity] in shaping information, or the role that artwork plays in questioning 
expectations” (Pelowski & Akiba 2011, p.82). Given these constraints, retrieval 
qualifies as meaning-making only because symbols, metaphors, etc. are often 
not immediately transparent; they have to be worked out by the viewer in order 
to establish the work’s repertoire. This involves ‘adequate yielding’ and an 
activity of reasoning and choosing between different interpretative avenues. An 
artwork is made purposeful in retrieval mode alone only in so far as it can 
become a source of self-affirmative satisfaction to the viewer.   
3.6.2 Speculation 
Post-structuralist theory and reader response criticism emphasise the 
contingency of all interpretation. In this vein, Iser (similar to Eco; compare 6.2.1) 
argued that it is the interpreter’s task to “elucidate the potential meanings of a 
text, and not to restrict himself to just one” even though “the total potential can 
never be fulfilled in the reading process” (Iser 1994 [1976], p.22). It is this 
impossibility that brings the relativity and subjectivity of meaning, as well as the 
“factors that precondition the composition of the meaning” to awareness (Iser 
1994 [1976], p.22). A radical consequence of post-structuralist teachings and a 
position diametrically opposed to retrieval is to withhold any formulation of 
meaning; that is, to acknowledge art as something where words find their limit 
and “resistance is mounted against the authority of discourse, against 
discursive hegemony” (Derrida et al. 1994, p.13). Although corresponding 
attitudes have been observed in art viewers,46 a more modest and arguably 
                                            
45 “The results of the cognitive mastering stage are permanently evaluated in relation to their 
success in either revealing a satisfying understanding, successful cognitive mastering or 
expected changes in the level of ambiguity” (Leder et al. 2004, p.499). 
46 Halcour argued that the conscious disavowal of explanation – to keep meaning ‘floating’ – 
represents a rare, self-confident, intellectual attitude which consists in enjoying to maintain the 
tension of the unexplained (Halcour 2002). Halcour regards this attitude as often linked to self-
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more frequent renouncement of fixed meaning in interpretative practice is a 
consciously biased, experimental and playful approach to meaning-making that 
may be identified as speculation. Andrea Weltzl-Fairchild drew attention to 
related interpretive activities ... 
… in which the viewer is orienting herself in relation to 
the work of art and in which other solutions are being 
offered to a perceived problem, new links, usages, 
and elements are being made, or new insight may 
perhaps be gained. (Weltzl-Fairchild 1991, p.275)47 
Some audience studies have 
revealed that viewers 
occasionally interpret 
artworks as metaphors for 
aspects of their own lives.48 
To speculate about the 
meaning of an artwork is to 
seek feasible interpretations 
whilst accepting that there 
may be equally viable 
alternatives. The difference 
between retrieval and 
speculation is an attitudinal 
one: the retrieving viewer 
seeks an embedded truth whilst the speculating viewer is not concerned about 
‘missing the point’.  
An example of speculative meaning-making is the following description by 
author Benjamin Weissman of his encounter with Christopher Wool’s word 
paintings (Fig. 41): 
                                                                                                                                
esteem: “[D]oes it not speak for one’s own sophistication to deal with ultimately unanswerable 
questions?” (Halcour 2002, p.82, my translation). Another reason for suspending meaning may 
be that any commitment entails the chance to err. In this respect, Housen observed that some 
viewers acknowledge the work’s “identity and value being subject to reinterpretation” and 
mistrust their “own processes, which are knowingly subject to chance and change” (Housen 
2007, p.175, see also Halcour 2002, p.340). 
47 This kind of response applies also describes to activities of meaning-making in separation 
mode. 
48 See: Weltzl-Fairchild (1991), Falk and Dierking (2000), Halcour (2002), Weltzl-Fairchild and 
Gumpert (2006), Van Moer (2007) and Rowold (2008). 
 
Fig. 41: Christopher Wool, Untitled, 1990, enamel on 
aluminium, 274,3 x 182,9 cm. 
Museum of Modern Art, New York. Courtesy of the artist and 
Luhring Augustine, New York. Photo: Tim McFarlane / Public 
Domain (CC BY-NC-ND) 
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[At first] I thought they were smug, flip, arrogant, 
simplistic; another art world gimmick straight from 
bogus island. ... Years passed, and the humorous 
ghosts inside Mr Wool’s cryptic utterances suddenly 
made sense to me and turned me into an ardent 
admirer. I started to see the words as figuration, 
enlarging English letters to the size of a human torso, 
sometimes bigger. I understood them in terms of a 
body. So much dimension in their flatness. ... They 
made more and more sense. They also prefigure the 
broken syntax of text messaging by at least a decade.  
(Weissman 2007, para.16,19) 
Weissman’s initial response to Wool’s work revealed no ‘meaning to’ him at all. 
Later, the ‘cryptic utterances suddenly made sense’. A phase of undergoing 
(indicated by happening suddenly) blended with a phase of making, which led 
Weissman to liken Wool’s paintings to ‘the broken syntax of text messaging’ 
that he knew could not have been the artist’s intention in 1990. A similar 
impression can be gleaned from the viewer of Mutu’s ‘Try Dismantling the Little 
Empire Inside of You’ (Fig. 37): 
Embedded in the installation, the wall appears to have 
these jewel-like pearlescent forms, which may or may 
not have been intended to also be seen as acne.  
(Fortner 2007, para.3)  
or 
To me, the monkey could represent the socially 
sanctioned media, where it gets to deem what sorts of 
things are attractive. (para.6) 
Interpretations like these indicate an awareness of a personal bias without 
contradicting the work’s repertoire. It is compatible with Eco’s view that Open 
Works produce an especially intense pleasure because viewers enjoy 
scrutinizing them for clues and formulating tentative interpretations of the “ever-
changing profiles and possibilities in a single form” (Eco 1989, p.74 [1962]). The 
purpose that viewers create for themselves in speculation mode is mainly a 
playful, entertaining one.  
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3.6.3 Separation  
Attitudes of retrieval and speculation both look for signs and relations 
between these signs in the art object, which are then interpreted with or without 
reference to the artist’s intentions. When Weiss referred Wool’s work to ‘the 
broken syntax of text messaging’, he neither began to reflect on this topic (as 
far as we can tell) nor is this the work’s subject matter. By contrast, in all other 
examples cited in this chapter, viewers seem at some point to disregard 
meaning related to formal qualities, symbols and intentions. Rather they 
focussed on a negotiation of (social) norms and their self-image and thus issues 
that the apprehended works are about. In other words, these viewers were 
more concerned with the signified than the signifier.  
The search for meaning separated from object-features is more difficult to 
relate to certain philosophical positions than are retrieval and speculation. 
Rather it is found in the ideas of various, not necessarily related thinkers. Iser’s 
idea of negation is akin to this approach as is to some degree Jacques 
Rancière’s view that to experience works of art can have a political effect in 
dealing with its “multiplicity of folds and gaps in the fabric of common 
experience that change the cartography of the perceptible, the thinkable and the 
feasible” (Rancère 2008, para.28). In a similar vein, Nicolas Bourriaud 
demanded an art that “enables us to realize alternative, temporary versions of 
reality” (Bourriaud & Ryan 2009, para.17). Also related is Michael Parsons’ view 
that it is the highest level of art appreciation when the viewer confronts 
questions regarding human values more generally as opposed to merely 
contemplating aesthetic issues (Parsons 1987, p.151).  
Despite the negative empirical evaluation of viewers’ endorsement of their 
role as meaning-makers, separative meaning-making has been recognised. 
Mihaly Csíkszentmihályi and Rick Robinson note that in their study, artists’ 
intentions were sometimes “bypassed” by viewers who saw the art “as a vehicle 
for stimulating fantasy and imagination” or by reflections “upon themselves as 
viewers”, and subsequently reported a heightened awareness of themselves 
(Csíkszentmihályi & Robinson 1990, p.66). From theses observations, they 
concluded that “art can become a means of questioning (oneself) and (one’s) 
surroundings in order to obtain a greater understanding of different values” 
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(Csíkszentmihályi & Robinson 1990, p.67). The Martin-, the Bourgeois-, and the 
Strand-viewer’s examples support this observation.  
Another type of response in line with Csíkszentmihályi & Robinson’s 
conclusion focuses on more general, ‘political’, values. The following viewer’s 
comment on Maria Fernanda Cardoso’s sculptures of tiny animal genitals 
(including those of insects) (Fig. 42) provides an example: 
They are absolutely incredible structures and it makes 
you wonder why on Earth nature created such weird 
and unique shapes for different creatures to ultimately 
do the same thing, that is, reproduce. This type of art 
is so conducive to getting the audience to look at their 
world in a whole new way and ponder upon what other 
little microcosms (or big macrocosms) might exist right 
underneath our very noses. For me, this type of art 
has really made me realise that humans are just one 
creature within a whole network of life. What we think 
is normal, other species would probably think is weird 
and mysterious, and vice versa. … It has also made 
me question why we are so intent on finding life away 
from Earth, when most of us don’t even appreciate the 
inspiring array of life here in our very own backyard! 
















Similarly, regarding Mutu’s ‘Try Dismantling the Little Empire Inside of You’ the 
afore quoted viewer stated: 
 
Fig. 42: Maria Fernanda Cardoso, Museum of Copulatory Organs, 
2012, multimedia installation. Sydney; Sydney Biennale. 
Courtesy of the artist (©). Photo: Penny Clay (©) 
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It is something that all women deal with, but some get 
sucked into the easier, thornier web of social trends. 
Women want to feel attractive and emotionally valid, 
but what we really need as women is to create our 
own personal standards – not allowing it get inside 
and taint ourselves. (Fortner 2007, para.6) 
Besides grappling with general political issues, both viewers also relate the 
subject matter to their own life; a situation that Iser, following Dewey, described 
as follows: 
The ability to perceive oneself during the process of 
participation is an essential quality of the aesthetic 
experience; the observer finds himself in a strange, 
halfway position: he is involved, and he watches 
himself being involved. (Iser 1994 [1976], p.134)49 
This intermediate position of the viewer is related to a condition referred to as 
‘psychical distance’ (Funch 1997, pp.188–194; Cupchik 2002), a concept 
introduced by the aesthetician Edward Bullough (1912). Like Immanuel Kant’s 
concept of ‘disinterestedness’50, psychical distance describes a mode of 
engaging with art objects that is removed from all practical concerns. In contrast 
to Kant, however, whose argument is rooted in metaphysics, Bullough based 
his theory in psychology. Psychical distance enables viewers to better 
understand their own modes of responding:  
[Psychical Distance] has a negative, inhibitory aspect 
– the cutting-out of the practical sides of things and of 
our practical attitude to them – and a positive side – 
the elaboration of the experience on the new basis 
created by the inhibitory action of Distance.  
(Bullough 1912, p.89) 
The recognition of an object ‘as art’ inhibits actions that real-world phenomena 
would foster (we do not actually talk back to Rembrandt’s ‘Syndics’ or comment 
on spelling mistakes in Wool’s word paintings). Psychical distance entails a 
division between the observing self and emotions and response behaviour the 
observer would usually have given certain observations s/he makes. This mode 
of viewing allows for the contemplation of depictions and objects, including 
uncomfortable ones, and to observe one’s own response to them. According to 
Bullough, it is crucial to realise an appropriate balance between engagement 
                                            
49 For a related, psychological perspective, see: Pelowski and Akiba (2011), see also Olafur 
Eliasson’s statement quoted in chapter one, p 23. 
50 See: chapter one, note 26. 
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and distance, which is in fact “the utmost decrease of Distance without its 
disappearance”, and separate the object and its appeal “from one’s own self, by 
putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends” (Bullough 1912, p.94,89). 
However, this must not exceed the point where the work looses its capacity to 
affect the viewer: “[T]he relation between the self and the object” must not be 
“broken to the extent of becoming ‘impersonal’” (Bullough 1912, p.89).  
 
Whilst Iser’s reader simply ‘finds himself’ in the ‘halfway position’, Bullough 
posited that we must interpret our own “‘subjective’ affections not as modes of 
our being but rather as characteristics of the phenomenon” (Bullough 1912, 
p.89). Under certain circumstances this seems to happen automatically as the 
Strand-viewer’s example shows; however, it is also influenced by many 
contextual factors. In the next chapter it will be argued that much of the context 
in which art is usually apprehended works in favour of this attitude, and that 
artists have developed various strategies to facilitate a balance of emotional 
and reflective responses.  
Psychical distance is one aspect of separative meaning-making. This thesis 
agrees that strategically, it is important for art aiming to turn the viewer back to 
her/himself (as viewer); here, however, additional emphasis is placed on the 
viewer’s reflection on her/his own involvement. Also, whilst Bullough rejected 
treating artworks as an inspiration for personal fantasies – a condition he called 
‘under-distanced’ – such imagination is not considered problematic to the theory 
of meaning-making advanced here, as long as it does not contradict the work’s 
repertoire.  Examples of explicit reflections on one’s own involvement would be 
McCloskey’s testimonial and the ‘Mutu-viewer’s’ as she feels ‘the same internal 
struggle of contemporary beauty standards’ and wonders what she ‘should and 
should not be doing as an independent woman’. A more implicit version is 
exemplified by the Cardoso-viewer, as she realised that ‘humans are just one 
creature within a whole network of life’ etc. but did not thematise her personal 
position in relation to these issues. Either way, apprehensions like these reflect 
self-generated purposes that potentially promote habitual/conceptual change. 
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3.6.4 The Interrelation of Retrieval, Speculation, Separation 
The three levels of meaning-making are neither mutually exclusive nor 
phenomenologically distinct. McCloskey retrieved in passing that “maternity can 
be traced as a theme in [Bourgeois’] work” but promptly clarified that she was in 
a separative mode of meaning-making: “[I]t is the connecting to the maternal 
(my maternal) through the specificity of the encounter that is relevant here” 
(McCloskey 2010, p.2). This is a rather explicit distinction between two modes 
of meaning-making but it is likely that viewers will often not distinguish between 
different approaches. One might believe one is retrieving the artist’s intentions, 
but in fact one has already wandered into more general considerations. In this 
vein, Weltzl-Fairchild, drawing on her empirical studies, argued that viewers 
often suggest “in a spirit of play … other versions, solutions, or variations of the 
work of art” (Weltzl-Fairchild 1991, p.278). An effect may be that these changes 
“bring about a self-knowledge, a revelation of what the viewer is like and what 
she values” (Weltzl-Fairchild 1991, p.278). Such reflections are distinct from 
reflections in retrieval mode; however, they may not be registered as such.  
Despite the difficulties involved in disentangling the three levels of meaning-
making in practice, it is useful to theoretically distinguish them. Mere retrieval 
neglects that artworks can take on a variety of meanings beyond the context of 
their production. In speculation mode, art apprehension is more playful but 
remains committed to explaining the art object in terms of its objective features. 
Only in separation mode does meaning-making respond to political, social, 
environmental, or cultural issues and/or refer the viewer back to her/himself (as 
viewer).  
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to elucidate the relation between the third person 
perspective of ‘meaning of’ the artwork, and the first person perspective of its 
‘meaning to’ an art viewer. In a theory of meaning-making, which emphasises 
the idiosyncratic activity of the viewer, the former’s relevance is largely 
restricted to the work’s repertoire. Borrowing this term from Wolfgang Iser, the 
repertoire is defined as those social norms, conventions and historical facts that 
constitute a work’s subject matter. As a basic constituent of the work, the 
repertoire must be taken into account as a platform on which personal meaning 
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is developed. Failure to appreciate the repertoire means to treat a work of art as 
a trigger for reflection just like any other random object.  
‘Meaning of’ is not limited to the third person perspective but extends to the 
purpose a work fulfils for the individual viewer. To define meaning as personal 
purpose only makes sense if this purpose is not fixed by any external agent, be 
that an artist or any other authority. A work’s purpose is thus subject to 
individual negotiation and as such converges with the notion of ‘meaning to’ as 
a source of personal benefit. The meaning-making viewer renders the artwork 
purposeful to her/himself by allowing it to promote habitual changes (including 
changes of concepts and attitudes): viewers create a meaning, building on the 
meaning of the artwork, which is limited to its repertoire and never complete. 
Meaning as purpose and source of benefit does not depend on 
verbalisation. As immediate ‘experience’ it may have practical psychological 
consequences ‘beneath interpretation’, which includes but is not limited to being 
a source of pleasure, self-affirmation or therapeutic effects. However, with 
respect to the focus on meaning-making as an act of construction or 
elaboration, language is a crucial tool. When reasons for the viewer’s own 
emotional responses are put into words, meaning is made sharable and 
accessible to further elaboration. Additional ‘meaning to’ can be gained by 
meta-reflection, for example by questioning explicitly how the work integrates 
with the collection of other objects that belong to one’s own experience of the 
world. 
Meaning-making can be divided into three different ‘modes’, which have 
been defined as retrieval, speculation and separation. Meaning retrieval – 
whether focused on the necessary account of the repertoire or hoping to reveal 
the work’s whole secret by seizing artistic intentions, symbols, etc. – can count 
only in a very limited sense as ‘making’ of meaning. More in line with the 
suggested creative notion of meaning-making is the playful, speculative mode, 
which involves formulating hypotheses regarding what certain features of a 
work and their internal relations can be seen as representing. The speculative 
attitude is experimental and consciously biased but, like retrieval, foregrounds 
the interpretation of a work’s discernable features. Since much contemporary 
art points to critical issues of the world we live in, meaning-making must grapple 
with such subject matter, addressing it directly rather than dwelling on 
reflections of ‘what looks like what’ in the work. Meaning-making that goes 
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beyond the interpretation of the object’s signifiers and focuses instead on the 
signified has been called separative meaning-making. This is the type of 
meaning making most pertinent to this thesis, and is therefore the focus of the 
following chapters. 
4           CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF THE ARTIST  
 
As an artist you’re looking for universal triggers. You 
want it both ways. You want it to have an immediate 
impact, and you want it to have deep meanings as 
well. … When I make the artwork, anything I say, I try 
to deny it as well at the same time, so you make 
viewers responsible for interpretation. I think that’s 
good. I want to make artwork that makes people 
question their own lives, rather than give them any 
answers. 
Damien Hirst, 20071  
 
The viewer testimonials discussed in chapter three were selected because 
they reflect certain types of response independent of the artist’s intention. It is 
interesting to note that all of the artists whose works viewers commented on 
agree on the importance of viewer contribution. Wangechi Mutu explained that 
she is “constantly trying to figure out ways” to make viewers “dialogue with 
whatever is there” (Mutu & Enright 2008, para.24). Maria Fernanda Cardoso 
stated that “the viewers’ reading of the work of art completes it” but also 
stressed the artist’s responsibility to make the work’s repertoire transparent: 
 [Y]ou also have to try to fill the ‘gap in meaning’ 
perhaps some other ways, perhaps by writing and 
talking about it, or being choosy about the context 
where you exhibit your artworks ... yet all this dance is 
part of what makes the work of art.  
(Cardoso 2013, personal communication) 
Jennifer Louise Martin agrees that “the viewer has the freedom to interpret art 
how they like/want” but that “at the same time it is the artist’s job to make 
artwork that evokes [the] kind of response they want” (Martin 2012, personal 
communication). This differentiation points to the tension between the work’s 
openness and its repertoire. Louise Bourgeois was interested in the viewer 
being “no longer merely a viewer if he is able to move from the stage of viewing 
to the stage of collaborating” which transforms her/him “through a ‘crise de 
conscience’” from a passive “into a person who becomes suddenly active … 
through the creative act” (Bourgeois 1976, p.372). Clare Strand is cautious not 
                                            
1 Hirst & Ayers (2007, para.24) 
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“to explain the image away and allow viewers no space for their own 
interpretation” and thus enjoys leaving issues “unsolved” (Strand et al. 2009, 
p.95). Given artist’s wide-spread interest in engaging viewers in (separative) 
meaning-making raises questions about how far their responsibilities and 
possibilities reach within the network of factors influencing an artwork’s 
reception. Before turning to this question, however, it is necessary to address 
the ‘intention to neglect intention’ paradox.  
4.1 The ‘Intention of Neglecting Intention – Paradox’ 
Nicolas Bourriaud made an important point: “When an artist shows us 
something, he uses a transitive ethic which places his work between the ‘look-
at-me’ and the ‘look-at-that’” (Bourriaud 2002 [1998], p.24). Art calls attention to 
form, medium, subject matter and context, which together make a work 
recognisable as an artist’s intentional product. The viewer sees the artist’s 
‘actualised choices’ (Eco) and thus her/his subjective point of view (‘look-at-
me’). However, this often includes the intention to make the viewer reflect on 
the work’s subject matter (‘look-at-that’) and to refrain from searching for the 
artist’s intentions. It has been argued that acknowledging an artwork’s repertoire 
is essential for its appropriate apprehension. It was also presumed that artworks 
made with the intention to be open for the viewer’s ‘contribution to the creative 
act’ are only appreciated appropriately if this intention is in fact realised by the 
viewer. The two premises seem to work against each other like Epimenides’ 
paradox: how can it be a valid artistic intention that the viewer neglects to look 
for artistic intention?  
The answer lies in the difference between two kinds of intentions. For 
example, the Israel-Palestine conflict belongs to the repertoire of Friedl’s ‘Zoo 
Story’, which both directs and limits appropriate meaning-making in terms of its 
semantic content. By contrast, the openness of the work pertains to a general 
attitude the viewer shall adopt.2 Philosopher Jerrold Levinson made a useful 
distinction between ‘semantic’ and ‘categorial’ [sic] intentions. The former 
pertain to a work’s subject matter (for example aiming to induce some 
imagination or suggesting a thematic frame), whereas the latter “govern not 
                                            
2 Friedl said that he “views the giraffe as a sculpture that can and should help visitors invent 
stories to go along with it” (cited by Deutsche Welle Online 2007, para.7). 
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what a work is to mean but how it is to be fundamentally conceived or 
approached”, reflecting “the maker’s conception of what he has produced and 
what it is for” (Levinson 1995, p.222,232).3 These intentions are distinct from 
the work’s subject matter and are not always ‘extractable’ because they are not 
made available in the same way as semantic intentions. Categorial intentions 
determine whether a stuffed giraffe should be understood as a political or 
ecological statement, for example, or as no statement at all, as it would if 
exhibited in a natural history museum. Each categorial understanding 
presupposes a different mode of approach, such as seeing something for its 
beauty or its political implications.  
Although this thesis essentially agrees with Levinson’s distinction, the 
descriptor ‘categorial’ is not ideal. ‘How’ a work ‘is to be fundamentally 
conceived or approached’ is not only determined by categorisation. The same 
artwork may fall into different categories such as ‘sculpture’, ‘ready-made’, or 
‘political art’, which demand different and perhaps controversial approaches. 
Also, the ‘how’ of dealing with an artwork may not be determined by categorial 
affiliation alone. Independent from categorial recognition, artworks can be 
approached in various modes, such as different types of meaning-making, 
meditative contemplation, physical participation, etc. From the artist’s 
perspective, the viewer’s adoption of a certain approach can also be described 
as a modal intention. Levinson’s definition of ‘categorial intentions’ still applies, 
yet its referent ‘categorial’ is replaced with the more comprehensive term 
‘modal’. 
Simon O’Sullivan suggested that more important than ‘understanding’ an 
artwork is “being in a certain mode so that the practice ‘works’, something is 
activated by it” (O’Sullivan 2006, p.80). Slightly shifting the notion of 
‘understanding’, one might even say that to understand the work is partially to 
approach it in a certain mode. The artist’s modal intention that the viewer 
contributes to the creative act, reduces the relevance of her/his semantic 
intentions to the viewer’s comprehension of the repertoire. Modal and semantic 
intentions are epistemologically distinct. A viewer’s mode of approach 
(pertaining to a deliberate attitude) or mode of reception (including also visceral 
responses) does not presuppose a search for the artist’s semantic intentions. 
                                            
3 In a similar vein, philosopher Roberto Casati argued that “the artist can have intentions, but 
these concern the use of the work and not its interpretation” (Casati 2003, p.7). 
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Thus, epistemological differentiation between semantic and modal intentions 
renders the ostensive paradox of intentions redundant.  
4.2 The Artist’s Responsibilities 
Joseph Kosuth cautioned that: “If my intention is denied at its inception, 
then my responsibility for the meaning I generate in the world as an artist is also 
nullified” (Kosuth 1996, p.408). Kosuth’s viewpoint highlights that not only from 
the (intentionalist) critic’s position but also from the artist’s, certain intentions are 
not to be left to the whim of the viewer. This includes the modal intention “to 
engage the viewer/reader’s participation in the meaning-making process” 
(Kosuth 1996, p.409). Kosuth also referred to his (the artist’s) responsibility in 
this respect, arguing that it entails ‘standing up’ for one’s own position as well as 
asking oneself how to convey relevant intentions. Clearly, this opinion is not 
shared by everyone. Some would emphatically deny this being the job of the 
artist: if anyone’s it would be that of the curator or critic;4 however, I have 
argued in chapter one (and further in chapter six), that artists inevitably create 
artworks with a view to their reception. It is thus apt to consider their 
responsibility with respect to their works’ reception. 
The moderate intentionalist position claims that “the best evidence for what 
an utterer, artist, or author intends to say or mean is the utterance or artwork 
itself” (Carroll 2000, p.77). However, if that does not suffice, and it is granted 
that certain actual and not just hypothetical5 intentions of the artist are relevant, 
intentionalist criticism recommends the consultation of external sources, as 
Levinson explained:  
The author’s ancillary theoretical pronouncements; the 
rest of the author’s corpus; the work of those of the 
author’s contemporaries of whom he was aware; the 
social movements or political developments of the 
time that had a demonstrable impact on the author; 
and the author’s participation in or identification with 
artistic movements. (Levinson 1995, p.247) 
                                            
4 A pertinent example is painter Georg Baselitz’ declaration: “The artist is not responsible to 
anyone. His social role is asocial; his only responsibility consists in an attitude to the work he 
does. There is no communication with any public whatsoever. The artist can ask no question, 
and he makes no statement; he offers no information, and his work cannot be used. It is the end 
product which counts, in my case the picture” (cited by Gablik 1992, p.2). 
5 See: chapter three, note 10. 
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To scrutinise such resources may be pertinent for scholars who assess a work 
through comprehensive retrieval, but it is of little use to viewers in an exhibition 
as they can hardly be sent to the library before being able to grasp a work’s 
repertoire and adopt the desired mode of approach. Formalist anti-
intentionalists would respond that it is the artist’s task to design “his work in 
such a way that the receiver can process it successfully” (Beardsley 1980, 
p.191). However, post-structuralist critics would be quick to argue that this is a 
contentious claim as it will be difficult to determine who the receiver is, what 
s/he requires to know, and what ‘successfully’ means in each instance. Clearly 
artists cannot be held responsible for ensuring that every viewer is able to grasp 
the repertoire and any modal intentions, but does this mean that artists are 
relieved of all responsibility to consider defaults for reception? The following 
example illustrates this problem.  
Artist Ghada Amer’s work ‘Untitled (John Rose)’ (1999) (Fig.43a) shown at 
the 2000 Whitney Biennial was reviewed by Arthur Danto: 
Her paintings look, the catalog concedes, ‘like finely 
drawn, delicate abstractions.’ The informed eye leads 
one to surmise that her work shows the influence of 
Cy Twombly. But … the eye is a very poor guide to 
what we in fact see.… the forms are not abstract but 
derived from images of women in pornographic 
magazines… Amer is making, by means of stitched 
prurient imagery, some statement about the 
representation of women. One would not know this 
without help. (Danto 2007, p.23) 
To underpin an argument for the pertinence of the artist’s intention, philosopher 
Hans Maes cited this review and concluded that if even Danto – “arguably one 
of the most respected art critics today” – as well as other critics6 admit that 
“without the explanation we have no way of knowing what we are looking at”, 
we are justified to “look for reports of artistic intention to solve our interpretive 
quandaries” (Maes 2010, pp.134,133,138). This conclusion neglects that an 
artist like Amer should be interested in ensuring through the means at her own 
disposal that essential information (in this case the work’s feminist repertoire) 
                                            
6 Maes refers to Kimberley Lamm who confirmed that some of Amer’s works “at first glance 
seem to be Abstract Expressionist paintings but are actually pornographic images of women 
embroidered onto canvases with colored thread” (Maes 2010, p.135). For a similar assessment, 
see: Haber (2000). 
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can be understood.7 These means will usually be the work itself, although they 
might extend to informational 
directives provided alongside in 
an exhibition. An alternative to 
Maes’ conclusion would be that 
Amer simply fails to make a 
fundamental intention intelligible, 
and this is, Danto confirms, no 
exception since “a lot of the art 
being made today … we know to 
be meaningful but whose 
meaning we cannot grasp” 
(Danto 1994, p.xiii).8 In this 
particular case one wonders 
however if any of the critics have 
closely looked at the work. In 
fact, Amer’s repertoire is not 
particularly disguised (Fig. 43b).  
Amer cannot be made 
responsible for viewers who fail 
to see ostensive details in her 
work but this does not mean that 
artists cannot fail to guide 
reception in a way appropriate to 
their work, or that such guidance 
is not in their own interest. 
Criticism must take into account 
whether an artist is content with the way her/his work is exhibited. Regarding 
the 2007 Documenta – the exhibition where Friedl’s ‘Zoo Story’ was shown – 
                                            
7 It is unlikely that Amer would be equally content with an interpretation rendering her ideas 
subservient to her formal interests as she explained: “I am telling my story. I am really basically 
like a writer who is writing a diary. I cannot write, so I am painting it. People can ‘read’ it and 
they have to take it, or if it is something they don’t really understand, they don’t get touched. 
Others, if it touches them, they get invigorated” (Amer et al. 2010, p.135). Compare: Umberto 
Eco’s example of Jean Dubuffet’s ‘Materiologies’: chapter three, note 17. 
8 Michael Parsons went even further as he argued: “In many works what one needs to know 
cannot be taken for granted, even as part of a well-educated, art historical background. In these 
cases the meaning needs to be explained to the viewer or the work has little meaning” (Parsons 
2002, p.31). 
 
Fig. 43 a + b (total + detail): Ghada Amer, 
Untitled (John Rose), 1999, acrylic, embroidery, 
and gel medium on canvas, 183 x 183 cm. 
Private collection. Courtesy of Ghada Amer and Gallery 
Cheim & Read, New York (©).  Licensed by Bildrecht, Vienna, 
2014 (©) 
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critic Jörg Heiser complained that the “absence of any factual information on the 
wall labels” might give viewers the impression that they are expected “to give 
the right answer to an unintelligible question” (Heiser 2007, para.4). It would 
only be fair to criticise Friedl for difficulties in apprehending his giraffe on 
appropriate terms if he supported this curatorial policy.9 
The above discussion shifts the focus from the artist’s responsibility to the 
artist’s personal interest and the means used to articulate it. Even if artists rely 
on curators and external facilitators to contextualise their work appropriately, it 
can be expected that the material they provide themselves will be noticed. 
Rather than taking a neutral position, not giving intentions away promotes 
arbitrary rather than open meaning-making.  
4.3 Confining and Facilitating Aspects of the Viewing Context  
All strategies aiming to involve the viewer in the meaning-making process 
come with contextual limitations. Context in the realm of art apprehension has 
two closely related dimensions: the viewer’s personal dispositions, and the 
modification of these dispositions through viewing situations pertaining to where 
and how a work is presented. Philosopher David E.W. Fenner defined context 
as “all those various lenses – ethical, social, sexual, emotional, imaginative, 
political, religious, and so forth – through which a work of art may appropriately 
be viewed” (Fenner 2008, p.1).10 Appropriate ‘lenses’ are, to an extent, 
suggested by the work’s repertoire and the environment in which it is presented, 
but they are also shaped by the unique perspective of each viewer. In the vein 
of Eco’s Open Work the variety of these unique perspectives is what ultimately 
validates the work. If one is to gain any influence on these perspectives – and if 
that is at all possible – one must consider socio-cultural factors that permeate 
individual viewpoints. A wider, socio-cultural notion of context will be considered 
before focussing on the specific notion of context in (art) exhibition 
environments. 
 
                                            
9 Indeed, Friedl is vulnerable to such charges as he declared in relation to his work at the 
Documenta: “A lack of information, which would sometimes be desirable, doesn’t exist in art” 
(cited by Deutsche Welle Online 2007, para.7). If this was true, the origin of his giraffe would be 
irrelevant. 
10 For a summary of these factors, see: Fenner (2003, pp.46–53). 
  110 
4.3.1 The Viewer’s Mindset and the Culture of Art Viewing 
As argued in 3.5.2, meaning-making often begins before the actual 
encounter with the artwork. Viewers have different motivations for looking at art, 
and these motivations are modified by situational factors. People visit galleries 
as tourists, for study reasons, for matters of social prestige, etc. and thereby 
arrive with very different mindsets (Sifakakis 2007). An important factor in the 
web of pre-conceptions concerns expectations associated with certain artists’ 
names. Regarding the author of literary fiction, Michel Foucault argued that 
her/his name is a ... 
... functional principle by which, in our culture, one 
limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one 
impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the 
free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of 
fiction. (Foucault 2008 [1969], p.292) 
In this view, preconceptions that readers (or, by extension, art viewers) have 
about the author/artist play a major role in how they will process a work. Even if 
we put aside the scope of influence that Foucault assigns to this, we cannot 
deny that various cultural factors co-determine how we encounter works of art.  
Prior knowledge on the part of every viewer is influenced by exposure to 
other people’s opinion, cultural conventions, the media etc., a fact that Blake 
Gopnik dramtised as he concluded:  
Elites and experts of one kind or another, from 
mothers to priests to art critics to college professors – 
even some scientists – may be almost entirely 
responsible for what an artwork makes us feel, think, 
and say at any given time. (Gopnik 2012, p.130)  
Gopnik’s claim is bold but not unfounded. It explains why so many viewers look 
for the intention of the artist, the work’s symbolic meaning, and/or the ‘official 
version’ of interpretation. The challenge for artists interested in the viewer’s 
creative contribution is to move beyond these approaches.  
With his idea of the ‘emancipated spectator’, Jacques Rancière offered a 
theoretical model that undermines official versions of interpretation (whether 
explicitly provided by the gallery or merely assumed to exist by the viewer). 
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Rancière introduced the concept of the ‘ignorant master’11 as an analogy for the 
artist who invites the audience to examine the work as if venturing “into the 
forest of things and signs, to say what they have seen and what they think of 
what they have seen, to verify it and have it verified” (Rancière 2009, p.11). A 
viewer can only learn what the artist ‘master’ does not yet know her/himself, as: 
“She learns it as an effect of the mastery that forces her to search and verifies 
this research. But she does not learn the schoolmaster’s knowledge” (Rancière 
2009, p.14). In this model, the artist promotes ‘emancipated spectators’ by 
presenting them with problematic fields of subject matter, whilst (in the vein of 
Iser’s negation) refraining from imposing her/his own opinions.12 The problem 
remains that this modal intention must somehow become transparent to the 
viewer.  
Before discussing the task of working against official versions, it must be 
noted that art critics and curators can also enhance the transparency of the 
work’s repertoire and facilitate environments that help viewer’s realise the 
artist’s modal intentions. The function of art theorists, according to Gopnik, is to 
facilitate a change in viewers’ understanding and emotional response to the 
work by presenting interesting perceptions that they, due to a lack of expertise 
or differing viewpoints, do not have. In this view, new meaning is made by art 
theorists because they – through articles, catalogue essays, wall texts, etc. – 
shape the general apprehension of art and are perceived as the most qualified 
to process art’s complex languages.13  
In theory, artists can influence meaning-making using the same methods as 
critics and philosophers; they can publish their own texts, offer interviews and 
artist’s talks, or maintain a website. Kosuth described such contributions as 
“primary theory” and as being superior to ‘experts’’ “secondary theory”: 
                                            
11 Rancière referred here to his earlier publication ‘The Ignorant Schoolmaster. Five Lessons in 
Intellectual Emancipation’ which recounts the method of Joseph Jacotot (1770-1840), a lecturer 
who taught Flemish without knowing the language himself, arguing that: “I must teach you that I 
have nothing to teach you” (Rancière 1991 [1987], p.15). Jacotot tried to make sense of 
bilingual texts conjointly with his students. In effect, he did not aim to transmit his knowledge but 
rather foster his students’ own productive powers.  
12 See: chapter three, note 42. 
13 This is consistent with Anne-Marie Émond’s observation that many viewers in contemporary 
art exhibitions are not sure if they understand the art and “would like to spend more time with a 
contemporary art work but find they do not have the tools to do so” (Émond 2013, personal 
communication). 
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The act of putting [art]14 into the world is empty unless 
an artist also fights for its meaning. This informational 
framing of the proposition itself increasingly becomes 
part of the artistic process. Thus, a key to the changed 
role of intention and the artist’s self-perception of his 
or her practice, is the role of writing by artists.  
(Kosuth 1996, p.408) 
Kosuth’s ‘primary theory’ concept is evidenced by a number of self-publishing 
artists such as Victor Burgin, Olafur Eliasson, or Liam Gillick whose statements 
receive as much attention as those of leading critics and philosophers. Their 
theoretical works are published in art magazines and edited volumes (for 
example Stiles & Selz 2012), found in museum bookshops, and quoted in wall 
texts. However, whether such texts should be considered ‘primary theory’ per 
se is debatable since we cannot assume that artists are necessarily more 
versed to contextualise their work than professional critics or philosophers. 
Also, less well-known artists will find it more difficult to have their views 
published than famous personalities. What would have to be examined further 
is how artist writings are proliferated, and what impact they actually have on 
different audiences.  
Gopnik’s view implies a certain omnipotence of expert opinions. The 
influence of these factors is undeniable, but it is also relative to culturally and/or 
phylogenetically determined elements that are not exclusively bound to art-
related and expert-mediated knowledge. For example, people aim to integrate 
disparate patterns and objects according to Gestalt-laws (Arnheim 1974) and 
spontaneous emotional responses. They react with “anger, confusion, disgust, 
pride, surprise, and other unusual aesthetic emotions” (Silvia 2009, p.48). Being 
stimulated emotionally can suspend learned art assessment schemata and the 
viewer’s emotional response can itself become the object of separative 
meaning-making (as exemplified by the responses of the Bourgeois- and the 
Strand-viewer discussed in 3.4 and 3.5.1).  
Another argument against the omnipotence of expert opinions are studies 
suggesting that viewers of contemporary art tend to rely more on their own 
perception than viewers of traditional art (Émond 2006a; Mastandrea et al. 
2009). Anne-Marie Émond observed that non art specialist viewers15 often 
                                            
14 Kosuth circumscribed the term referring to a “signifying action, which may or may not employ 
the object, performance, video, text, et al.” (Kosuth 1996, p.408). 
15 Émond’s study focussed on people who visit museums more than twice a year. 
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create a story that can be associated with the artwork, and that their comments 
are “more like personal narratives than observations based on factual 
knowledge” (Émond 2006a, p.84). This observation resonates with the concept 
of speculative meaning-meaning. Finally, the influence of the artist’s name may 
also be called into question since in many situations viewers are simply not 
familiar with this name.  
The above named factors mitigate the power of expert opinions, but they do 
not concurrently empower the voice of the artist, instead they point to the limits 
of all contextualising theory. Opportunities artists have to influence the broad 
range of socio-cultural factors that affect meaning-making exist but remain 
limited. Further entry points for framing one’s works’ apprehension are available 
in the physical, more immediate context of the gallery or museum. However, as 
institutions, these places have an idiosyncratic influence on viewing habits that 
can be both problematic and beneficial for separative meaning-making. 
4.3.2 The Viewer’s Mindset and the Gallery Atmosphere 
The question of how gallery/museum contexts can shape the apprehension 
of art has been hotly debated. Empirical research confirms the common 
assumption of these debates that the experience of artworks “arises in and 
through socially organised, embodied practices at the exhibit-face” (vom Lehn 
2010, p.33). For Umberto Eco, a frame sufficed to “turn a piece of sackcloth into 
an artifact” (Eco 1989 [1962], p.99) and according to Danto the gallery’s 
“atmosphere of artistic theory” can turn any object into one that will be regarded 
as meaningful (Danto 1964, p.580). Gallery and museum environments can 
therefore fundamentally transform the ontological status of an object, such as a 
household item on a supermarket shelf to an object of high art in Andy Warhol’s 
‘Brillo Box (Soap Pads)’ (1964) (Danto 1964; 1981; 2000, see also Dickie 1974).  
Artist and critic Brian O’Doherty concluded that “the esthetics of the wall” 
inevitably “‘artify the work in a way that frequently diffuses its intentions” 
(O’Doherty 1999 [1976], p.29). This will often concern the artist’s modal 
intention that viewers treat the work as open to be endowed with their own 
meaning. The apprehension of artworks is further influenced by exhibition 
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themes and presentation 
headlines,16 neighbouring 
works, lighting, and the 
architectural environment 
(Choi 1999; Bourdeau & 
Chebat 2001). 
Any institutional 
framework that presents 
objects or situations ‘as art’ 
channels and preconfigures 
meaning-making through 
mechanisms of selection, 
promotion, collection, display 
and the appeal to certain 
audiences (Dickie 1997; 
Becker 1984; Bourdieu 1991 [1966]). Artists have taken issue with these 
mechanisms, collectively known as ‘institutional critique’,17 but – certain 
ephemera or intervention practices left aside (see Wright 2008) – there is no 
escape from art being recognised and treated as art. Since the awareness of 
seeing art commonly activates attitudes of meaning-retrieval, one should expect 
an atmosphere reminiscent of a works’ ‘artiness’ to be a major antagonist of 
separative meaning-making. However, the gallery environment has an 
ambivalent function in that respect. There are even many situations in which it 
promotes rather than contradicts this kind of response.     
Works with robust visceral appeal can effectively profit from the gallery’s 
theoretical counter-appeal. One viewer’s response to Tony Oursler’s video 
projections of faces and facial parts onto various surfaces, such as dolls’ heads 
or simple geometric objects (Figs. 44, 50, 53), serves as an example: 
                                            
16 New York times art critic Roberta Smith remarked: “The exhibition titles ... in many cases are 
a show’s main cleverness” and gave some expectation-fuelling examples: “‘Better Than Sex, 
Better Than Disneyland’ ... ‘Binge and Purge’ ... ‘Photography Is Not an Art!’ ... ‘Montezuma’s 
Revenge’ ... ‘Men and Materials’” (R. Smith 2006, para.4). 
17 I do not discuss ‘institutional critique’ here as related artistic strategies have largely focused 
on art commenting on itself in its system. By contrast, this thesis highlights practices with a 
momentum to make viewers re-perceive the world in which we live, and this is, usually, not the 
art world (although this may sometimes be difficult to disentangle). For a collection of artists’ 
writings and an introduction to institutional critique, see: Alberro & Stimson (2009); Raunig & 
Ray (2009). 
 
Fig. 44: Tony Oursler, Swathe, 2004, fiberglass 
sculpture, video projection, loud speakers, 74 x 81 x 
38 cm. 
Philbrook Museum, Tulsa, USA. Courtesy of the artist and Metro 
Pictures. Photo: The Philbrook Museum of Art, Inc., Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, 2013 (©) 
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You see people crying, laughing, yelling, drunk, etc. 
and it never seems odd ... that’s what everyone does. 
But this was on a totally different scale. It was right 
there, in your face and there was no way to get away 
from it. I think that when you’re out in public, you can 
avoid feeling uncomfortable by people’s displays of 
emotion. I don’t really think about my own thoughts 
and feelings when I see people in public displaying 
their own emotion, but Oursler’s work … made me 
think about what’s acceptable to do in public and 
what’s not. For instance, if you could avoid it, you 
wouldn’t cry hysterically in public, at least I wouldn’t. 
But, when you see someone doing that, it tends to 
seem more dramatic than it is. (Jellots 2008, para.1) 
The viewer’s emphasis on the difference between ‘what you see in public’ and 
what she experienced in the gallery demonstrates the psychical distance that an 
institutional context can proffer. The statement suggests that the viewer did not 
approach the work in retrieval mode, and, if she did, it seems to have been 
suspended by an emotional response. As in the examples of the Mutu-, the 
Bourgeois- and the Strand-viewer discussed in the previous chapter, this 
response suggests a strong sense of emotional recognition of ‘real life’ 
phenomena, which is taken over by a more reflective attitude. Arguably, this 
assessment would have been unlikely if the viewer had encountered the same 
work in the context of a department store or a nightclub. The gallery’s 
‘atmosphere of theory’ clarifies that objects on display are intentionally made 
and have been placed there to be thought about, and related thinking is not 
limited to art theory. 
The gallery context does not diffuse initial emotional responses altogether, 
but it can frame them. Psychological research suggests that interest as the 
driving force behind learning, seeking information, and adopting general 
explorative and creative attitudes, develops best in ‘safe’ yet ‘innovative’ 
contexts (Izard 1977; Kaplan 1992; Silvia 2006). Art venues often provide such 
an atmosphere, one that promotes ‘psychical distance’ and encourages viewers 
“to perceive consciously a system in which [they] had hitherto been 
unconsciously caught up” (Iser 1994, p.212). Empirical research confirms that 
people commonly visit galleries expecting a positive experience (Émond 2002; 
2008; Chen 2009; Mastandrea et al. 2009), and this includes a “pleasure of 
discourse” (Émond 2008, p.55). The question thus becomes how advantageous 
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effects can be harnessed while circumventing retrieval-focussed art assessment 
schemata. 
The gallery context offers artists some opportunities to influence a work’s 
reception. By giving works titles (which can be expected to be provided 
alongside), artists have traditionally worked at the interstices between art and 
curation. Some have also written their own wall texts (examples include Alfredo 
Jaar and Dan Graham). Another approach is to motivate people to spend more 
time with the work (Smith & Smith 2001; Hensher 2011). “Responding to a work 
takes time”, Michael Parsons elaborated, because ... 
... it requires a type of inquiry in which one looks 
closely at it, grasps some things quickly, explores their 
connections with other items, checks out possible 
further connections in light of what is seen in the work 
and of what is already known, grasps some further 
things; and so on. (Parsons 2002, p.33) 
 Psychological research suggests that when viewers are prepared and able 
to interact with a work for at least 10 continuous minutes it changes their 
expectations and muddies the question of what it means to ‘understand’ the 
work’s ‘message’ (Pelowski 2007; also Lachapelle 2010). This is a challenge for 
curators but also an issue that some artists have addressed. Jaar for example, 
explained that he is frequently shocked at the short amount of time viewers 
spend with artworks (Jaar & Phillips 2005). In response to this, he designs his 
installations to slow viewers down and “encourage people to take time, to stop, 
to read” (Jaar & Phillips 2005, p.12). 
Despite some contextual ‘levers’ to tackle the wider culture of art 
apprehension and specific viewing situations the main starting point for artists to 
facilitate the viewer’s meaning-making remains the work itself. It has already 
been argued that a crucial component of meaning-making is the interplay of 
emotional and intellectual aspects, and that both can be facilitated through the 
work itself. The next section takes a closer look at these and at their relation to 
contextual aspects. 
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4.4 Work and Context: Balancing Emotional Stimuli 
Established media and modes of framing (oil on canvas, objects on plinths, 
etc.) establish objects as contemplative material. The “visibly intentional 
arrangement or unification”, Bullough wrote, “must by the mere fact of its 
presence, enforce Distance, by distinguishing the object from the confused, 
disjointed and scattered form of actual experience” (Bullough 1912, p.106). 
Although it is debatable that art can be excluded from ‘actual experience’, 
Bullough’s general point is still valid. Some stylistic features and/or subject 
matters have a tendency to reduce and others to foster ‘psychical distance’, 
facilitating the viewer’s awareness of her/his position as observing subject. 
Arguably, art performances with live actors will have a greater tendency to 
diminish the viewer’s distance than a sculpture on a plinth. The same is true for 
works with a subject matter involving affairs currently in the news or topics with 
a strong sensual appeal such as sexual scenes or acts of cruelty.  
Rancière argued that in order for art to be ‘political’ the artist must ensure 
“the readability of a political signification” (the repertoire) “and a sensible or 
perceptual shock caused, conversely, by the uncanny, by that which resists 
signification” (Rancière 2013 [2003], p.59).18 Similarly, pragmatist art theory, 
Iser’s theory of reading, and many other theories of art apprehension subscribe 
to the idea that art’s transformative power presupposes an initial experience of 
dissonance. In this similar vein, Rancière appeals to an ‘art of dissensus’:   
There is dissensus when there is something wrong in 
the picture, when something is not at the right place. 
There is dissensus when we don’t know how to 
designate what we see, when a name no longer suits 
the thing or the character that it names, etc. ... It 
means a displacement or a break in a given set of 
places and identities. (Rancière 2007b, p.560) 
Like Iser’s concept of ‘negation’, Rancière’s ‘dissensus’ relies on upsetting 
the viewer as an important impulse to participate in meaning-making. 
Psychological approaches often refer to the concept of cognitive dissonance, a 
                                            
18 A good example of this quality is Marc Quinn’s ‘Alison Lapper (8 months)’  (see: 2.2, pp.43/44 
and the discussion in 6.2.1.  
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term introduced by Leon Festinger (1957).19 Émond defined it in relation to art 
viewing as “a lack of coherence between the visitor’s knowledge and what 
he/(she) was viewing or between expectations and what was occurring at the 
moment in the museum” (Émond 2006b, p.4).20 Pelowski and Akiba described 
the resulting challenge, which requires the viewer ... 
... to overcome the human instinct of escape or 
assimilation through surface evaluation or self-
withdrawal and instead enter an intractable position 
whereby one might use their own disruptive encounter 
as a means of self-retransformation, and therefore 
come to believe or see something new ...  
(Pelowski & Akiba 2011, p.92)  
In this view, failure to understand an artwork by meaning-retrieval can lead to 
meta-cognitive reflection (or separative meaning-making; the viewer being 
turned back to him/herself as viewer) if the viewer is motivated to scrutinize ‘that 
which resists signification’.  
Whether viewers will feel motivated to explore their own process of 
reasoning and overcome the dissonant situation depends on many personal 
and situational factors. However, artists deliberately provoke dissonant 
experiences. Strategies for ‘shocking the viewer’, for example, have been hotly 
debated.21 Offensive works may cause public debates and the occasional 
scandal22 (another – ‘relational’ – facet of meaning-making); more importantly, 
such strategies disrupt conventional, retrieval-focussed art assessment 
schemata. As discussed in 3.5.2, viewing habits can be suspended by an 
                                            
19 Festinger (1957) defined ‘cognitive dissonance’ as a state where one’s actions or behaviours 
contradict one’s beliefs. One example of this is the cognitive dissonance that 18th century 
Christians faced when engaging in the very anti-Christian action of keeping other people as 
slaves, hence they convinced themselves that slaves were not ‘people’ at all to overcome the 
dilemma. Robert L. Solso has re-framed the notion as ‘visual dissonance’ and argued that its 
evocation has been a common strategy of artists; Solso defines it as “a state of psychological 
tension caused when one experiences a disparity between what one expects to see and what 
one actually sees” (Solso 1994, p.122).  
20 The converse experience, cognitive consonance, is often linked to finding expectations of 
‘what art should be like’ confirmed (Weltzl-Fairchild et al. 1997; Émond 2006b). However, 
Émond’s studies point to notions of viewers’ ‘entering into’ and identifiying with the work, which 
can also make them “more aware of their personal psychological functioning” (Émond 2006b, 
p.8). This assessment lends support to the productive merit of relational art’s focus on convivial 
experiences, and it is confirmed by the example of the Bourgeois-viewer (3.4); however, the 
relation between consonant experiences and meaning-making would require further 
examination.  
21 For related discussions, see: Bayles (1994), Beech (2006), Cashell (2009), Korsmeyer 
(2011), Doyle (2013). 
22 Compare: Raymond W. Gibbs’ discussion of works by Andres Serrano, Karen Finley, Robert 
Mapplethorpe, and Cindy Sherman (Gibbs 1999, pp.295–301). 
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‘affective ambush’ that evokes the impression of a ‘promise of meaning’ and 
related strategies are not limited to predictable shock effects.  
Many kinds of stimuli facilitate innate or learned responses and artists have 
worked with a variety of auditory, olfactory and tactile triggers (Di Benedetto 
2007). Three examples of emotional appeal are: disgust, sexual arousal, and 
empathy. They vary in complexity and all of them have been the subject of 
extended debates that cannot be covered here. The subsequent account will be 
limited to a discussion of their potential function as antagonists of art 
assessment schemata that focus on artistic intention, symbolic content, or 
formal qualities involved in meaning retrieval. Much art working with strong 
emotional stimuli destroys the ‘psychical distance’ characteristic of meaning-
retrieval (or aims to do so). Since a certain distance is also needed to achieve 
separative meaning-making its eventual recoupment is indispensable. For this 
reason, factors that facilitate a return to reflective meaning-making must be 
considered.  
4.4.1 Disgust 
 Disgust is a universal and fundamental human emotion that serves the 
evolutionary function of helping protect the life of an organism by warning 
against possibly harmful substances (David & Olatunji 2011). Cultural theorist 
Winfried Menninghaus observed: 
The disgusting may well be the strongest possible 
stimulator of the human perceptual apparatus. It 
generates strong defensive affects which, at the same 
time, are powerful instants of self-perception on the 
part of the system forced to defend its own integrity. 
(Menninghaus 2003, p.398) 
What people find disgusting is to a great extent culturally determined, and 
thus to some level predictable. Disgust is particularly likely to be generated by 
certain notions of death, such as the decomposition of human corpses and 
other organic matter (Menninghaus 2003; Korsmeyer 2011). Such effects must 
be carefully directed. If viewers simply turn away nauseated, or write the work 
off as sensationalism (‘shock for shock’s sake’) the potential to instigate 
meaning-making is defused. To evoke disgust in relation to issues of death or 
harm, the negative emotional impulse needs to be counterbalanced and 
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reduced to the extent that the viewer accepts it as a challenge. It is easy to 
draw attention using a strong emotional provocation, but it is difficult to facilitate 
its retention and subsequent reflection. Audience research confirms that 
viewers tend to “react to strong provocative work but do not pursue what they 
have undertaken with the work” (Émond 2013, personal communication). 
The level of disgust necessary to disturb viewers and the level of 
displeasure they are willing to face naturally differ from subject to subject, 
however, the disgusting is still ‘managed’ by artists. According to Menninghaus, 
Cindy Sherman’s use of ‘high-gloss beauty’ in her ‘Disgust’ series23 and Damien 
Hirst’s use of laboratory-instruments to frame his cadaver sculptures are 
examples of this type of management (Menninghaus 2003, p.400). Also, closer 
inspection of repulsive works sometimes reveals clues asking for a reflective 
approach, as, for example, the Iraqi money spread under the cow’s feet in 
Damien Hirst’s ‘The Promise of Money’ (2003) (Fig. 45). 
 
 
Fig. 45: Damien Hirst, The Promise 
of Money, 2003, resin, steel, mirror, 
pigments, cow hair, glass eyes, 
sling, hoist, Iraqi money and blood, 
dimensions untraceable.  
© Damien Hirst and Science Ltd. All rights 
reserved. Photo: Prudence Cuming 
Associates. Licensed by Bildrecht, Vienna, 
2013 (©) 
 
Fig. 46: Santiago Sierra, 21 Anthropometric Modules 
Made of Human Faeces By the People of Sulabh 
International, India, 2005/2006,  20 parts, mixed media, 
each 75 x 215 x 20 cm.  
David Roberts Collection, London. Exhibition shown: Santiago Sierra, 
Magasin 3 Konsthall, Stockholm (2009). Photo: Thomas Hagström (©) 
 
                                            
23 In her ‘Disgust’ series (1986-90), Sherman explored by means of staged photography issues 
of decay, loathing food, fecal matter, corpses, etc. For an analysis how Sherman’s works 
overlay multiple meanings and her general strategies to appeal to audiences on a visceral as 
well as a intellectual level, see: Ingelfinger (2010).  
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Whilst usually contextual features balance the disgusting, sometimes it is 
evoked only in the interplay of work and context. Without its explanatory title ‘21 
Anthropometric Modules Made of Human Faeces By the People of Sulabh 
International, India’, Santiago Sierra’s 2006 (inodorous) work may easily be 
mistaken for a minimalist sculpture (Fig. 46). The work challenges the viewer to 
question precisely whether s/he is disgusted at all, fostering the ‘strange 
halfway position’ in which s/he is at the same time involved and watches 
her/himself being involved (see 3.6.3). 
4.4.2 Sexual Attraction 
Advertising research suggests that emotional responses evoked by sexual 
information through images, sound, or text, are to a great extent predictable; 
they easily attract attention, cause arousal and are memorable (for a review, 
see Belch et al. 1987). It can never be guaranteed that a work of art will not be 
appreciated for the ‘wrong’ reasons (that is: contradicting its repertoire) but it is 
clear that sexual stimuli tend to draw particular attention (Lykins et al. 2008; 
Rupp & Wallen 2008). Thus they are effective to suspend art assessment 
schemata but, again, they require counterbalancing. Wangechi Mutu 
summarised the resultant challenge:  
[T]he thing you’re drawing them [the audience] in with 
is also the thing with which you’re planning to sting 
them. How do you use the same gesture to draw them 
in that you would use to smack the hand and wake 
them up? (Mutu & Enright 2008, para.24)24 
The assumption (or perhaps just the diction) that the audience should be 
‘woken up’ is debatable, but the methodological implication is clear. Within her 
feminist agenda, Mutu employs images of naked women. In ‘The Ark Collection’ 
(2006), for example, she explored the objectifying image of African women in 
the western world by overlaying ethnographic photographs of African culture 
with western pornographic representations of black women (Fig. 47). By means 
                                            
24 Not referring to sexual stimuli in particular, a similar point was made by Mauricio Cattelan as 
he explained, referring to his audience: “I like to give them something appealing and then to 
slap them. The deception is to make them think it could be nice and then to deliver something 
that probably they don’t want to face. This is always in my mind” (Cattelan & Earnest 2011, 
para.61).  
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of her collage technique, the original sexual appeal of the images becomes 
vague; their fragmentation and disruption defies voyeuristic consumption.   
Vanessa Beecroft, renowned for having groups of attractive, young, and 
mostly naked women pose in front of audiences, deals with a similar challenge. 
Journalist and artist Mimi Seldner who participated as a model in Beecroft’s ‘VB 
#69’ (2010) (Fig. 48) reported the artist handing out rule sheets with precise 
instructions for the girls:  
“[D]on’t speak”, “don’t laugh”, “don’t act sexy”, “forget 
that you are naked”, “don’t engage with people”, “be 
strong”, “be distant”, “be dazed”, “pretend you are 
wearing a uniform”, “ignore people who look at you too 
long”, and “look back towards the audience from a 
position of power”. (Seldner 2010, para.4) 
 
 
Obedient behaviour and the immobile, stern and regimented choreography are 
to ensure effects (at least on male viewers) that critic Dave Hickey described 
with respect to earlier works by Beecroft: 
[W]e are denied both the privacy of contemplating a 
representation and the intimacy of participating in a 
real encounter. As a consequence we find Beecroft’s 
women, at once more present to us and less 
accessible than we would wish ... Our anxiety, then, 
does not arise from the fact that naked women are 
near to us, but from the unbridgeable, yet ill-defined 
distance between ourselves and them. It is not the 
anxiety of desire, but the anxiety of displacement. 






Fig. 47: Wangechi Mutu, The Ark Collection 
(detail), 2006, collages on postcards displayed in 
4 vitrines. 
Courtesy of Susanne Vielmetter, Los Angeles and Sikkema 









Fig. 48: Vanessa Beecroft, VB #69, 2010, 
performance with live models; Miami, The 
Standard Hotel. 
Photo: PRISM (©) 
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Displacement arises not only from the relation between the viewer and the 
artwork itself but also in relation to other members of the audience. When 
presenting sexually evocative work, the context of the gallery (or an art event 
like the Art Basel fair in Miami where ‘VB #69’ took place) acquires an additional 
function. Not only does it suggest that objects or situations are there to be 
contemplated; it also acts as a spatial confinement that forces viewers into a 
relational situation. They are aware that they are being seen looking at explicit 
content by other viewers.25 This effect was highlighted by journalist Judith 
Flanders in a review of the Jeff Koons room at the Tate Modern’s 2009 Pop Life 
exhibition, in which much of the artist’s sexually explicit Made in Heaven 
series26 was shown: 
Galleries are for looking, not for being looked at. And 
yet with these works, it became very obvious that all 
the spectators were suddenly aware of being 
observed: viewees not viewers. … I actually had to 
ask myself the question: how do I look at this? Insofar 
as it disoriented me, and made me reflect, I suppose 
the works had some value. (Flanders 2009, para.3,6) 
Effects of co-surveillance on individuals’ ‘impression management’ are well-
studied sociological phenomena27 and an interesting corollary in situations of 
art-viewing. For those sensitive to it, it practically reverses the ‘convivial’ merits 
of relational art by referring viewers back to themselves as individuals in a 
crowd. In summary, sexually explicit content like disgusting scenes, are likely to 
thwart retrieval-oriented and psychically distant approaches to art, and it is often 
the gallery’s atmosphere that eventually facilitates/recoups an attitude of 
reflection. 
                                            
25 See: chapter two, note 12. 
26 ‘Made in Heaven’ (1989/1990) is a series of paintings, photographs, and sculptures showing 
Koons and his then-wife, pornographic actress Illona Staller, in explicit sexual positions. 
27 Sociologist Erving Goffman defines impression management as “the way in which the 
individual ... presents himself and his activity to others, the ways in which he guides and 
controls the impression they form of him, and the kinds of things he may and may not do while 
sustaining his performance before them” (Goffman 1959, preface, n.p.). See also: Tedeschi 
(1981). 
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4.4.3 Empathy 
Empathy has been defined in many ways and associated with a wide range 
of emotional states. These include the desire to help other people, feeling ‘into’ 
another’s emotional state (experiencing the same emotions as someone else), 
or sharing another’s thoughts (Coplan & Goldie 2011). Cognitive scientist and 
philosopher Frédérique de Vignemont identified a set of variables that tend to 
foster empathetic responses. De Vignemont suggested that salient, negative 
and basic emotions (such as sadness or pain) are easier to share than weak, 
positive or complex ones (de Vignemont 2007).28 In this vein, art historian David 
Freedberg and neuro scientist Vittorio Gallese argued that it can be 
demonstrated that vision of painful touch, as in Caravaggio’s ‘Incredulity of St 
Thomas’ (1601–1602) (Fig. 49), activates the same cortical networks that are 
activated when we are actually physically touched (Freedberg & Gallese 
2007b).29 Empathetic experiences with works of art have received significant 
attention in the psychology of art.30 In the context of this thesis what exactly 
characterises such experiences is less important than how they are facilitated 
by artistic strategies. Tony Oursler’s practice provides an example. 
Oursler described his work as “very related to an exploration of empathy 
between the viewer and the artwork and almost like setting up a psychological 
trap” (Oursler 2012, 2:08min). In fact, viewers respond instinctively to his 
projected characters whether they evoke humour/pleasant emotions or negative 
ones. In her blog regarding Oursler’s 1995 ‘Guilty’ (a woman’s face projected on 
a pillow spouting accusatory remarks while being squashed by a mattress; Fig. 
50) a viewer wrote: “I felt kind of bad because I too am guilty of not caring after 
a while” (“RaSheena” 2008, para.1). Another viewer even talked back to a 
similar work (‘Get Away’, 1994): 
                                            
28 For related discussions, see: Fultz et al. (1988), Yamada & Decety (2009).  
29 For related discussions of the role of mirror neurons, see: Rizzolatti & Craighero (2004) and 
Freedberg & Gallese (2007a). 
30 See: Lipps (1903), Kris (1952, pp.54–56), Crozier & Greenhalgh (1992), Freedberg & Gallese 
(2007b). 
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It’s a favorite of mine because of the strident, accusing 
voice that hollers at us: “What are ya looking at?” I 
SAID [sic] “What are ya looking at?” It’s charming but 
ironic: the trapped figure that refuses to be observed, 
or helped, even though he’s ‘trapped’ – what a modern 
dilemma!  
(Williams in Williams & Rapoport 2000, para.36) 
Initially the viewer’s response was emotional. She talked back to a lifeless 
object having seemingly lost her distance. Then, in hindsight, meaning is made 
by interpreting the work as related to a larger social theme. 
 
 
Fig. 49: Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio, 
Incredulity of St Thomas, 1601, oil on canvas, 
107 × 146.1 cm.  
Neues Palais, Potsdam, Germany. Photo: JarektUploadBot 
/ Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain (GNU-FDL PD-old-
100) 
 
Fig. 50: Tony Oursler, Guilty, 1995, video 
projector, VCR, videotape, mattress, cloth. 
Performance by: Tracy Leipold, irregular 
dimensions (overall approx. 36 x 193 x 316 
cm).  
Reproduction: Courtesy of the artist and Metro Pictures  
 
The balance between the emotional stimuli and the appeal to reflection is 
intermeshed in the material. The artificial source of the viewer’s empathy – an 
often pixelated projection in distorted colours on less than realistically crafted 
dummy heads or amorphous objects – is still able to evoke robust emotions. It 
would appear that we have a low threshold with regard to empathetic response. 
Oursler himself described these works as an “embodiment of the link between 
the media and the psychological states it is capable of provoking: empathy, 
fear, arousal, anger” (Oursler & Janus 2000, p.75). Even grotesquely distorted 
faces and individual facial parts (Fig. 44) can evoke empathy, which made critic 
Edward Colless wonder: “Why is it so hard to shake the feeling that there’s 
something in there, watching you, like some kind of ghost in the machine?” 
(Colless 2012, para.1). Powerless to prevent the emotional response, the 
visibility of the technology (Oursler’s projectors are mostly deliberately exposed) 
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becomes at the same time a confounder and a facilitator of viewers’ response 
and of any subsequent assessment of that response: “People have to answer 
questions”, Oursler said, “they have to complete the picture” (Oursler & Janus 
2000, p.73). Colles’ question stands as testimony to empathy in Oursler’s work 
as an agent for meaning-making.  
Some of Oursler’s works appeal to reflection through what some scholars 
refer to as ‘cognitive empathy’ (A. Smith 2006). This occurs when empathic 
emotion and assessment of its cause happen concurrently.31 Works like ‘Guilty’ 
or ‘Get Away’ entail characters that insult, swear at and accuse the viewer. In 
such situations, people tend to find it generally difficult, if not impossible to 
empathise with the interlocutor’s emotions; we can at best understand but not 
share emotions when they are directed at us (de Vignemont 2007). Works 
operating in this way force the viewer more directly into a reflective (and 
possibly even defensive) position. Cultural theorist Nikos Papastergiadis 
regards emotional and intellectual components of empathy as intrinsically 
related, and described empathetic viewing as ... 
 … a dynamic process of going closer to be able to 
see, but also never forgetting where you are coming 
from … empathy is about that process of surrender 
and to learn with the other, but also the catch that 
transforms your perception.  
(Papastergiadis & Zournazi 2002, p.95/96) 
Put this way, empathy turns into a form of separative meaning-making: the 
viewer examines the emotional situation s/he has been exposed to and to a 
greater or lesser degree entered into. This allows viewers to connect with the 
situation of others, which is the objective of much contemporary art addressing 
controversial subjects such as sexual abuse, political conflicts, or human 
atrocities.  
The connection between empathetic viewing and the treatment of traumatic 
experiences by contemporary artists was examined by cultural theorist Jill 
Bennett (2005).32 Bennett sees the basis of empathy not as grounded in “feeling 
for another insofar as we imagine being that other” but rather as “a feeling for 
                                            
31 From an evolutionary perspective, the shift to an analytic position is healthy in order not to 
become paralysed by another’s distress and, for example, to engage in helping behaviour 
(Decety & Jackson 2006). 
32 Bennett’s examples include works by Dennis Del Favero, Sandra Johnston, Doris Salcedo, 
William Kentridge, Willie Doherty, Jo Ractcliffe, Gavin Younge, Paul Seawright and Gordon 
Bennett. 
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another that entails an encounter with something irreducible and different, often 
inaccessible” (Bennett 2005, p.10). In the context of this thesis this is an 
interesting trajectory as it carries the concept of empathy from ‘feeling into’ an 
individual person to trying to ‘get a hunch’ of what, as Rancière said, eventually 
‘resists signification’. It expands the idea that art can give form to existential 
themes and allow for the audience to constitute and retain new emotional 
qualities. Bennett’s approach suggests that even other people’s existential 
themes can be touched33 by viewers as they compare a depicted or otherwise 
thematised situation with their own. Going beyond the emotional side of 
empathy, Bennett stressed that artists “exploit forms of embodied perception in 
order to promote forms of critical inquiry” (Bennett 2005, p.10). By evoking 
emotions, it is possible for a more profound engagement with the work’s subject 
matter to be forged, thus appealing to empathy becomes a “manner of doing 
politics” (Bennett 2005, p.152). An example of this is the viewer who links 
Oursler’s trapped but help-refusing figure to a ‘modern dilemma’, another is 
Celia Shapiro’s ‘John William Rook - 09/19/86’ (Fig. 13) and also Alfredo Jaar’s 
‘The Eyes of Gutete Emerita’ which will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter.  
In summary, the psycho-physiological effect of experiencing the same 
emotions that one is observing in others as well as relating other peoples’ 
destiny to one’s own life can be powerful tools to facilitate meaning-making. 
This is so because, first, empathetic emotions (like disgust and sexual arousal), 
are triggered instinctively and supersede usual modes of art interpretation, and 
second, because emotional empathy is often paired with the desire to better 
understand the other’s and/or one’s own situation on an intellectual level. 
4.5 Conclusion 
To facilitate response to one’s own artwork has clear limitations. Efforts to 
orchestrate a work’s reception can run counter to the intuitive creative process, 
plus, the artist has to consider a significant number of contextual factors, many 
of which are beyond her/his influence. However, to convey two kinds of 
                                            
33 In the same vein, Thomas Hirschhorn stated: “I always ask myself: Does my work have the 
ability to generate an event? Can I encounter someone with my work? And am I – through my 
work – trying to touch something? Can something – through my work – be touched?” 
(Hirschhorn 2009, p.76). 
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information: the repertoire and the appeal to open-ended meaning-making, is in 
the interest of artists addressing political, social, environmental, or cultural 
issues and/or referring viewers back to themselves (as viewers). The appeal to 
open-ended meaning-making is described as an modal intention and as such 
distinct from semantic intentions, which pertain to a work’s ‘message’. With this 
distinction, the paradox that artists cannot hold up as an intention that viewers 
do not look for their intentions is remediated.  
If (a) it is an artist’s intention that a work is open to diverse responses 
(conditioned only by the repertoire, within a ‘particular field of possibilities’) and 
(b) such open works are in danger of remaining altogether incomprehensible 
(as Eco and Danto observed), it becomes a structural necessity that the 
viewer’s understanding of the work’s repertoire and the artist’s wish to engage 
the viewer in meaning-making are not left to chance. This task can be 
approached in two ways: artists can interfere with the context within which their 
work is apprehended, or anchor relevant information in the work itself. 
Examples of contextual strategies are the provision of titles, talks and 
statements of various kinds. Such measures will often be especially helpful to 
facilitate the repertoire’s understanding. Engaging the viewer in separative 
meaning-making (to insinuate or suggest the work’s ‘open’ character) has been 
exemplified by strategies that foster the suspension of retrieval-oriented art 
assessment schemata by initially emotion-dominated responses. 
Despite individual differences, some biologically or culturally rooted triggers 
can facilitate shifts in the mode of the viewer’s apprehension with some degree 
of predictability. Examples of often-used triggers are the evocation of disgust, 
sexual attraction, and appeals to empathy. However, if the viewer’s participation 
in meaning-making is desired, viewers must not get fully absorbed by their 
emotional response. A counterbalance is needed. In some cases (for example 
Beecroft’s models or Oursler’s projections) this counterbalance is inherent to 
the object that first disrupted the art-contemplation mode, but it only reveals 
itself through reflection. In others, it is constituted by a physically separate 
element of the same work, as for example, a textual supplement. A third 
component is the work’s presentation in a gallery context where it is expected 
that the displayed objects and situations are there to be thought about and 
which will sooner or later come back to awareness when the effect of the 
‘emotional ambush’ ceases. 
5                                    CHAPTER FIVE:  
           MEANING-MAKING AND ARTISTIC MEDIA –  
                                 SOME EXAMPLES  
 
I do go through a sort of continuous process of 
‘imagining the viewer’. I think all artists, in the process 
of making a work, hypothesize the audience, invent an 
imaginary audience which is exactly the one which will 
appreciate that work profoundly.  
Jeff Wall, 19901 
 
The preceding two chapters took theoretical issues as points of departure 
and used specific artworks as examples. This chapter reverses this approach 
by analysing artistic practices in terms of their relation to separative meaning-
making. The discussion includes Alfredo Jaar’s ‘The Eyes of Gutete Emerita’ 
(1996), Tony Oursler’s already introduced projection technique, Superflex’ work 
‘The Financial Crisis’ (2009), and Tino Sehgal’s live ‘interpreters’ that engage 
gallery visitors in conversations. I am using these practices as exemplars 
because the artworks are designed to elucidate meaning-making. Finally, I draw 
on my own practice to show how the theory of meaning-making as defined in 
this thesis can be used to assess an artwork’s likeliness to elicit meaning-
making responses. 
5.1 Alfredo Jaar’s ‘The Eyes of Gutete Emerita’  
Alfredo Jaar’s ‘The Eyes of Gutete Emerita’ (1996) unites a variety of 
strategies to engage the viewer in the meaning-making process. There are 
several versions of this work but they all comprise two main elements: a 
transparency of two eyes (or two transparencies showing one eye each) and a 
150-word piece of text. The two eyes are either displayed next to each other 
and fixed on individual, backlit light boxes (Fig. 51a), or as a single slide copied 
100,000 times, displayed on a large light table (Fig. 51c,d). The text is 
presented as a narrow brightly glowing line of text in small letters (Fig. 51e), as 
a series of six alternating transparencies (Fig. 51b) or as a plain inscription on 
the gallery wall. It tells the story of Gutete Emerita, a woman whose husband 
                                            
1 In: Harrison & Wood (2006, p.1159) 
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and sons were murdered in front of her eyes in a 1994 Rwanda massacre. The 
text begins by recounting in sober, impersonal style that “Over a five month 
period in 1994, more than one million Rwandans, mostly members of the Tutsi 
minority, were systematically slaughtered as the world closed its eyes to 
genocide” and ends by emphasizing the strong personal impact that the eyes of 
the witness (whom Jaar met and interviewed in Rwanda) made on the artist. 
 
 
Fig. 51: Alfredo Jaar, The Eyes of Gutete Emerita, 1996. 
Top row (51 a + b; ‘light box version’): two quad vision light boxes with six black-and-white text 
transparencies and two colour transparencies, overall: 66.5 x 127.5 x 15.5 cm. 
Bottom row (51 c-e; ‘slide table version’): 100,000 slides, light table, magnifiers and illuminated 
wall text, table: 550.5 x 363.2 x 91.4 cm, text: 457.2 x 15.2 cm.                         
Courtesy of the artist. Photos: alfredojaar.net  
 
In a review of this work, Jacques Rancière wrote:  
[F]or all that they have seen, these eyes do not tell us 
what Gutete Emerita thinks and feels. They are the 
eyes of someone endowed with the same power as 
those who view them, but also with the same power 
that her brothers and sisters have been deprived of by 
the murders ... (Rancière 2009, p.97/98) 
The viewer is not overwhelmed by a ‘spectacle’ of dead bodies, but prompted to 
contemplate the “construction of the victim as an element in a certain 
distribution of the visible” (Rancière 2009, p.99)2. Jaar’s work combines 
addressing political and social issues with an appeal to meaning-making in 
                                            
2 The “distribution of the visible” is Rancière’s formula for habitual ways of seeing as well as the 
selection and presentation of images by various parties (media, advertising, etc.). 
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leaving the viewer, as art historian Griselda Pollock explains, “with some heavy, 
unresolved, and challenging questions about our involvement in [its] 
conundrum” (Pollock 2007, p.121). The conundrum arises from a major blank: 
what Gutete Emerita saw and experienced, and even in what situation she is 
now as a survivor, is not and cannot be depicted; this is left instead to the 
viewer’s imagination, which is initiated by the woman’s gaze:  
First and foremost it is that gaze ... for all that it has 
seen the massacre, does not reconstitute its 
perception of it for us. We may know what she has 
seen. We do not know what she thinks.  
(Rancière 2007a, p.76) 
Jaar carefully orchestrates this gaze. The viewer is presented with a 
cropped section of a face, backlit in a dark environment. Eyes and gaze are 
stimuli that we are conditioned to attend to closely and spontaneously3 and their 
impact is further enhanced by the theatrical mode of presentation. It may be 
argued that the viewer might turn to the text first before seeing the eyes 
(Rancière 2009, p.98), but the text fosters a similar response. In a confusing 
situation, people quickly turn to text to find explanations and orientation. In the 
dark environment the text itself is a source of light, which captures the viewer’s 
attention. Jaar’s strategy thus appeals to biologically and culturally conditioned 
response schemata, which are then coupled with reflection-invoking 
information. 
Several authors have addressed the relationship between photographic and 
textual representation and the issue of representational limits as a key theme in 
Jaar’s work (Rancière 2007a; 2009; Pollock 2007; Levan 2011). Arguably, for 
exhibition visitors, such discursive dimensions only come to the fore after 
contemplating their own direct encounter. Once viewers know whom they are 
facing, they confront “an impossible meeting with eyes … that look at you but 
see murder … as they look upon an invisible scene burned onto her retina from 
the inside” (Pollock 2007, p.127). They might then ask questions like: ‘What 
could, or should, I see seeing these eyes?’ or ‘Can I ever empathise with this 
person?’ Such questions will usually precede more general, intellectual and 
contextual considerations. 
                                            
3 For an overview of relevant research, see Itier et al. (Itier et al. 2007, pp.1019–1020).   
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Having presented (‘illuminated’) the work’s subject matter and provided 
orientation in the dark, the text’s principle functions are complete and the work’s 
negation strategy can gain traction. This includes questions like whether/how 
texts (or photographs) can accurately depict atrocities, or what is needed to 
truly engage consumers numbed by media images4 to empathise and change 
their lives. Norms are not rejected per se:  
The problem does not lie in criticizing television 
messages, it lies in creating other spatiotemporal 
arrangements, in opposing to the dominant light box 
other light boxes, where the text and images pass 
through the same channel, where the words are no 
longer spoken by a voice, but arranged like a poem on 
the screen… (Rancière 2007a, p.79) 
In other words, by questioning the limits of representation and documentation, 
Jaar’s installation ultimately turns meaning-making towards meaning-making. 
Jaar employs a variety of methods introduced in previous chapters: information 
is ‘blanked out’, the viewer is addressed by a direct gaze and provided with 
textual guidance. The emotional-cognitive interplay orchestrated by Jaar 
strongly relies on the viewer’s ‘empathetic vision’: an attempt to touch another 
person’s (and by extension that of thousands of others) ‘existential theme’. The 
fact that such attempts are usually doomed to failure given the difference 
between the world of the Western art viewer and that of the African civil war 
survivor challenges the viewer’s intellectual response. 
The effective arrangement not withstanding, Jaar’s strategy eventually turns 
against itself. Reflective viewers will recognise themselves as being amidst a 
mise-en-scène that suspiciously resembles the ‘dominant light boxes’ the work 
opposes. Victor Burgin held exactly this against Jaar’s work and against 
Rancière’s positive critique, arguing that in “its own spectacular theatricality the 
apparatus of Jaar’s work parallels that of mainstream cinema” (Burgin 2011, 
p.153). Burgin went on to criticise “the spectacular form of its presentation in 
gallery installations, where his theatrically lit display strategies recall and rival 
those of luxury boutiques and bars” (Burgin 2011, p.153). Rancière has indeed 
cautioned against exhibitions “that want to make viewers ‘active’ at all costs with 
the help of various gadgets borrowed from advertising” (Rancière et al. 2007, 
                                            
4 Pollock asked: “The viewer is shielded from what she witnessed ‘as an image’ (if shown as a 
news image, would it not be iconized and thus be commodified?). But in meeting these eyes 
and what they, unshown, reveal she has seen, might this moment sear the soul of the viewer 
also to remember…?” (Pollock 2007, p.127) 
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p.258) and his appraisal of Jaar’s work would seem to contradict his own 
position. Jaar himself is aware of this problem:  
As an artist and architect, everything I do is to facilitate 
the reading of the work … [T]he theatrics of a project 
… respond to the needs of the piece to communicate 
specific ideas. I hope that any theatricality is 
understood as just one element in the language that I 
need to communicate an idea. I am sure that I 
sometimes fall into an excess or suppression of the 
theatrical. ... You always walk a fine line between 
excess and constraint. (Jaar & Phillips 2005, p.26) 
Jaar may be criticised for over-stressing the objective of ‘communicating an 
idea’ and going beyond what is needed to establish the work’s repertoire; 
however, his installation highlights the field of tension between the work’s 
semantic intentions and the openness that situates separative meaning-making 
and which artists interested in this kind of response must balance out.  
5.2 Challenging Art Assessment Schemata with Video:  
Tony Oursler and Superflex 
 A certain ‘theatricality’ 
is inherent to many artistic 
strategies, particularly 
those employing cinematic 
techniques. Tony Oursler’s 
objects are often the only 
source of movement and 
light in an otherwise static 
environment (Fig. 52). The 
unanticipated appearance 
and motion of luminous 
objects are environmental 
features that, like eyes, we 
are conditioned to pay 
attention to (Yantis & 
Jonides 1984; Brockmole & Henderson 2005), as is the change of an object’s 
colour (Matsukura et al. 2009). Viewers experience both with much video art. In 
busy art exhibitions however, people are exposed to a multitude of moving 
 
Fig. 52:  Tony Oursler, Million Miles (Orbital Screw), 
2007, fiberglass sculpture, video projection, loud 
speakers, performance by: Constance De Jong, 122 x 
168 x 76 cm. 
Exhibition shown: Mirada Pisante, El Tanque Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 
Canary Islands (2008). Courtesy of the artist and Metro Pictures.  
Photo: tonyoursler.com 
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stimuli, and are often engaged in demanding tasks like interpretation that 
mitigate the effect (Simons 2000). It is partly for this reason that most video art 
is housed in separate, darkened, and often purpose-built rooms. These 
environments can invite, as art theorist Tiffany Sutton argued, ... 
... a proprioceptive comparison of the visitor’s body 
and mode of regard with bodies and modes of regard 
represented in the display, thus occasioning an 
immersive experience of bodily self-in-relation.  
(Sutton 2005, para.25) 
In Oursler’s and Jaar’s installations, this effect enforces an empathetic 
response; it blocks out distractions and focuses attention on the relation 
between the viewer and the characters in the display.  
When moving images are used, accompanying sound often adds a decisive 
dimension to the illusive effect. The fact that the words we hear are not from the 
dummies’ mouths is something that evolution has not prepared us for 
(Anderson 1998, p.84). Perceiving coherent, synchronic information via various 
senses helps validate our perceptions (Smith et al. 2012). Conversely, when 
perceptual information is incoherent the suspension of disbelief disappears.5 
Technology that is capable of reproducing multi-sensory, ‘realistic’ perceptual 
information thus lends itself to immersive effect and to transcending  ‘psychical 
distance’. However, it also reflects the same problems with regard to facilitating 
meaning-making discussed in connection with strong emotional stimuli (see 
4.4): since an overly captivating effect is eventually incompatible with meaning-
making, a counterbalance is required to recoup a reflective attitude. In most 
situations, a given set of circumstances – the size of the image, its lack of three 
dimensionality, the context in which it is seen, etc. – work against sustained 
immersion. Also, we can assume that contemporary viewers are accustomed to 
cinematic displays and thus capable of maintaining a certain distance. Even if 
realistic cinema does make people scream, cry, empathise, turn away or cover 
their eyes, it usually does not make them run away or get up to help a person 
suffering on the screen. 
 Distancing effects can also be carefully orchestrated, as in Oursler’s 
display of technical equipment. More common methods include editing 
                                            
5 Bruce Nauman’s video ‘Lip Sync’ (1969) thematises this effect: The work shows a close-up of 
the artist’s mouth turned upside-down, repeating the words “lip sync”. As he speaks the sound-
track shifts out of, and back into, sync with the image. 
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techniques, camera handling (Branigan 2006, chap.five), and the screenplay 
itself (for example, the concept of ‘alienation effect’ derived from Bertolt Brecht’s 
theatre theory, see (Féral 1987))  to name just a few. An example that 
dramatises the interplay of involving and distancing viewers is ‘The Financial 
Crisis’ (2009) (Fig. 53), a video installation by the artist collective Superflex. 
When exhibited, the 14-minute video is usually presented in a large box-type 
room with seating spaces.6 On their website, Superflex describe the work as 
addressing “the financial crisis and meltdown from a therapeutic perspective”:  
A hypnotist guides us through our worst nightmares to 
reveal the crisis without as the psychosis within. 
During 4 sessions you will experience the fascination 
of speculation and power, fear, anxiety and frustration 
of loosing control, economic loss and personal 
disaster. (Superflex 2009, para.1) 
Each session begins with 
an instruction to close 
one’s eyes, followed by a 
description of various 
scenarios. One such 
scenario involves 
operating an invisible hand 
that safely guides other 
people’s actions, but the 
viewer gradually loses 
control over it. Another 
session prompts the 
audience to imagine losing 
a perfect job and all the 
material security it brings. Each session is ended by the spell-breaking snap of 
a finger and the instruction to wake up feeling comfortable, fresh and happy.  
 At once involving and distancing are situations in which narrators or actors 
turn to the viewer and address her/him directly in the second person voice 
(Auter & Davis 1991). This is a key feature in the works of both Superflex and 
Oursler. The cinematic hypnotist talks to the audience face to face, telling 
                                            
6 The work was also broadcasted on British television (Channel 4, October 12-15, 2009 as part 
of the 3 Minute Wonder series) and is available from Superflex’ homepage www.superflex.net 
 
Fig. 53: Superflex, The Financial Crisis, 2009, video 
installation, 14 min. 
Exhibition shown: It’s the Political Economy, Stupid, Pori Art Museum 
(2013). Photo (museum press release): Erkki Valli-Jaakola. Courtesy of 
the artists (©) 
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viewers to close their eyes, imagine various situations, and wake up on 
command. They are prompted to respond to a mediated, two-dimensional 
authority and will often do so, but at the same time viewers are challenged to 
decide whether they indeed want to obey instructions given by a disembodied 
character (a work of art, an anonymous, absent person, etc.) and often in a 
setting where others may be watching. 
The strategies of Oursler and Superflex place particular emphasis on what 
may be called ‘suture’. This film theoretical term is normally used to describe 
techniques that draw (or ‘suture’) viewers into a cinematic story world, letting 
them forget their role as spectators (Lapsley & Westlake 2006, pp.86–90). 
However, suture also describes those processes and cinematic techniques that 
remind viewers of that very role (Oudart 1969; 1978; Dayan 1974). Similar 
processes and techniques were discussed in 4.4 with regard to a ‘return’ from 
an emotion-dominated response to a reflective attitude. According to the suture 
concept this development is predetermined and controlled by the 
filmmaker/author. Social scientist Daniel Dayan defined the system of suture as 
having “the function of transforming a vision or seeing of the film into a reading 
of it” (Dayan 1974, p.29). When attention shifts to a film’s technical aspects and 
its mise-en-scène, questions arise as to “why the frame is what it is” (Dayan 
1974, p.29).7 To realise that one’s own gaze is in fact that of another also 
encourages meaning-making in retrieval mode. In many films the viewer 
assumes the point of view (‘POV shot’ in film theory) of a diegetic character, 
looking through her or his eyes. The illusion is suspended as soon as this 
character is seen from the outside or when one suddenly takes the point of view 
of another character.8 This rupture of the illusion can turn the spectator to the 
intentions of the ‘real owner’ of the gaze: the one behind the camera, the 
director, “the haunting presence of the Absent One”, as film theorist Jean-Pierre 
Oudart said (Oudart 1978, p.41). So in principal, the effect of “flip-flopping in 
and out of the illusion” (Allen 1993, p.39) makes video a particularly powerful 
                                            
7 Dayan elaborated: “The spectator discovers that his possession of space was only partial, 
illusory. He feels dispossessed of what he is prevented from seeing. He discovers that he is 
only authorized to see what happens to be in the axis of the glance of another spectator, who is 
ghostly or absent” (Dayan 1974, p.29). 
8 A classical example would be the shot/reverse shot technique in which the spectator follows 
alternatingly the gaze of two people in conversation, hence being in a position impossible to 
adopt in real life (Oudart 1969; 1978; Dayan 1974). For a summary of the concept of suture, 
see: Lapsley and Westlake (2006, pp.86–90). 
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medium to suspend art assessment schemata, but also to recoup an attitude of 
assessment.  
If separative meaning-making is the objective, the described effect must be 
organised in a way that encourages a mode of assessment that goes beyond 
retrieval. The video installations of Oursler and Superflex do not lead viewers 
into and out of the perspective of diegetic characters, but instead prompt them 
to behave idiosyncratically from the start. Oursler enhances proprioceptive 
experiences by encouraging the audience to move around in his installations. 
The ‘frame’ that viewers might wonder ‘why it is what it is’ includes themselves 
as viewers. Moreover, some of Oursler’s characters directly address the viewer 
prompting her/his response. The viewer is not made to slip into the guise of 
another person, but is rather cast into alternating roles of an addressed 
opposite and a self-observer. 
The strategy is carried to extremes in ‘The Financial Crisis’. Arguably, few 
viewer/participants will effectively be hypnotised. They are led through a brief, 
slightly tongue-in-cheek, period of meditation. Whilst apprehending the work, 
the participant’s attention is focussed on conjuring up images in the mind; after 
this experience, the ‘treatment’ can, as Superflex member Jakob Fenger 
anticipates, cause us “to look upon ourselves and look upon how we have 
decided to live in this world” (Bui et al. 2010, para.69).9 In ‘The Financial Crisis’ 
as with Oursler’s chatty dummies, the suturing devices promote the ‘strange 
halfway position’ that Iser described: viewers are both involved and prompted to 
watch themselves being involved.  
Oursler, Superflex, Jaar and many other artists employ theatrical 
techniques that first aim to immerse viewers, and then disrupt this effect to 
make them aware of their role as perceiving or interacting subjects. In the 
discussed examples, the artwork ultimately asserts viewers’ ‘psychical distance’ 
by remaining static and unable to adjust to their response. Some artists have 
created work that attacks this safe distance by organising encounters with 
actors that entangle the viewer in a complex set of interactions. An example 
already discussed is Valie Export’s ‘Tap and Touch Cinema’ (Fig. 24); another 
                                            
9 The work’s repertoire warrants reflections, for example, on the conflation of internal and 
external, subjective and objective, imagined and real elements of the crisis as well as offering a 
metaphor for the hypnotic effect of the media. 
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one is Pedro Reyes’ project ‘Sanatorium’ (Fig. 54), first performed in 2011.10 
The work consists of a multi-room installation simulating a clinic including a 
reception and various consulting rooms. Upon arrival, visitors are requested to 
register as ‘patients’ before being interviewed by a receptionist and assigned 
therapeutic treatments.11 For each ‘treatment’ – a “game that will help to see 
your situation in a different light” (Reyes & Designindaba 2013, 4:43min) – the 
visitor is led to a ‘consulting room’ where s/he is encouraged to playfully work 
on a pressing theme or 
momentary conflict with a 
performer who has been 
briefed on simple therapeutic 
techniques. In exploring 
intersections between 
psychology and art as means 
to make people more aware 
of themselves Reyes’ strategy 
is similar to that of Oursler 
and Superflex. However, 
Reyes’ use of live actors 
makes it much more difficult 
for viewers to withdraw once 
they decided to become participants. In a sense, this may be seen as an artistic 
answer to the human instinct of escape or self-withdrawal that Pelowski and 
Akiba identified in connection to art apprehension (see: 4.4, p.118). Working 
with performers that interact with the audience is also the signature strategy of 




                                            
10 Guggenheim Museum, New York, 2011; also shown at the 2012 Documenta and London’s 
Whitechapel Gallery in 2013. 
11 Reyes’ website describes these ‘therapies’ as a “variations or mash ups of existing schools 
such as Gestalt psychology, theatre warm-up exercises, fluxus events, conflict resolution 
techniques, trust-building games, corporate coaching, psychodrama, and hypnosis” (Reyes 
2013, para.3). 
 
Fig. 54: Pedro Reyes, Sanatorium, first shown 2011, 
participatory project and installation. Here (2012): 
Performer and participant in ‘therapeutic session’ 
(‘Philosophical Casino’). 
Exhibition shown: Documenta XIII (2012), Kassel. Courtesy of 
the artist and Documenta. Photo: Matt Keyworth (©) 
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5.3 The Viewer as Actor: Tino Sehgal’s Conversational Works 
In many of his works, Tino Sehgal has people (usually lay performers whom 
he calls ‘interpreters’) approach and instigate discussions with audience 
members. In his ‘This Situation’, first performed in 2007, museum visitors face a 
group of six interpreters engaged in a debate on philosophical 
issues. Occasionally one of them would turn around and prompt a response 
from audience members asking: ‘Or what do you think?’. In ‘These 
Associations’ (2012), performed at the Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall, the visitor 
entered a crowd of about 70 people of different ages and occupations, one of 
whom would approach and ask her/him to share a personal experience or 
memory. For ‘This Progress’ (2006/2010) visitors were engaged in a 
conversation about the concept of progress whilst walking through the museum. 
When performed at New York’s Guggenheim museum, individual visitors were 
first welcomed by a child who started the conversation while accompanying 
them up the museum’s spiral gallery ramp. Here they were passed on to a high 
school student. Yet further up, the viewer was passed onto a young adult, and 
finally an elderly person before reaching the top of the spiral.  
Like facing Beecroft’s models, the viewer in these works is “confronted with 
him- or herself, with his or her own presence in the situation” but the meaning-
making position s/he is led to adopt is a very different one (Sehgal in Sehgal & 
Griffin 2005, p.219). In a sense, Sehgal’s interpreters are the opposite of 
Beecroft’s: the latter’s chilly manners enforce one’s awareness of being a part 
of the context, whereas the former’s proactive behaviour turns viewers into 
participants who become part of the work itself.  
Sehgal appreciates tourist visitors because they are, as he says, “more 
open” and “ready to experience something not necessarily art-related” (Sehgal 
& Thatcher 2012, p.3). However, many viewers may have some idea of what 
awaits them since Sehgal’s works feature prominently at international art events 
and in the media. The ‘artist’s name’ will thus often impede ‘the free 
manipulation’ of the work (compare 4.3.1, p. 110). Apart from giving interviews, 
Sehgal interferes with general viewing habits and the contextualisation of his 
work by prohibiting photography. The (intended)12 absence of imagery 
                                            
12 Unauthorised images of Sehgal’s works are nevertheless proliferated on the Internet. 
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underpins the uniqueness of the viewer’s personal encounter, and the fact that 
a conversation can survive only in memory and as a topic of conversation itself.  
Sehgal has often claimed that his work needs to be framed as art (Sehgal & 
Lubow 2010; Sehgal & Obrist 2012; Sehgal & Thatcher 2012). If his interpreters 
approached passers-by in the street for example, any reflective appeal would 
be jeopardised by the public’s general suspicion of strangers, especially when 
asked philosophical questions or to share personal experiences. What is 
missing in everyday experience is the “facilitating framework for contemplating 
an aspect of experience” (Sutton 2005, para.19). One has to categorise the 
experience somehow, Sehgal explained, “because obviously your eyes are 
telling you: ‘I have seen something’, and your brain has to say: ‘what is this 
something?’” and the institutional context can provide the necessary framework 
(Sehgal & Sgualdini 2005, para.17).  
The gallery’s ‘atmosphere of theory’ channels the viewer’s meaning-making 
per se, but Sehgal also manipulates this context. Typically, the artist has it 
cleared from all other artwork so that the only tangible cause left for reflection is 
the communicative situation that the viewer becomes a part of. The viewer is, 
Sehgal said, to experience the museum as a place of “legitimate and official 
culture that now evolves around her/him, around what s/he thinks” (Sehgal & 
Obrist 2012, p.60, my translation). Apart from shaping the context of his work, 
Sehgal also shapes, to an extent, the encounter between visitors and 
interpreters. The latter are instructed to avoid both small talk and discussions 
about the piece itself (Sehgal & Thatcher 2012), and to employ “a kind of 
prologue, which seduces the viewer into saying something” (Sehgal & Sgualdini 
2005, para.48). Sehgal’s strategy is thus an ideal example of the Open Work:  
[A]t the end of the interpretative dialogue, a form 
which is his [the artist’s] form will have been 
organized, even though it may have been assembled 
by an outside party in a particular way that he could 
not have foreseen. The author is the one who 
proposed a number of possibilities which had already 
been rationally organized, oriented, and endowed with 
specifications for proper development ...   
(Eco 1989 [1962], p.19) 
Despite the constraints that Sehgal imposes there is a lot of freedom in his 
constructed situations. The key component of their openness is the 
unpredictability of individual conversations. For the interpreter as for the visitor, 
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the conversation with a stranger is a challenge and a motor of meaning-making. 
Conversations proffer new ideas, test established views, make tacit knowledge 
explicit, and assimilate experiences. These are typical effects of conversations 
in general (Baker et al. 2002, chap.1,4 and 7; Sachs 1987), but they are 
intensified when talking to a stranger. Such encounters are especially 
demanding since people have to deal with a high degree of uncertainty and 
manage anxiety (Ball-Rokeach 1973; Berger & Calabrese 1975). 
Communication theorists Charles R. Berger and Richard J. Calabrese named 
typical variables of the uncertainty involved in conversations with strangers, 
many of which parallel processes of art apprehension. These are: seeking 
information, reward value of conversational partners (insights gained from 
artworks), the degree to which their behaviour (or the art’s form and content) 
matches normative expectations, and the likeliness of future interaction (Berger 
& Calabrese 1975). Sehgal’s conversational situations expand these typical 
features by what Berger and Calabrese identified as ‘intimacy of self-disclosure’ 
and the potential attraction of the stranger (Berger & Calabrese 1975).  
Sociologists have also hinted at people’s desire to have a ‘definition of the 
situation’, which can be defined as a mutual agreement on the nature of the 
interaction that is appropriate (Goffman 1959; Thomas 2002). To establish a 
situational definition participants must agree on the interaction’s social context 
and their own identities, respectively the roles in which they see themselves. 
Viewers’ self-assessment was previously discussed with regard to sexually 
explicit displays (see 4.4.2), and this can be seen as part of the struggle to 
achieve a situational definition. Situations like those instigated by Sehgal (where 
oppositional feed-back is guaranteed) augment the challenge to monitor and 
facilitate the way one is perceived and perceives oneself. This is exemplified by 
author Zoe Weil’s description of her encounter with ‘This Progress’ as follows:  
It was interesting to observe my own style as a visitor. 
... I found myself in a bit of a teaching mode with the 
child and 20-something but with the older person, I 
shifted into an equal sharing of thoughts and ideas 
and basic human information exchange, learning and 
stretching through the interactions. This ‘exhibit’ 
offered me a surprising mirror into myself.  
(Weil 2010, para.8) 
In a review of the same work, art historian Gillian Sneed remembered: 
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As a woman of 30, I was aware of my shifting roles as 
I progressed along the ramp. I transitioned from a 
protective caretaker to a mentor to a protégée in the 
matter of 10 minutes. (Sneed 2010, para.10) 
A third viewer, art critic Holland Cotter, recounted his experience with the work 
asking: “Why, I began to wonder as I walked and talked and listened, had I 
answered Giuliana’s [one of the interpreters] question as I did? What would I 
say if I were asked again?” (Cotter 2010, para.26). The three testimonials affirm 
the capacity of Sehgal’s conversational prompts to turn viewers/participants 
back to themselves. The artist tests the viewer’s readiness to confront 
dissonance and maintain ‘psychical distance’.13 If uncertainty is what many 
people seek when visiting an art exhibition, Sehgal twists and intensifies this 
challenge. Yet once initial difficulties are overcome, the experience can become 
relaxed. Sehgal himself used the example of meeting a stranger on a train to 
whom one can “always say more” because s/he is not a part of one’s own life 
(Sehgal & Thatcher 2012, p.2).  
The afore discussed trajectory from a more emotional to a more intellectual 
attitude is also characteristic of Sehgal’s constructed situations. Despite their 
intellectual merits (discussing and reflecting), these works are also an 
emotionally challenging experience. Sehgal couples a socially conditioned 
stimulus (conversational prompt) and associated response behaviour – ‘give an 
answer’, ‘try to understand’, ‘be polite’, ... – with an appeal to contemplate one’s 
own behaviour and the topic provided.14 Weil’s account confirms this: 
Tino Seghal offered me an opportunity to connect with 
others, explore ideas, self-reflect, and consider the 
concept of progress. I was a co-creator of the art, and 
the product wasn’t just the discussion but also the 
lingering aftermath of new ideas and questions and 
connection with people who had been strangers until 
we had taken the time, in this unstructured, yet 
structured way, to simply talk. (Weil 2010, para.11) 
Beyond such encounters, Sehgal’s works can raise more general questions 
about, for example, the boundary between real-life and enactment, the 
                                            
13 One of Sehgal’s interpreters reported in an interview that museum visitors are “not always 
relaxed about being approached by chatty strangers” and “say something like ‘I think we’re here 
for the art’” (Desantis 2010, para.22). Such responses document how deeply rooted and 
resistant art assessment schemata can be. 
14 In Reyes ‘Sanatorium’ the self-reflexive element is yet enhanced as he lets the participant 
provide the theme of reflection. 
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intertwining of private and public realms, or what constitutes the ‘work’ in these 
ephemeral situations. Related reflections will be undertaken mainly by 
observers assessing the work from a distance or in hindsight. Talking to 
interpreters absorbs the participant’s attention to an extent that makes a 
simultaneous interpretation of the work very difficult. This highlights the 
temporal aspect of meaning-making that was already observed in connection 
with Superflex’ ‘The Financial Crisis’ and the viewer’s response to Oursler’s ‘Get 
Away’. On the one hand, meaning can arise out of the immediate experience as 
it inspires reflection, on the other it may result from retrospective interpretation. 
Since Sehgal forcefully challenges participants’ distance, it will often only be in 
hindsight that meaning, in a broader, ‘political’ sense, can be made.  
5.4 Theory in Practice: ‘Base 211’ 
 
 
Fig. 55 a + b (exhibition simulation and detail): Jörg Jozwiak and Claudia Antonius, Base 211, 
2012/13, ten text panels, framed photographs and documents, maps, video, various objects, 
dimensions flexible. 
 
The preceding sections include various examples how the ‘work of art’, in 
Dewey’s procedural sense and as far as it concerns the viewer’s meaning-
making, can be illuminated through the lenses of other disciplines. This is 
interesting and perhaps useful to theoretically account for existing works, but 
how useful are such ‘lenses’ for artists themselves? One can imagine that they 
are indeed conducive to their work considering that artists are “looking for 
universal triggers” (Hirst), “go through a sort of continuous process of ‘imagining 
the viewer’” (Wall) and “want people to leave thinking that they must reposition 
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themselves in relation to what is being dealt with” (Tiravanija). However, the 
artist’s job may be regarded as taking a distinctly alternative approach to the 
‘distribution of the sensible’ – one that remains independent from other 
domains’ modes of describing or framing ‘reality’.  
To acknowledge that artists tackle and express subject matter in unique 
ways is important, but this does not mean that knowledge from other disciplines 
is arbitrary within the domain of art. Cross-disciplinary knowledge does not 
substitute artistic intuition, it adds to it. Artists observe (and perhaps ‘feel’) 
where existing descriptions of the world are weak and in need of improvement, 
and the intuitive nature of creative practice is undisputed here. However, when 
existing knowledge can be related to an artwork’s subject matter or an artist’s 
methods it can provide additional inspiration. Critic and curator Robert Storr 
pointed out that “[s]ome artists have derived a lot from their theoretical reading” 
and added, that not many do so “as systematically as people are inclined to 
think” (Storr & Stoilas 2009, para.3). Storr used Felix Gonzalez-Torres as an 
example as he “read theory carefully, nonetheless made a point of saying that it 
was not to be read in a kind of rigorous, academic way, but to help unblock 
thoughts and open up questions” (Storr & Stoilas 2009, para.3).15 Because 
artists often address the same topics as professionals from other disciplines, 
scientists, psychotherapists, and journalists for example, Nicolas Bourriaud 
rightly observed that:  
The contemporary artwork does not rightfully occupy a 
position in a field, but presents itself as an object of 
negotiation, caught up in a cross-border trade which 
confronts different disciplines, traditions or concepts. 
(Bourriaud 2009b, p.32)  
In such a situation, cross-disciplinary knowledge can only make a work more 
nuanced or varied, and contribute to the artist’s competence to comment on the 
world we live in. Disciplinary knowledge from other fields also has potential 
utility when it comes to assessing one’s own work, and bringing complementary 
theories to one’s own practice can afford new perspectives on how it is likely to 
                                            
15 Gonzalez-Torres himself explained that without the influence of Barthes, Foucault, Borges, 
and others, he wouldn’t have been able to conceive certain pieces, or arrive at some positions: 
“Some of their writings and ideas gave me a certain freedom to see. These ideas moved me to 
a place of pleasure through knowledge and some understanding of the way reality is 
constructed, of the way the self is formed in culture, of the way language sets traps ...” 
(González-Torres et al. 1993, para.8). In the vein of a meaning-making theory, Gonzales-Torres 
concludes: “I want you, the viewer, to be intellectually challenged, moved, and informed” 
(González-Torres et al. 1993, para.8). 
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be apprehended. To demonstrate this, one of the artworks created as part of 
the practice element of this study is assessed below. 
‘Base 211’ (Fig. 55) is a multi media exhibition proposal conceived in 
collaboration with artist Claudia Antonius. The work deals with the myth and 
conspiracy theory that the Nazis built a secret underground base in Antarctica, 
where many survived long after World War II. The myth, which was originally 
spread by post-war tabloids, has seen a revival in recent years and has 
proliferated on the Internet. For ‘Base 211’, the myth was re-edited and partially 
re-written. Drawing on existing conspiracy theories, the work balances on the 
borderline between what one can believe and what one can no longer believe. 
The objects on display combine genuine (but re-contextualised) and false 
documents such as photos, official and private letters, maps, and sketches. 
Successive information panels guide the viewer through the exhibition. As 
viewers proceed, they confront an increasingly grotesque narrative beginning 
with an authentic Nazi-led Antarctic expedition, and ending with the 
abandonment and demolition of the secret facility.   
No cross-disciplinary theory was drawn on when developing the idea and 
producing many of the work’s components. These stages were guided by the 
fascination with an absurd story and its exploitation by hoaxers, neo-Nazis and 
conspiracy theorists. Material was gathered from Internet blogs and websites 
and the historical texts in which the myth first appeared. We then playfully re-
arranged the story and stripped it of the most obviously nonsensical aspects 
such as UFO engineering on the base and Hitler’s survival in Antarctica. 
Our modal intention has been to turn viewers back to themselves in that 
they get into a position of questioning what they believe and where they begin 
to doubt. It was important to conceive the work in such a way that it would not 
immediately be regarded as fiction or hoax. To that end – dubbing conspiracy 
theorists’ methods – some genuine documentary material including coverage of 
the ‘German Antarctic Expedition’ of 1938/39 was used. Also, great care was 
taken to create authentic looking false documents. It seemed furthermore 
pertinent to recognise curatorial conventions of historical exhibitions regarding 
the wording and the design of the text panels, the framing of historical 
photographs and documents, and the overall arrangement of the exhibits.  
Rather than study curatorial theories, we spent time looking at actual history 
exhibitions, taking advice as needed from curators. The concept and material 
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for ‘Base 211’ was largely 
developed intuitively. Theory 
from other disciplines became 
especially interesting as we 
assessed the work for its 
capacity to facilitate the 
desired mode of response. 
The concept of suture, for 
example, provided an 
interesting reference to 
assess features that would 
make the viewer ‘flip-flop in 
and out of the illusion’. Various elements were identified as conducive to this, 
such as the mixture of authentic documentary material and our own (often 
humorous) supplements (Fig. 56). An essential aspect in this respect is the 
discrepancy between the (ostensive) history exhibition within the environment of 
the art gallery. The identified features inspired further thinking, which eventually 
led to the modification of some components.16 The temporary suspension of 
retrieval-focussed art assessment schemata could be anticipated because of 
the work’s suturing features.  
Applying this thesis’ theory of meaning-making to ‘Base 211’ also involved 
identifying the work’s repertoire. The essential semantic information needed to 
process this work appropriately is that its ‘story’ builds on an existing fringe 
theory involving the Nazi’s construction of an underground base in Antarctica, 
and that this myth is still widely believed. Moreover, we examined the relation 
between emotion-stimulating and reflection-stimulating aspects in the work. The 
Nazi era setting of the narrative (especially due to the imagery included) is likely 
to attract attention. This historical period continues to fascinate people; literature 
and cultural theorist Sabine Hake even identified an “almost compulsive 
preoccupation with ‘sexy Nazis’ and ‘nasty Nazis’ in popular culture” (Hake 
2012, p.3). Exploiting the Nazi theme deliberately to trigger attention would 
have been ethically questionable but the setting is an essential component of 
the existing myth that is the work’s subject matter. Eventually, it is a part of 
                                            
16 An information panel with book covers, website copies, etc. documenting already existing 
versions of the Base 211-myth was added as the final station of the trajectory through the 
exhibition. 
 
Fig. 56: Jörg Jozwiak and Claudia Antonius, Base 
211 (detail), digital collage printed on baryta 
photographic paper, 9x6 cm. 
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thework’s critical objective that such theories continue to proliferate and acquire 
new believers. We did consider carefully whether toying with this part of history 
is ethically feasible but decided to realise this work whilst omitting some 
elements.17  
Another concern with ‘Base 211’ was that the Nazi context could capture 
too much attention when the work was not meant to be a comment on Nazism 
in particular. Rather it deals with its appropriation by fringe theorists and 
hoaxers, the reception of their inventions and the acceptance of (historical) 
narratives more generally. According to our assessment, a fixation on the Nazi 
context is counterbalanced by emphasising specific details of the story. Instead 
of stressing issues related to Nazi ideology, the ‘documentary’ material focuses 
on the planning and construction of, and everyday life on, the base. Moreover 
the work is pervaded by humorous elements, which are an important means to 
spur viewer’s doubts about historical authenticity. Also, contrary to existing 
versions of the myth, the construction and maintenance of the base is portrayed 
as a series of failures and misfortunes, such as most of the Nazis on the base 
dying from influenza. 
The first text panel explains to visitors that the exhibition is a ‘correction’ of 
existing fringe theories dealing with the same topic. To avoid this leading to a 
focus on a ‘Nazi story’, an additional contextual frame is introduced. Not only 
the story of ‘Base 211’ is told but at the same time the story of the efforts of two 
collectors who allegedly tracked down and acquired the items on display. This 
aspect is foregrounded by a video interview with one of them and thus through 
a medium drawing special attention. The format of the history exhibition 
functions as an intellectual trigger and fosters an impression of seriousness to 
counterbalance the absurdity of the narrative. However, this presents another 
threat to the work’s repertoire. The discrepancy between form and content may 
be taken to suggest a critique of museum rhetoric, which would be a 
misinterpretation. This remains a weakness of the work.18  
                                            
17 Initially we had considered, for example, the use of images of genuine underground Nazi 
facilities in Germany in digital collages but as we found out that these were almost always built 
by slave labour under dreadful conditions any appropriation for our purposes was out of 
question. For related discussions about cinematic comedy and satire dealing with the Nazi time, 
see: Fröhlich et al. (2003). 
18 Alternative presentation modes (for example an online version or even channelling the fake 
imagery into fringe forums) were considered but not yet realised. 
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Overall, we came to the conclusion that ‘Base 211’ appeals to the viewer’s 
emotional engagement and thereby counters retrieval-oriented art assessment 
schemata. This effect is also fostered by the work’s intellectual appeal, which is 
largely owed to the format of a history exhibition. The theory of meaning-making 
developed in this thesis has focused on the role of an ‘affective ambush’ in this 
respect. Much post-conceptual art, like ‘Base 211’ uses intellectually oriented 
methods that facilitate the suspension of retrieval-oriented art assessment 
schemata. In contrast to more traditional Concept Art, the aim is less to provoke 
reflections about art’s own ontology (although this may be considered) but 
about the world we live in and the viewer’s place in it.  
The intellectual appeal of ‘Base 211’ notwithstanding, emotional aspects are 
also pertinent. Besides the potential excitement caused by the Nazi-setting, a 
certain mirth rivals approaches to seize the work by retrieval (an aspect also 
found in the works of Oursler and Superflex)19. Psychologist Avner Ziv argued 
that exploration, humour and art, converge in feeding on incongruity and 
novelty, or departures from what is usual, or expected (Ziv 1976). In this vein, 
humour may also function as another way to suspend conventional art 
assessment schemata and facilitate separative meaning-making. This 
assumption is supported by various studies on the relation between humour and 
people’s creative potential suggesting that “there is evidence that exposure to 
humour can enhance creative thinking, and that this effect is likely mediated by 
the positive emotion (i.e., mirth) associated with humour” (Martin 2010, p.103).20  
‘Spy-visits’ like those I made to my snowman installation (see 1.1) might 
disclose actual patterns of viewer response related to humorous works. The 
option of systematically studying actual viewers’ response will be considered in 
the final chapter; with regard to the ‘Base 211’ project, we felt confident that it 
embodies the necessary elements to facilitate separative meaning-making.21 
 
                                            
19 In a TV interview, Oursler paraphrased Sigmund Freud, saying ‘a good joke can jump 
consciousness’ and that this is a technique he applies (Oursler 2010, 0:30min). 
20 For in-depth discussions on the role of humour in art, see: Higgie (2007) and Klein (2007). 
21 The account in this section does not claim to cover our entire assessment of ‘Base 211’. Only 
a few considerations are presented here in order to exemplify how this thesis’ theory of 
meaning-making may be applied to artworks. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Using various examples, it has been argued that theories from disciplines 
as diverse as psychology, biology, sociology, and film theory can help us better 
understand how an appeal to meaning-making is anchored in artworks. Which 
discourses lend themselves to such an investigation will always depend on the 
subject matter and methods of the work under review. This chapter also drew 
attention to the temporal aspects of meaning-making theory: When ‘psychical 
distance’ is minimised during an encounter with the work, it may be only in 
hindsight that meaning can emerge. 
The theory of meaning-making proposed in this thesis is informed by 
philosophical theories and scientific knowledge. As a general tool, artists and 
theorists may use this framework to describe what belongs to a work’s 
repertoire, clarify modal intentions, and assess how it appeals to different kinds 
of meaning-making. An important variable in this context is the relation and 
interaction between features that appeal to viewers’ emotional response and 
those that appeal to reflection. It is not assumed that this theory will play an 
important role in inspiring the production of art; rather it can be applied usefully 
to assess works in hindsight or at an advanced stage of their production.
6                       CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
  
The tasks facing us today are to analyse how 
contemporary art addresses the viewer and assess 
the quality of the audience relations it produces: the 
subject position that any work presupposes and the 
democratic notion that it upholds, and how these are 
manifested in our experience of the work.  
Claire Bishop, 20041 
6.1 Research Summary 
Meaning: A work-inspired and viewer-produced 
agency to change the viewer’s ability to reflect, feel, 
respond, perceive, or act in a way the viewer will judge 
as beneficial. An object or situation becomes 
meaningful when it acquires a purpose in a viewer’s 
life; the artist is relevant to a work’s meaning only by 
setting the theme or subject matter as an obligatory 
platform for personal meaning. 
Meaning-making: The deliberate act of exploring an 
artwork’s potential and/or one’s own response to an 
artwork in order to find meaning, coupled with the 
(often verbalised) elaboration of that meaning. 
Meaning-making is an emotion-driven intellectual 
activity that facilitates habitual (including conceptual) 
change and is ultimately motivated by the natural 
desire to increase one’s own ability to understand or 
act.  
The above definitions reflect how meaning and meaning-making in the realm of 
art apprehension are interpreted throughout this thesis. The two questions 
addressed in this study are: 
a) How can meaning and meaning-making be properly defined in the 
context of contemporary art practice? and 
b) What conditions best facilitate meaning-making?  
To address these questions, various philosophical, historical and psychological 
perspectives were explored and information taken from these fields was 
evaluated using examples from contemporary and historical art practice. Viewer 
responses were accounted for drawing on empirical audience research findings 
and individual experiences recorded in Internet blogs, journal articles and other 
                                            
1 Bishop (2004, p.78) 
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sources. Views of practitioners were taken from interviews and/or statements, 
articles and essays written by artists. The meaning-making processes defined in 




Fig. 57: Components of art-related meaning-making        
 
Reflecting on an artwork is inevitably influenced by the presentation context, 
which includes but is not limited to the viewer’s prior knowledge, values and 
expectations, as well as the exhibition venue, the exhibition title, and the 
placement of neighbouring artworks (1). The work and the presentation context 
influence the viewer’s mood and spontaneous affective response (2). Initial 
associations, value judgements, and memories are triggered, which determine 
whether the work seems likely to integrate with one’s interests and existing 
‘experience of the world’ (3). If the viewer decides that the work has potential to 
acquire ‘meaning to’, her/him s/he will be motivated (4a) to further investigate it 
(5). If a promise of ‘meaning to’ is absent, further investigation is unlikely. The 
motivation to reflect on an artwork is also conditioned by whether or not the 
artwork is actually recognised as a ‘work’ (4b). Although equally capable of 
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evoking associations and memories etc., a painting made by a monkey will not 
be considered meaningful because it ostensively lacks any intention. The 
gallery context alone will often suffice in suggesting that an object is intended to 
be apprehended as art.2 
Initially, the process of apprehension is one of ‘undergoing’ followed by a 
phase of ‘doing’. This doing is where the actual making of meaning transpires, 
and this involves the reflective integration of triggered emotions, perceptions 
and memories within one’s own view of the world. The viewer’s unique 
perspectives and personal style of approaching art determines her/his ‘mode’ of 
meaning-making. This thesis proposes a taxonomy for distinguishing three 
different, although often interwoven, modes of meaning-making and their 
attendant meaning-types: 
 Retrieval (6) focuses on the work’s signifiers in order to reveal the artist’s 
intentions, formal relations within the work, symbolised/metaphorical 
content, stylistic and historical classification and/or the context of the work’s 
production (7). Meaning-retrieval can be supported by drawing on all kinds 
of contextual material, from titles to historical sources. 
 Speculation (8) also focuses on the work’s signifiers but with a conscious, 
often playful bias. Subsequent meaning arises from personal and tentative 
interpretations (9). 
 Separation (10) focuses on the work’s signified, and leads to meaning 
related to the work’s subject matter (11). An important variant of separation 
is introspection (12) where the focus is on one’s own way of responding. 
Separative meaning-making as the result of being turned back to oneself (as 
viewer/participant) leads to meaning related to one’s own habits and beliefs 
(13).  
In each case, the viewer’s initial intuition that a work holds the potential for 
‘meaning to’ her/him is further explored by verbalising the ‘meaning of’ the 
artwork. At first, a ‘promise of meaning’ manifests affectively as a state of 
excitement or interest that fosters further attention. The intuition that the work 
has ‘meaning to’ oneself is made tangible through determining the ‘meaning of’ 
the work. The meaning-making process can thus also be described as an 
attempt to determine the relation between the object and the viewer. As they 
                                            
2 Even a painting by a monkey shown in a gallery (as opposed to a zoo or a laboratory) 
suggests an intention; in this case, however, it would be that of a curator. 
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arise, new apprehensions are implicitly or explicitly integrated into the viewer’s 
existing knowledge potentially increasing her/his understanding (14). Resultant 
conceptual changes qualify art apprehension as meaning-making in that they 
fulfil the original ‘promise of meaning’ (15): 
 Retrieved meaning improves the viewer’s understanding of art in terms of its 
formal and symbolic/metaphorical qualities and its (art-) historical context. It 
potentially fosters the viewer’s ability to articulate related knowledge in the 
future. 
 Speculated meaning is similar to retrieved meaning but it also fosters playful 
and creative activities. 
 Separated meaning yields a better understanding of oneself and/or the 
world we live in.  
Separative meaning-making involves the viewer’s thinking beyond ‘art as art’ by 
identifying with and expanding upon the artist’s concerns. In doing so, the main 
emphasis is not placed on reconstructing the artist’s point of view or intentions, 
but rather on making personal connections with the subject matter presented.  
With this understanding of meaning-making, it is possible to address the 
central research question how contemporary artists can facilitate conditions 
under which viewers will be more likely to actively participate in the meaning-
making of their work. Individuals respond differently to different stimuli, and 
each individual has personal – sometimes ‘existential’ – themes that, when 
evoked, will let her/him temporarily forget that s/he is looking at a work of art. 
This entails the temporary suspension of typical, often retrieval-oriented art 
assessment schemata. The same effect occurs on a relatively predictable basis 
when stimuli appeal to certain biologically or socially determined response 
behaviours. Salient examples include triggers of disgust, sexual attraction, or 
empathy. An art object or situation that elicits any of these types of response 
challenges the viewer’s ‘psychical distance’. Rather than recognising an object 
or situation as one to be contemplated, one will first and foremost perceive it as 
a phenomenon of potential harm or benefit. Much art places particular emphasis 
on stimuli that trigger intuitive, predictable ways of responding. To facilitate 
meaning-making, as opposed to a purely emotional/visceral response, it is 
crucial that the respective appeal is counterbalanced by offers to engage with 
the work on a more intellectual level. Emotional stimuli work against attitudes of 
  154 
meaning-retrieval, but do not in themselves promote separative meaning-
making.  
A key condition that encourages a reflective attitude is the gallery or 
museum environment, as it embodies an ‘atmosphere of theory’ that will remind 
the viewer of the observed phenomenon’s status as an object or situation to be 
thought about. Wall texts and other curatorial devices used by both curators and 
artists are specific tools to promote reflection within the gallery context. The 
return to a reflective attitude can also be facilitated by features that belong to 
the work itself. A popular artistic strategy is the use of ‘blanks’; that is the 
omission or obfuscation of information that the viewer is then obliged to provide. 
Methods used to achieve this include concealing details, posing narrative 
puzzles, and using apparently unrelated titles. 
Stimuli for reflection cannot determine separative meaning-making. The 
viewer may still prefer to fill in blanks by pursuing the artist’s (or imagined 
experts’) ‘solution’. The examples discussed suggest that attitudes of separative 
meaning-making are enhanced by reflection-evoking stimuli that are closely 
linked to the emotional experience: the text element in Alfredo Jaar’s Eyes of 
Gutete Emerita, the visible technology in Tony Oursler’s installations, and the 
union of emotional and intellectual triggers in Tino Sehgal’s conversational 
prompts. Fig. 58 summarises the artist’s potential for influencing the viewer’s 
meaning-making. 
For an artist interested in the viewer’s participation in the making of 
meaning it is important to convey the information needed to do so in 
accordance with the work’s repertoire (a). The repertoire includes, first and 
foremost, social norms and conventions addressed by the work as well as 
historical facts that need to be understood in order to make sense of the work. 
The repertoire belongs to the artist’s semantic intentions (b). Semantic 
intentions are what viewers focussing on meaning-retrieval are most interested 
in knowing (c); for many artists however, any semantic intentions that go 
beyond the repertoire are not important for the viewer to know. To debilitate 
retrieval-dominated approaches and foster more creative kinds of meaning-
making (d) belongs to the artist’s modal intentions (e). Modal intentions are 
aimed at the viewer’s way of responding to the artwork (f) and can be 
articulated, like all intentions, via the art object/situation and/or its presentation 
context. Artists sometimes manipulate the presentation context (for example by 
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providing wall texts) (g); however, this is more commonly the domain of curators 
or educators who know (or assume) what the artist’s intentions are (h) and 
facilitate their apprehension (i). The artist can appeal to viewers’ emotions and 
spontaneous affective responses (j). To balance emotional and affective 
responses3 (k) and facilitate separative meaning-making (m), requires stimuli 
that evoke reflection (l). 
 
 
Fig. 58: The artist’s potential influence on the viewer’s meaning-making 
 
This thesis has addressed current reservations towards the idea of 
meaning, and investigated both this concept and its definitions in the context of 
visual art practice. However, much of what appears to be a fundamental critique 
in fact focuses on, and is thus limited to, specific notions of meaning. One of 
these notions concerns the identification of an object, situation or condition’s 
meaning with its objective ‘truth’ or a universally accepted definition. Another 
                                            
3 The differentiation of emotional and affective responses refers to the distinction introduced in 
3.4. This thesis has mainly focussed on the evocation of emotions. 
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critiques the possibility of subjective meaning by positing that there is no 
subject, understood as a self-determined authority capable of producing unique 
meaning. The first critique is shared by this thesis; the second is 
accommodated by acknowledging that cultural, social, and historical contexts 
play a significant role in shaping the subject. However, this view is ultimately too 
reductive as it neglects phenomenological and pragmatic aspects of meaning. 
There is an epistemological difference between ‘meaning of’ (something) and 
‘meaning to’ (somebody) and between meaning-making concerned with a 
work’s signifiers and its signified.  
A key issue in this thesis has been the tie between emotional and 
intellectual aspects of meaning-making and the role of verbalisation. It was 
considered that the concept of meaning could be re-defined positing a purely 
ineffable quality. When an object or situation means something to a person (that 
is, the object is considered valuable by an individual to her/him) meaning 
(‘meaning to’) can become a driving force that does not require verbalisation. 
However, to replace the definition of meaning as discourse-rooted with one 
being an emotion-rooted promoter of self-change turned out to be too radical. It 
cannot be claimed that what the viewer of an artwork verbally elaborates has 
nothing to do with its meaning. This would also downplay the utility of language 
for clarifying what was sensed. When viewers verbalise their apprehensions 
they offer interpretations, first and foremost, to themselves. This does not imply 
that a work’s ‘meaning to’ oneself can be fully captured in words, nor that any 
meaning made must stand the critique of others. Verbalisation is the most 
tangible indication of a deliberate activity of making (which is by definition one of 
constructing or elaborating) in meaning-making.  
 
Two principle aims of this thesis were: 
a) to clarify and define the concept of meaning-making and 
b) to compile a list of factors that can potentially facilitate meaning-making. 
Both of these aims were accomplished. The third aim was to explore whether 
and how the concept of meaning-making can serve as an example for the 
potential utility of non-art-disciplines within the realm of art. So far, this has only 
been partially accomplished. This thesis has presented pertinent areas of 
existing research from non-art disciplines, and has provided one example of 
how art practitioners could use this knowledge to assess their own work. In the 
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following sections it will be argued that a theory of meaning and factors that 
facilitate meaning-making as defined in this thesis can also be valuable in art 
theoretical and art educational contexts.   
6.2 Application of the Research Findings 
The relation between ‘designing for the viewer’ (Housen 2007) and 
producing daring, innovative work guided by ‘free’ intuition is a delicate one. 
The balance between emotional stimuli and triggers of reflection, between 
openness and closure, and between too little and too much information cannot 
and should not be defined by any rules. This balance has to be ‘sensed’ and 
resolved on a case-by-case basis. However, to make the best decisions it can 
be helpful to consider what constitutes the meaning-making process and what 
the viewer needs to know. This research has developed new definitions and a 
new vocabulary that may be useful within the field of art theory and art criticism, 
and reveals the benefits of a stronger emphasis on reception-oriented questions 
in art educational contexts.  
6.2.1 Art Theory and Art Criticism  
This thesis has shown that meaning-making is a pertinent concept in 
contemporary art practice because it describes important aspects of the art 
viewer’s participatory activity. Attention was drawn to the connotation of 
meaning-making as creating individual purpose for the viewer, whilst 
maintaining, through the notion of repertoire, that the artist’s semantic intentions 
must not be sacrificed altogether. The approach taken here builds on Umberto 
Eco’s concept of the Open Work, which has opened doors for debate on the 
viewer as meaning-maker. The Open Work concept reflects the ideas presented 
in this thesis in three ways. First, it establishes that certain types or genres of 
art are intended to be completed by the viewer. Second, it points out that 
openness must be delimited in order to avoid lapsing into arbitrariness, and, 
third, it upholds the intellectual dimension of art apprehension.  
What the Open Work concept does not do is offer insight into the artist’s 
role in facilitating an open response. Eco only broadly suggested that 
“intentional form” should “organize the vision” (Eco 1989 [1962], p.99) and that 
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occasionally artists will have to provide a catalogue text (Eco 1968, n.p.)4. 
Openness is not only liable to be confused with arbitrary interpretation, but also 
to being cancelled out by retrieval-oriented approaches to art. Several 
strategies have been discussed through which artists disrupt retrieval-oriented 
art assessment schemata. In the vein of the Open Work, it is concluded that 
viewers’ understanding of the repertoire and their mode of approach must not, 
and does not have to be left entirely to chance.  
Openness is a part of the ‘meaning of’ the artwork; a perspective that Eco 
endorsed in principal by arguing that Open Works function as “epistemological 
metaphors” for “the unlimited discovery of contrasts and oppositions that keep 
multiplying with every new look” (Eco 1989 [1962], p.93). How many of the 
informal painters Eco favoured as exemplars would subscribe to this view is 
debateable; surely many contemporary and more conceptually minded artists 
have a different understanding of openness. As art theorist Christopher Atkins 
wrote, they challenge their audience to participate within the ‘articulation of 
different world views and to exchange and critique them’ (compare 2.11).5 Such 
works can still enforce the insight that political or social ‘realities’ are contingent, 
however, they also allow personal conclusions and conceptual change. 
Meaning-making, and especially separative meaning-making, is now an 
important process involved in responding to works’ open-ended design. 
Artworks remain open to other viewers’ meaning-making and potentially to the 
viewer’s own re-assessment, but it is hard to accept that meaning once made 
would have to be perpetually overturned. 
A different perspective on openness is offered by Jacques Rancière. His 
concept of the ‘emancipated spectator’ posits a viewer who links “what she sees 
to a host of other things that she has seen” and associates the display “with a 
story which she has read or dreamt, experienced or invented” (Rancière 2009, 
p.13).6 Elsewhere, Rancière argued that art claiming to be ‘political’ requires a 
‘readable political signification’ (Rancière 2013 [2003], p.59), which would be 
evidenced in the work’s repertoire. Taken together, these perspectives 
constitute an ‘update’ of the Open Work concept: building on the repertoire, the 
                                            
4 See under the headline “’Dall’ informale alle nuove figurazioni”. 
5 In the words of Jacques Rancière: They construct “different realities, different forms of 
common sense – that is to say, different spatiotemporal systems, different communities of 
words and things, forms and meanings” (Rancière 2009, p.102). 
6 Superflex’ ‘The Financial Crisis’ emphasises this scenario.  
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viewer constructs or elaborates (or ‘translates’) the work’s ‘meaning to’ her/him. 
However, this is not Rancière’s own conclusion. Although articulated as a 
theory of political art, he eventually denied the requirement of a ‘readable 
political signification’ reflecting his view. The ‘ideal effect’ of ‘political art’, 
Rancière wrote ... 
... is always the object of a negotiation between 
opposites, between the readability of the message that 
threatens to destroy the sensible form of art and the 
radical uncanniness that threatens to destroy all 
political meaning. (Rancière 2013 [2003], p.59) 
This containment of the readable signification by the uncanny is not sufficient 
for Rancière. The ideal ‘political effect’ in this interpretation belongs to “the pre-
suppositions of the strategic view of art” that he himself denies: 
[The] possible subversive effect [of art] is the effect of 
aesthetic experience and not the effect of artistic 
strategies. [This] does not mean that precisely art is 
not subversive, art can contribute to produce new 
changes in the configuration of the sensible, in the 
cartography of the visible and the sensible, but it 
cannot anticipate and calculate its own effect. 
(Rancière et al. 2008, para.10,12)  
This thesis follows Rancière (and mainstream art theory) in his discontent 
with art that passes on prefabricated messages, but it does not reject any 
‘strategic view of art’ per se. To dispense with the ‘readable political 
signification’ creates a limbo regarding an artwork’s critical momentum. Denying 
that ‘good’ artworks have momenta is not an option here since this would 
incapacitate the artist and foster arbitrariness in meaning-making. It is admitted 
however, that the notion of the ‘readable political signification’ needs 
specification to ensure it is not confused with didactic messages. The idea of 
the repertoire lends itself to this purpose. It posits the readable (political) 
signification not as a teaching but as a platform from which new meaning can 
emerge in correspondence with a work’s momentum. The repertoire may 
sometimes be minimal, even banal but yet indispensible: Shapiro’s ‘Last 
Suppers’ show recreated death row meals (and not anyone else’s food); 
Cardoso’s sculptures are modelled on sexual organs of animals (they are not 
informal sculptures and are not based on any other forms). Such basic 
significations are also evident in all of Rancière’s examples. For instance, it is a 
political signification made readable by Jaar that, with Gutete Emerita’s eyes, 
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we face a civil war survivor and it is important that they do not belong to any 
other person.  
Artists must anticipate viewer responses to a certain extent. Art is rarely the 
production of Rorschach test-like ink spills that the artist and (other) viewers can 
equally use to inspire their imagination. Here, the (ignorant master) artist and 
the (emancipated) spectator would indeed be equal meaning-makers, but this 
leads back to the ‘promise of meaning’: viewers’ interest in an artwork depends 
on whether they confront an ‘intentional organisation’, regardless of how far 
their own meaning-making will eventually digress from such defaults.  
 
Another issue to be considered is the epistemological status of meaning. 
The concept of meaning-making developed throughout this thesis is both 
descriptive and normative. To elucidate a descriptive dimension the research 
drew from philosophical approaches, empirical audience studies, psychological 
research and viewer testimonials. Because the objective of meaning-making is 
to increase a person’s ability to understand or act and to bring about conceptual 
change, the concept is also normative. The capacity of an artwork to elicit 
meaning-making can thus be used as an evaluative measure. Being descriptive 
but normatively charged, ‘meaning’ in the context of art is a ‘thick’ concept.7  
Since the evocation of separative meaning-making is a key objective of 
much contemporary art, achieving it becomes pivotal for a work’s success. 
When an artist holds that the viewer’s contribution to the meaning of an artwork 
is important, creates favourable conditions for viewers to add their ‘contribution 
to the creative act’, and viewers are infact inspired to do so (demonstrable, for 
example through viewer testimonials or audience studies), her/his work can be 
seen as successful. Some philosophically minded art theorists might reject this 
approach, arguing that measurable agreement of people regarding an artwork’s 
meaning (for example through its description by certain adjectives) or value (on 
a preference scale), are at least to the philosopher far from sufficient evidence 
                                            
7 Descriptive concepts that are normatively charged have been described as ‘thick concepts’ 
(Williams 1985; Dancy 1995; Bonzon 2009; Kirchin 2013). The terminology is owed to the idea 
that some descriptive concepts are difficult to define without an undertone of evaluation. 
Examples include ‘courage’, ‘blasphemy’, and ‘coherence’. Philosopher Bernard Williams 
argued that certain concepts “seem to express a union of fact and value. The way these notions 
are applied is determined by what the world is like (for instance, by how someone has 
behaved), and yet, at the same time, their application usually involves a certain valuation of the 
situation, of persons or actions” (Williams 1985, p.129). Hence they are said to be ‘thicker’ than 
comparatively ‘thin’ descriptive concepts (such as ‘table’) or clear-cut normative concepts (such 
as ‘beauty’). 
  161 
that the work indeed has this meaning or value (Dickie 1962).8 Rather, such 
questions would have to be determined by the ruling aesthetic conventions and 
‘language games’ used to describe and evaluate art and these are beyond 
psychological methodology. 
Such a critique gains little traction here since empirical observation does not 
mark the beginning, but the end of the envisaged evaluation. Observable 
strategies of appreciation do not define a work’s meaning or value, rather, it is 
suggested that they be used to assess whether already defined criteria of 
meaning and value are realised in viewers’ meaning-making practices. It is not 
the empirical researcher’s task to determine what an audience’s response will 
or should be, this area is always to be left to the artists or philosophers involved. 
It is also acknowledged that the complexity and subjectivity of responding to 
artworks is not conducive to empirical research. What empirical research can do 
however, is show whether predicted and well-defined types of response 
correspond with those responses observed in viewers (Reber 2008; Konečni 
2012, sec.II.1). With the definition of various modes of meaning-making, this 
thesis provides the necessary foundation for such an investigation (compare 
6.3).  
The categories of retrieving, speculative, and separative meaning-making 
were introduced based on philosophical premises, which were then 
substantiated by empirical and anecdotal evidence, and this approach can be 
extended to art criticism. This does not imply that all ‘value’ criteria have to be 
empirically verifiable, but in the case of participation in meaning-making such 
confirmation is feasible. The main hurdle will concern resources, namely that 
empirical observations are available in only a few exceptional cases. Therefore, 
in practice, art criticism will often rely on those determining features that make a 
work likely to facilitate meaning-making. Examples of such features have been 
presented throughout this thesis, highlighting especially the relation between 
stimuli of emotional and of intellectual responses, as well as the necessity to 
make a work’s repertoire readable. 
Finally, this thesis contributes to the theory of art by providing new 
vocabulary to better describe various aspects of meaning-making. Some 
concepts from other disciplines were transferred to visual art theory, including 
                                            
8 Views similar to Dickie’s were already pronounced by Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1938 
(Wittgenstein 1967, II §35 [p.17], III §7 [p.19]); more recently they were partially re-affirmed by 
Gopnik (2012), see also: chapter one, note 19. 
  162 
Wolfgang Iser’s notions of ‘repertoire’ and of ‘negation’ as well as Jerrold 
Levinson’s distinction between ‘semantic’ and ‘categorial’ intentions. The 
concept of categorial intentions was slightly modified and termed ‘modal 
intentions’ in order to underpin that component of artistic intention that focuses 
on the viewer’s general mode of responding, which is not limited to 
categorisation. Whilst all these describe aspects of the artist’s part in shaping a 
work’s meaning, the main emphasis of this investigation was put on the viewer’s 
share. In this area, the new terminology of retrieving, speculative and separative 
meaning-making was introduced in order to distinguish between different facets 
of the viewer’s ‘contribution to the creative act’.  
6.2.2 Art Studies (Higher Education) 
An argument for integrating aspects of art’s reception into art school 
curricula was presented by the dean of Columbia University’s School of the 
Arts, Carol Becker, who argued that art students ...  
… need to be helped to understand not only the 
subject of their work but its objective, they must learn 
to ask themselves who would be their ideal viewer and 
who, most likely, will be their actual viewer. What 
might the audience need to know to understand the 
work? How much information should they offer?  
(C. Becker 1993, p.110) 
Like Howard Becker’s statement regarding artists catering to professional art 
audiences (see 1.2.1), this is a similarly delicate question as it challenges 
students to consider how much they are willing to adjust their work to suit a 
potential audience. C. Becker emphasised, however, that this is inevitable, for 
instance, if artists seek to reach audiences who have little or no previous 
knowledge of art. The growing recognition of this objective by many art schools 
is evidenced in current programmes that have compulsory elements of ‘socially 
engaged practice’ and in the existence of specialised branches of study 
dedicated to this field.9 Within such a framework it is pertinent to consider how 
people are likely to respond and many higher education programmes do pose 
                                            
9 Examples are the MA programmes in ‘Participatory & Community Arts’ at Goldsmiths College 
and Staffordshire University, ‘Social Sculpture’ at Oxford Brookes University, and ‘Socially 
Engaged Practice’ at Ireland’s National College of Art and Design, and the Art. Similar 
programmes are offered at other art schools across the UK and in many other countries.   
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such questions.10 However, the focus of this thesis has not been on practices 
seeking to reach ‘new audiences’ in particular. To avoid misunderstandings 
regarding the assumed responsibilities of the artist, it was noted that this thesis’ 
advocacy of heeding the viewer’s meaning-making must not be confused with 
the aims and debates surrounding social inclusion. Thus the question of what 
role knowledge about viewers’ meaning-making plays in the context of art 
education must be posed more broadly. 
    A pragmatic answer lies with Jeffrey T. Schnapp and Michael Shanks who 
argued in their contribution to the edited volume Art school: Propositions for the 
21st Century, that the sheer amount of different media in contemporary art asks 
for multiple modes of audience engagement:  
As we envision a program that meets the 
requirements of twenty-first-century arts practice 
education, an understanding of engagement is 
essential. The immense flow of data needs to be 
controlled by the artist and directed toward the viewer 
in such a way that the viewer enters the rich strata that 
joined in the work and are completed by the viewer. 
(Schnapp & Shanks 2009, p.149)  
Art students should therefore be encouraged to consider how specific media are 
likely to affect the viewer. The discussions of working with video and life 
performers (see 5.2 and 5.3) resonate with and exemplify this point. 
Some might object that art belongs to the few, ‘free’, spheres of human 
existence where no definable purpose or utility determines means and actions. 
In this vein, the function of the art school is to promote art as a field of 
possibilities, free exploration, and experiment unconstrained by established 
methodology. Gary Peters, professor of critical and cultural theory at York St. 
John University took this view to its extreme by advocating an “(aesthetic) 
educational approach that is intent on developing the will and the wherewithal to 
operate effectively within the arbitrary and contingent circles of 
incomprehensibility” (Peters 2010, p.111).11 To anticipate or facilitate the 
viewer’s response would be diametrically opposed to the primacy of freedom, 
                                            
10 The ‘Contextual Practice’ MFA at Carnegie Mellon University’s School of Art, for example, 
encourages students to consider: “Who is your audience, and how does that audience shape 
the meaning of your work? What impact does the work have on the life of the audience? Where 
do you site your work, and how does that site change how the work is perceived?” (Carnegie 
Mellon University 2013, para.5) 
11 See: chapter four, note 4. 
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autonomy, and intuitive experimentation. This view has been disputed 
throughout this thesis.  
Cross-disciplinary knowledge, including theories of reception, does not 
substitute lived experience, artistic intuition, and free experimentation, but adds 
to them. First, it was pointed out that artists are permeated with learned norms 
of what constitutes a ‘good’ work and thus they necessarily, though not always 
deliberately, anticipate viewer responses. Second, reservations about students 
being led to ‘engineer’ audience insights are countered by the fact that it is not 
the viewers’ understanding of a message that is advocated here, but a mode of 
responding. It has been proposed that art students should be motivated to study 
conditions under which viewers will be more likely to adopt an attitude of 
separative meaning-making. This is expedient precisely because the viewer is 
so often envisaged as a proactive maker (as opposed to a decoder) of meaning, 
and the artist as not being the warrantor of signification.  
Another way to dispute that attending to the viewer’s response opposes 
art’s autonomous spirit is to hint at the potentially tacit effect of related 
knowledge.  Few people would argue that an artist who has first learned and 
then applies the effect of complementary colours unduly ‘engineers’ a response. 
The same applies to photographic and cinematic recording, editing, and 
dramatic techniques. They are methods to appeal to and resonate with viewers’ 
perceptual systems and common response behaviour. Arguably, the use of 
knowledge in art creation is more acceptable when it remains intuitive. 
Propaganda artists, advertising professionals, and illustrators calculate and test 
the effect of their methods and this is a crucial reason to distinguish this type of 
work from ‘fine’ arts. The former promote meaning-retrieval, the latter 
speculative and separative meaning-making. Once the mutual amplification of 
red and green or the effect of the establishing shot is learned, it is internalised 
and often applied intuitively. By extension, knowledge about biologically, 
psychologically or socially determined ways of responding to certain stimuli will 
operate similarly. 
The above can only be a secondary or corollary argument however. In 
many situations, video artists consider carefully how to use an establishing shot 
and painters will also think about adding a red to amplify a green. Furthermore, 
the finished work, as a product of the artist’s tacit and/or deliberately applied 
knowledge, is usually evaluated by her/him before it is presented to the public. 
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A vast amount of works never leave the studio because they do not pass the 
artist’s own assessment, and it is questionable whether the decisions involved 
are always purely intuitive.  
In an environment where art schools promote an understanding of art as 
‘research’, theoretical frameworks are increasingly important. Philosopher 
Donald Schön described the “reflective practitioner” as involved in “reflection-in-
action” and “reflection-on-action’ (Schön 1983). This notion can be applied to 
the artist-researcher who tries to make sense of her/his own decisions, as s/he 
“reflects on the understandings which have been implicit in his action, 
understanding which he surfaces, criticises, restructures, and embodies in 
further action” (Scrivener 2000, para.19). Any change made ‘in further action’ 
will change the defaults of the work’s reception. 
There is no qualitative difference between knowledge related to the viewer’s 
meaning-making and many established standards of art school curricula. 
Students would need neither their tutors’ nor fellow students’ feedback if 
audience response was immaterial. Goldsmiths College defines the BA 
(Honours) Fine Art programme as equipping students “with creative, 
interpretive, critical and analytical skills” to enable them to “participate in and 
contribute to the expanding field of contemporary art” (Goldsmiths College, 
University of London 2013, para.1). The prospectus of the same course at 
London’s Central Saint Martins College of Arts and Design agrees that “critical 
and reflexive ‘moments’” are “at the centre of teaching and learning” and this 
includes discussions about “systems for the production of meaning” and the 
development of “a theoretical language for practice that brings it into association 
with different forms of literature and criticism” (Central Saint Martins College of 
Arts and Design 2013, p.3). Imputing that such discussions are rather typical 
than limited to these specific colleges and that they are intended to have a 
bearing not only on students’ general knowledge, their merit is to introduce 
learners to views and contexts that they may bring to their work. A key objective 
of both studio practice (including tutorials) and contextual studies thus already is 
to afford students perspectives on how their work will be received. Berkeley 
University states explicitly that its Art Practice graduate programme “seeks to 
help students develop a keen sense of their audience, and to consider how they 
will reach, or even create, that audience for their work” (The University of 
California, Berkeley 2013, para.10). 
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Tutors’ and fellow students’ feedback indicates how other people make 
meaning. Art history and philosophy seminars challenge students to situate their 
work within ‘an atmosphere of theory’ and draw conclusions regarding how their 
work is likely to be contextualised. Both aspects of art school education disclose 
how meaning will potentially be made. Seminars and/or workshops exploring 
biologically, psychologically and socially determined responses and common art 
apprehension schemata would complement existing art school curricula and 
further our understanding of audience behaviour. This thesis offers several 
examples that demonstrate the relation between artists’ strategies and the 
human response system that might serve as examples in related future 
debates, and the concepts of retrieving, speculative and separative meaning-
making provide a structure for discussing and further exploring different modes 
of viewer response. 
6.2.3 Other Educational Areas  
There is an increasing interest in the concept of meaning-making in the 
context of art education in museums (Skregelid 2010; Deeth 2012; Fróis & 
White 2013)12. Museum studies scholar Eilean Hooper-Greenhill favours a 
concept of museum pedagogy that acknowledges the “active role of the 
individual mind in making meaning”, respectively the “active meaning-making 
work that learners do to make knowledge their own” (Hooper-Greenhill 2007, 
p.42,35). Hooper-Greenhill acknowledges the role of individually shaped 
meaning and other researchers see this as belonging to the contemporary 
“categories from which to discuss educational philosophy and the work of 
museums as well as the values and beliefs that serve as their foundation” 
(Arriaga & Aguirre 2013, p.128).13 From this perspective, art education 
researchers Amaia Arriaga and Imanol Aguirre consider it especially 
enlightening when “information and thoughts are articulated with one’s own 
experience”, and provoke “mechanisms for self-reflection and self-affirmation 
                                            
12 Lisbet Skregelid points to the works of Falk & Dierking (2000), Hooper-Greenhill (2007), and 
Taylor (2008); Fróis & White draw attention to (among others): Barrett (2002), Carroll (2007), 
Duncum (2004), Émond (2010), Parsons (2002), White (2011). 
13 Arriaga & Aguirre identified four overlapping framings of the concept of art by museum 
educators; it is seen “as a visual representation and interpretation as identification”, “as 
communication and interpretation as decodification”, “as an intellectual, historical and cultural 
fact, and interpretation as an opportunity for critical reflection”, and “as experience and 
interpretation as an opportunity for self-development” (Arriaga & Aguirre 2013, p.128). 
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about who we are” (Arriaga & Aguirre 2013, p.134/135). This approach to 
meaning-making is not self-evident among educators. As Charman & Ross’ 
study of teachers’ interpretative approaches (see 1.1.2) indicates and many 
other investigations confirm, educational practice often encourages meaning-
making in retrieval mode (Tavin 2007). It is frequently seen as the key 
pedagogical agenda of art education to enable people to recognise formal, 
symbolic and historical aspects of artworks and to seize the artist’s intentions.14 
This thesis does not dispute the importance of these issues for art education, 
but it does submit that to fully account for contemporary art they are incomplete 
and offers the concept of separative meaning-making as a supplemental model. 
This theoretical model resonates with the conclusion of museum education 
researcher Eva Van Moer that the “challenge for museums is to find ways to 
formulate exhibitions that start from genuine experiences and lead to inquiry” 
and for educators to “develop tools which allow visitors to position themselves 
and make them think from various positions” (Van Moer 2010, p.143/144; also 
Hein 1999; Deeth 2012). Future art viewers that ‘come prepared’ to make 
meaning are going to be welcomed by artists and curators.  
 
Besides preferences for retrieval-oriented interpretation, another problem in 
pedagogical discussions of meaning-making is the focus on ‘aesthetics’. 
Educational psychologist João P. Fróis and art education scholar Boyd White 
for example, defined part of one of their studies’ rationale as “to provide a better 
understanding of how meaning making is achieved in relation to aesthetic 
experiences” (Fróis & White 2013, p.110). Whereas in many studies (including 
that of Fróis and White) notions of the ‘aesthetic’ and ‘meaning-making’ largely 
converge, Michael Parsons posited two closely related though ultimately distinct 
categories (Parsons 2002). Parsons defined aesthetic experience as being 
distinguished by a direct “grasp of aesthetic qualities of the object” rather than 
making discursive connections that can be verbalised and that refer to the 
concept of meaning (Parsons 2002, p.26).15 Parsons further elaborated that 
                                            
14 For a review see: Tavin (2007). 
15 Parsons elaborated that “we might speak in terms of aesthetic qualities and of aesthetic 
experience” if we envision the “satisfying moment of response to the work in which the qualities 
are directly seen. If on the other hand we have in mind the mental activities involved in 
constructing a coherent response to a work, that is, the kinds of connections a viewer might 
make and the discursive processes involved, we might speak of constructing its meanings” 
(Parsons 2002, p.32/33). 
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encounters with art usually entail both components, because “knowledge about 
images would be dead information and the direct grasp of qualities would be 
superficial”; a view that supports the theory developed in this thesis (Parsons 
2002, p.33). However, Parsons maintained the contentious and unnecessary 
notion of ‘aesthetics’ (see 1.3.3), even though ...  
... there is no doubt that in contemporary terms 
aesthetic experience is cognitive, not only because it 
is the result of active attention and investigation but 
also because the direct grasp of the qualities of 
objects is itself an act of cognition.  
(Parsons 2002, p.26) 
Despite Parsons’ having ‘no doubt’ about the cognitive nature of the 
‘aesthetic experience’, many scholars would disagree with his judgement.16 
Instead of embarking on a debate about ‘aesthetic experience’ it is possible to 
dispense with the notion of the ‘aesthetic’ and refer to meaning-making instead 
when discussing intellectual modes of art apprehension. The notion of ‘meaning 
to’ accommodates affective/emotional aspects of art apprehension and ‘direct 
grasping’ by maintaining that meaning-making begins, prior to reflection, with 
sensing a ‘promise of meaning’. What is not accommodated are connotations of 
beauty, formal coherence, and transcendental notions, amongst others, that 
linger in the concept of the ‘aesthetic experience’. Some definitions of the 
aesthetic experience overlap with the concept of meaning-making; however, 
they unnecessarily complicate and potentially divert the debate. Meaning is in 
itself a difficult term – one that may be “at least as complex and contested as 
the notion of the ‘aesthetic’” (Parsons 2002, p.30). This thesis has made the 
concept of meaning and meaning-making more manageable by proffering new 
definitions that make it possible to address questions of art apprehension 
without referring to ‘aesthetics’. 
                                            
16 An example would be Funch’s existential phenomenological theory of the aesthetic 
experience (see 3.4). 
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6.3 Limitations of the Study and Implications for Future 
Research 
Although the central aims of the research were achieved, there were 
several limitations that are presented here as recommendations for future 
research. Because of its interdisciplinary nature, the main challenge throughout 
this project was the number of potential research avenues it could take and the 
extent of pertinent discipline specific literature available. Some avenues could 
not be fully explored, or addressed at all, within the scope of this thesis. One 
promising area that merits further consideration is Pragmatist art theory; it is 
assumed that a more in depth look at the concepts and ideas of Richard 
Shusterman and Mark Johnson would be beneficial. The theoretical model 
proposed in this thesis could potentially be further developed if contextualised 
within Gestalt theory, hermeneutics and reader-response criticism. Also, some 
recently published literature concerning the mutual interest of philosophical and 
psychological theories of art apprehension could not be explored.17   
A conceptual problem that emerged during the research and could not be 
satisfactorily addressed concerns the trajectory from affective/emotional 
responses to the more intellectual processes of separative meaning-making. A 
difficulty here is that when an affect/emotion-dominated response passes over 
into a more intellectual one, there is always a possibility that viewers will fall 
back on meaning-retrieval. As stated above, the examples discussed in this 
thesis suggest that attitudes of separative meaning-making are likely to be 
enhanced by reflection-evoking stimuli that are closely linked to 
affective/emotional experiences. This raises both methodological and 
ideological questions regarding the limits of guiding response that this research 
brings to light, but does not address. Thus, future researchers may build on the 
work presented here by addressing questions raised by this thesis.  
Another concept that warrants further consideration is that of ‘repertoire’. It 
was argued that a significant share of the meaning of contemporary artworks is 
constructed by the viewer; the concept of repertoire was introduced in order to 
draw attention to the share of the artist. This may be challenged on definitional 
                                            
17 For example: Schellekens & Goldie (2011), Shimamura & Palmer (2012), Konečni (2012), 
Roald & Lang (2013), Bullot & Reber (2013); also: Catalano (2009), Malm et al. (2013). 
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grounds: where does the repertoire begin and end, what is essential to it, and 
what is already contingent ‘artist opinion’? Answers to these questions will have 
to be negotiated for each individual work of art, and we cannot anticipate 
agreement about any work’s repertoire. To expand on the repertoire concept 
through further debate and perhaps case studies is thus another avenue that 
future researchers may want to explore. 
Wolfgang Iser argued that before examining responses of real readers, one 
“must examine the response-inviting structures of the text”, so that one can then 
“see how much the actual reader has selected from the potential inherent in the 
text” (Iser 1989, p.50). Although it is debatable whether audience investigations 
must be guided by response-inviting structures, their revelation can constitute a 
prolific base for such studies. It could be said that this thesis re-frames Iser’s 
statement and applies it to visual art. ‘Response-inviting structures’, as well as 
different modes of meaning-making have been explored and defined, however, 
to determine how and what kinds of meaning viewers actually construct would 
require further empirical research. Thus, new avenues of research have been 
opened where future researchers can build on questions realised by this 
investigation.18 A related task for further evaluation concerns artists’ views on 
meaning and meaning-making. The correspondence between the theoretical 
objective to engage viewers in meaning-making (as defined in this thesis) and 
the actual modal intentions of artists drew mainly on anecdotal evidence. A 
survey or study of artists’ perspectives on meaning-making and the role of the 
viewer would further current understanding of the artist-audience relationship.  
This thesis has focussed on verbalisation as a tangible and important 
process for the production of meaning. However, it was also suggested that 
verbalisation is not mandatory, and when it occurs, it hardly does so 
independent from emotions and/or imagination.  This idea is supported by the 
view that inspired imagination already constitutes meaning. Psychologist and art 
theorist Rudolf Arnheim famously stressed this point. Arnheim argued that 
productive thinking necessarily happens “in the realm of imagery” because the 
mind works predominantly with images; organising “a total lifetime’s experience 
into a system of visual concepts” (Arnheim 1969, pp.v,232). Arnheim’s 
                                            
18 Such an investigation should be possible following psychologist Rolf Reber’s assessment that 
once art theory has set “the criteria of what the experience should be ... psychologists [can] 
examine whether the predicted experience matches the observed experience of the recipient” 
(Reber 2008, p.367). See also: Konečni (2012). 
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conclusion was that art works best when “it remains unacknowledged”, that is, 
when it brings to mind “those deeper and simpler powers in which man 
recognizes himself” (Arnheim 1969, p.315). For Arnheim, such inspired 
imagination is more the domain of the artist than that of the viewer, and he was 
ultimately concerned with ‘revealing truth’ rather than ‘creative making’.19 In 
contrast, Iser held that ‘meaning’ is always produced by “the imagination of the 
reader” but this is more applicable to literature since literary fiction is prone to 
conjure up images in the mind of the reader whilst visual art provides them from 
the start (Iser 1994 [1976], p.9).  
Alongside verbalisation, thinking in images is possibly another domain 
where ‘adequate yielding’ (Dewey) can produce conceptual change. If ‘concept’ 
is understood as defined in the introduction, which is a ‘regularity in events or 
objects, designated by a label’, these regularities may well be something we 
‘see in front of our inner eye’ and that can be subject to modification. This at 
least is implied by Arnheim’s definition of “visual thinking” as consisting “above 
all in the development of forms, of ‘perceptual terms’, and thereby fulfills the 
conditions of the intellectual formation of concepts” (Arnheim & Grundmann 
2001, para.37). To explore meaning-making on the basis of imagination, and 
the possible interplay between verbal and visual meaning-making, would be a 
far-reaching extension of this thesis. 
Another issue that could only be touched upon here is the temporal aspect 
of meaning-making. After the immediate response, the way art continues to 
affect viewers is largely unexplored, partly due to the methodological difficulties 
that such an investigation would involve. When is it that people make meaning? 
Is it within seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks or even longer after the 
encounter with an artwork? What are the identifiable variables within the work, 
its presentation context, or the viewer that accelerate or postpone meaning-
making? How does spontaneous meaning-making differ from meaning-making 
that occurs from a greater temporal distance? Questions like these are difficult 
to approach, but answers would yield interesting insights into the nature of 
meaning-making and the long-term effect art can have on viewers. Thus a 
better understanding of meaning-making will inform future studies of how we 
construct meaning at all levels, be it individually or collectively. 
                                            
19  “Art reveals to us the essence of things, the essence of our existence; that is its function” 
(Arnheim in Arnheim & Grundmann 2001, para.30). 
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Having established the concept of (separative) meaning-making, it is 
possible to further explore the conditions required to facilitate it. This research 
has stressed the interruption of common, retrieval-oriented art assessment 
schemata by an ‘affective ambush’. This approach assumes a ‘rupture’ and an 
experience of dissonance; however it has been suggested that consonant 
experiences with art can also make viewers “more aware of their personal 
psychological functioning” (Émond 2006b, p.8).20 Future investigations might 
explore whether and how affirmative experiences can also foster separative 
meaning-making. 
Another valuable area of investigation involves how the division of meaning-
making into the three distinct modes of retrieving, speculative and separative 
meaning-making can be exploited in education. In chapter 6.2, the utility of the 
meaning-making concept was located especially within the area of art theory 
and criticism, but it is conceivable that it can also be useful for developing 
pedagogical strategies. With regard to the debate in this thesis, Anne-Marie 
Émond suggested creating a ‘laboratory’ to explore a possible dialogue 
between artists and museum professionals (Émond 2013, personal 
communication). Such a laboratory could help realise new ways to encourage 
(separative) meaning-making in the museum.  
Finally, the ‘types’ or ‘genres’ of art that this thesis focused on revolve 
around artworks in the context of galleries and museums. It would be 
worthwhile exploring how people make meaning beyond institutional contexts, 
such as when encountering artistic interventions that are not necessarily 
recognised or labelled ‘as art’. “[T]o see something as art according to the 
dominant ... paradigm of the contemporary artworld”, curator and art theorist 
Stephen Wright argued, “is to acknowledge something terribly debilitating: that it 
is ‘just’ art – not the dangerous, litigious, real thing” (Wright 2008, p.8). This is 
an important point with regard to art that addresses social, environmental, 
and/or cultural issues. It is almost exclusively in contexts where art can be 
expected to be categorised ‘as art’ that it makes sense to refer to meaning-
making as retrieval, speculation and separation. If, as Wright argued, a growing 
number of artists have become disillusioned with the “invisible parentheses 
around art” and instead turn to intervention practices that enforce the “efficacy 
of disconnection” (separation), “breaking with artworldly consensus”, it would be 
                                            
20 See: chapter four, note 20. 
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interesting to investigate how meaning-making can be conceptionalised in this 
area (Wright 2008, pp.8,5). The question then becomes: How do we make 
meaning if we encounter strange phenomena such as heaps of pink bin bags in 
front of every house in a street, or church pews rotated faceing a corner of the 
building?21 
6.4 Concluding Thoughts 
When I built my snowman installation in Berlin, my own semantic intentions 
revolved around serious issues of climate change on the one hand, and humour 
(a ‘solar powered snowman’) on the other. Some viewers related to these 
issues, some did not. It was interesting to observe that viewers had 
associations similar to my own but it was also interesting that they came up with 
completely different ideas. The exhibition context was not conducive to 
metaphorical interpretations. The fact that one newspaper labelled my work an 
‘energy project’22 stands as testimony to the influence of the work’s exhibition 
context, which would have been very different in an art gallery.  
The repertoire in this case concerned the recognition of the freezer’s power 
source and the temporal aspect of the work; the snowman’s one-year survival 
was dependent on power supplied by the very thing that would have destroyed 
it in natural circumstances. An explanation tag ensured that this was 
understood; the solar panels and all other technical equipment were openly 
exposed. The modal intention was to stop people in their daily routines and 
make them wonder, and this was easily achieved by the snowman’s ‘cuteness’ 
as an emotional factor (which many viewers commented on) and that the 
installation stood in marked contrast to its surroundings. What also helped was 
the overall nature of the piece as an assemblage of seemingly disparate and 
misplaced objects in the lobby of a science university. I believe this work 
embodies many of the meaning-making factors explored in this thesis, and 
successfully couples both emotional and intellectual stimuli.  
                                            
21 See: Adrian Kondratowicz’s project Trash Maximalism (since 2008), for which residents in 
various New York neighbourhoods have been encouraged to exchange their typical black 
refuse bags for a pink, lightly scented and biodegradable candy-wrapper-like version (see the 
project website: www.trashproject.biz). The unprepared visitor of the Marktkirche (‘market 
church’) in Hannover, Germany, in June 2007 found the pews rotated by 51 degrees causing 
the congregation to look towards Mecca (‘51°’, an installation by Lotte Lindner and Till 
Steinbrenner, see: www.lindner-steinbrenner.com/51.html) 
22 BZ, March 29/30, 2003 
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Looking back at the work that inspired this thesis, I am pleased that the 
exploration has given me a language to account for various factors that 
facilitated the way people responded to the snowman. More importantly, the 
concepts developed here allow me to assess my own and other artworks in 
general because they demonstrate how certain conditions that facilitate viewers’ 
meaning-making can indeed be influenced by the artist. Therefore those artists 
who do aim for viewers’ meaning-making can build upon the concepts and 
factors put forward by this research to advance their own practice. From a 
research perspective, this study has contributed to a better understanding of 
meaning-making as an artistic objective and as an element of art’s reception, 
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